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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGY:  RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION THROUGH 
SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN- 
BRAZIL AND HAITI 
by 
Karen Clay 
Florida International University, 2017 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Eduardo Gamarra, Major Professor 
The dissertation examined the South-South cooperation as an alternative 
development strategy for Southern countries by targeting the collaboration between 
Brazil and Haiti, to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.  Examining 
development cooperation between Brazil and Haiti could contribute to a better 
understanding of the central question, why Southern countries engage in South-South 
cooperation? 
In the context of the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing reduction of aid 
coming from Global North countries to developing countries, South-South cooperation 
has become an alternative economic and political arrangement from the more traditional 
North-South framework. For this reason, South-South cooperation between emerging 
donors and recipients was deemed an important development for the international aid 
architecture as a whole.   
v 
 
A combination of semi-structured interviews and survey questionnaires were 
conducted to capture the professional, diplomatic and political perspectives of high-
ranking officials, leaders and experts on South-South cooperation and Latin American 
and Caribbean relations.  The study’s findings revealed that the benefits and challenges 
of the South-South cooperation framework does not affect development in a conclusive 
way. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVIEW OF THE STUDY 
INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation, emerging donor engagement in South-South cooperation was 
examined by targeting the collaboration between Brazil and Haiti.  In the context of the 
2008 financial crisis and the ensuing reduction of aid coming from Global North1 
countries to developing countries, South-South cooperation has become an alternative 
economic and political arrangement from the more traditional North-South framework.2 
Evidence for this alternative includes the growing presence of emerging donor countries 
                                                           
1 The “Global North” pertains to a cluster of developed countries that include the United States, Japan, and 
European nations based on their socio-economic and political similarities See Önis, Ziya (2016). 
“Democracy in Uncertain Times:  Inequality and Democratic Development in the Global North and Global 
South.” METU Studies in Development, 43(1):  317-336. 
 
2 See Burges, Sean W. (2007).  “Building a Global Southern Coalition:  The Competing Approaches of 
Brazil’s Lula and Venezuela’s  Chavez.”  Third World Quarterly, 28(7):  1343-1358.; de Renzio, Paolo and 
Seifert, Jurek (2014).  “South-South Cooperation and the Future of Development Assistance:  Mapping 
Actors and Options.” Third World Quarterly, 35(10):  1860-1875; Ugwuja, Alex A., Ubaku, Kelechi C. 
Obiakor, Nwachukwu J. and Ibekilo, Bruno (2014).  “South-South Cooperation and the Prospects of a New 
International Economic Order: An Insight into the India Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum.”  
International Journal of Humanities Social Sciences and Education (IJHSSE), 1(8):  171-182; Quadir, 
Fahimul (2013).  “Rising Donors and the New Narrative of ‘South–South’ Cooperation: What Prospects for 
Changing the Landscape of Development Assistance Programmes?”  Third World Quarterly, 34(2):  321-
338; Stuenkel, Oliver. (May 2013). “Institutionalizing South–South Cooperation: Towards a New 
Paradigm? Background Research Paper Submitted to the High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda.”   Accessed November 26, 2014.  http://www.post2015hlp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/Stuenkel_Institutionalizing-South-South-Cooperation-Towards-a-New-
Paradigm.pdf; Gore, Charles (2013). “The New Development Cooperation Landscape:  Actors, 
Approaches, Architecture.”  Journal of International Development, 25(6):  769-786. 
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such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia3, China, India, and South Africa) within the global aid 
architecture, providing assistance to other developing countries.4 
As an alternative strategy for the development of countries of the Global South5, 
the impact of South-South cooperation has largely been defined as too small to entirely 
replace Northern assistance; at best, it may only complement North-South cooperation.6  
This overall understanding is based on a gap in the available data on development 
cooperation activities between Southern countries including the amount, quality, and 
types of development assistance exchanged among them.7  Southern actors do not follow 
traditional reporting, evaluation, and assessment mechanisms; consequently, very little is 
known about development results from South-South cooperation.8  
To address this gap in knowledge about South-South assistance in the context of 
dwindling aid from the Global North9 and activism among developing countries in the 
                                                           
3 For the purpose of the dissertation Russia as a country of the North will not be defined as an emerging 
donor country.  
 
4 IBON International (2014). Ibon Primer on South-South Cooperation. IBON International. Quezon City, 
Philippines:  IBON International.  Accessed November 16, 2015.  
http://iboninternational.org/resources/14/05/13/ibon-primer-south-south-cooperation; Woods, Ngaire 
(2008). “Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in 
Development Assistance.”  International Affairs, 84(6): 1205-1221. 
 
5  The “Global South” pertains to a cluster of developing countries that include nations in Africa, Latin 
America, and parts of Asia based on their socio-economic and political similarities (Önis, 2016). 
 
6 Stuenkel (2013). 
 
7 Gray, Kevin and Gills, Barry K. (2016).  “South–South Cooperation and the Rise of the Global South.”  
Third World Quarterly, 37(4):  557-574. 
  
8 Quadir, (2013). 
 
9 Abdenur, Adriana Erthal and Marques Da Fonseca, João Moura Estevão (2013).  “The North’s Growing 
Role in South–South Cooperation: Keeping the Foothold.”  Third World Quarterly, 34(8):  1475-1491. 
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area of development cooperation, this dissertation aimed to examine the overall 
cooperation framework between Southern countries through the central question of why 
Southern countries engage in South-South cooperation.  To answer the question, I 
explored South-South cooperation as an alternative development strategy in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC).  The specific goal of this research was to analyze the 
impact including the benefits, challenges, and strategic rationale of a South-South 
cooperation framework (SSC framework) comprised of agreements, statements, rhetoric 
and actions of two countries.  I took the case study approach through the application of 
the SSC framework to two select countries in the LAC region: Brazil and Haiti. 
Yiping Zhou, Director of the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation in United 
Nations Development UNDP speaking to the OECD meeting of National Focal Points for 
Policy Coherence for Development argues for the need to define the aspects of South-
South relations, including South‐South trade, South‐South investment, South‐South 
technology transfers, and South‐South development cooperation in order to understand 
South-South cooperation.10  However, Partners in Population and Development—an 
inter-governmental organization for promoting South-South cooperation—has chosen to 
approach South-South cooperation as an “international development strategy.”11  This 
dissertation placed importance on examining South-South cooperation as an international 
                                                           
10 Zhou, Yiping (October 2010).  The Future of South-South Development Assistance and the Role of the 
UN.  Speech presented to the OECD Meeting of National Focal Points for Policy Coherence for 
Development, Paris, France.  Accessed June 11, 2014.  
http://www.oecd.org/development/pcd/46188961.pdf. 
 
11 Partners in Population Development. (n.d.). Chapter 1.  South-South cooperation:  A Pathway for 
Development.  Accessed on November 20, 2014.  http://www.partners-popdev.org/publication/ppd-
handbook/, 3. 
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development strategy between two Southern countries rooted in a particular social-
political context.  Viewing South-South cooperation as a “strategy” removes the need to 
identify or define any particular aspect of South-South relations and allows an 
examination of collaboration between countries on a case-by-case basis.  For countries of 
the South, South-South cooperation offers an additional tool or strategy to enhance their 
economic or political interests.  The lack of substantial, reliable data on what is 
happening in the Global South between development partners in general and between 
middle-income countries (MIC) and low-income countries (LIC) in particular, obscures 
an empirical understanding of the rationale for Southern actors’ involvement in 
development cooperation with other less developed countries. 
 
COMPLEXITY OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION 
The complexity of South-South cooperation is rooted in the North and South’s 
contrasting approaches to South-South cooperation.  Southern actors pursue South-South 
cooperation in a manner that is fundamentally different from traditional Northern actors.  
From the perspective of the Global South, South-South cooperation is a tool to augment 
their development agendas.  The principles of South-South cooperation—horizontality 
and equality, mutual benefit, non-intervention in domestic affairs, ownership, solidarity, 
and sovereignty—largely emanate from the historical and lived experiences of countries 
from the Global South.  Specifically, developing countries have pursued South-South 
cooperation as a mechanism to redress the unequal power relations found in the 
international system among states following shared colonial experiences and struggles 
with countries of the North.  Global South countries take a broad-based approach to 
5 
 
cooperation that goes beyond strict bilateral exchanges between governments to 
encompass civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector and 
tri-lateral forms of cooperation.  Trilateral cooperation includes two or more Southern 
countries and a Northern country or institution with Northern financing for developing 
countries activities and programs.  Southern actors are not limited to only the public 
sector; they may include private sources of funding through public-private partnerships.  
South-South cooperation as a model of development cooperation has options, policies, 
and trajectories more expansive than the North. 
Unlike the South’s expansive basis for South-South cooperation, the North’s key 
measure for “official development assistance” or ODA is that which follows the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD–DAC) aid based targets, assessment, and performance measures.  
The OECD–DAC’s definition includes aid flows to officially sanctioned entities (states, 
territories, executive agencies) on the DAC list of ODA Recipients and to multilateral 
institutions.12  The aid flows must be concessional and carry a grant element of at least 
25%.13  
In practice, South-South cooperation falls outside DAC-ODA prescription and is 
not included.  Specifically, DAC-ODA excludes development assistance involving 
private sector financing, which includes loans and grants that are for strictly commercial 
                                                           
12 From the OECD webpage on Official development assistance – definition and coverage. Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development.  (n.d.).  Official development assistance – definition and 
coverage.  OECD.org.  Accessed July 21, 2014.  
http://www.oecd.org/investment/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm. 
 
13 From the OECD Factsheet pdf “Is It ODA?” November 2008.  Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development.( November 2008).  Factsheet:  Is it ODA?.  OECD.org.  Accessed July 21, 2014.  
http://www.oecd.org/investment/stats/34086975.pdf. 
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purposes, export financing, and foreign direct investment.  Further multilateral 
institutions who are engaged in South-South cooperation from the perspective of the 
South may not be included on the List of ODA-eligible international organizations.  As a 
result, critical amounts of development assistance flows by major non-DAC countries of 
the South such as Brazil, China, India, and South Africa are not included in OECD-DAC 
official ODA. The lack of comprehensive data on all the forms of development assistance 
on the Global South misses the multifaceted nature of South-South cooperation under the 
South’s rubric and implies that the North and South’s perception of what constitutes 
development differ.  Much of the North’s approach dismisses development underway in 
the South, which too contributes to the complexity in defining South-South cooperation.  
Therefore, the DAC’s ODA prescription and the non-DAC countries broad-based, non-
prescriptive development serve as the basis to the contrasting approaches to South-South 
cooperation. 
In a narrow sense, South-South cooperation is simply a form of “assistance” 
whether pertaining to trade, investment, technology transfers, or development (social, 
political, educational, etc.) as long as the partners involved are from the South.  The 
differences between governments and institutions of the North and South’s development 
policies coupled with the evolving, often ad hoc14 “cooperative” non-policy driven 
activities between and among the Global South points to further inherent complications 
surrounding defining South-South cooperation.15  More importantly, there is the apparent 
resistance of Southern donors (Brazil, China, India) to follow official definitions and 
                                                           
14 Quadir (2013). 328. 
 
15 Bilal (2012). 20-21. 
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prescription outlined by the North.  Defining, evaluating, and assessing South-South 
cooperation is complex due to the contrasting approaches to development cooperation by 
the North and South, as well as the diversity of actors and development models within the 
Global South. 
This study targeted South-South cooperation between Brazil and Haiti, two states 
that are considered to be part of the Global South.16  These states were selected for their 
potential to examine South-South cooperation in the area of development in a single 
region of the Global South, with Brazil as the development provider and Haiti the 
recipient country.  Brazil and Haiti represent the most antithetical states and least similar 
development positions in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).  Examining 
development cooperation between them could contribute to a better understanding of 
what works for meeting the challenges of development in other Middle Income Country-
Least Income Country (MIC-LIC) contexts.  Further, these two case countries provide an 
example of the greatest potential to examine the greatest degree of mutually beneficial 
cooperation between the most extreme development conditions. 
Brazil is a MIC with aspirations of regional and global leadership.  Brazil stands 
out amongst the BRICS economies as a provider of development assistance to other 
developing countries.17  Brazil has a number of comparative advantages to draw on 
including its dual status as recipient and provider, technical and scientific expertise, and 
successful social and economic development policies and experiences including poverty 
                                                           
16 Önis (2016). 
   
17  Hanson, Gordon H. (2012).  “The Rise of Middle Kingdoms: Emerging Economies in Global Trade.”  
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(2):  41-63; Quadir, 2013. 
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reduction.18  Historically, Brazil has led technical cooperation in the areas of health, 
agriculture and professional qualification which it perceives as a tool to strengthen its 
bilateral relations with other countries.19  The concept of development is embedded in its 
domestic and foreign policies, which provides a level of credibility as it seeks to 
influence the international aid architecture as a leader and champion of developing 
countries.  Currently, Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOPs) are the main 
recipients of Brazilian development assistance.20  According to the Brazilian Ministry of 
External Relations document “South-South Cooperation Activities Carried out by 
Brazil,” 20 African countries receive South-South cooperation and of those cited, eight 
are LICs.21  Santiso (2013) found that overall Brazilian aid for international cooperation 
could potentially be “15 times” the Brazilian Cooperation Agency” [ABC] 30 million 
budget.22 This suggests that the Brazilian government’s commitment to international 
cooperation includes other ministries and their institutes outside the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ Brazilian Cooperation Agency.  According to Costa Vaz and Inoue, the 
Ministries of Education, Science and Technology, and Health and Agriculture have also 
                                                           
18 Inoue, Cristina Yumie Aoki and Costa Vaz, Alcides (2012).  “Brazil as ‘Southern donor’: Beyond 
Hierarchy and National Interests in Development Cooperation?.” Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, 25(4):  507-534. 
 
19 Ibid.; Vieira, Marco Antonio and Alden, Chris (2011). “India, Brazil, and South Africa (ISBA): South-
South Cooperation and the Paradox of Regional Leadership.” Global Governance, 17:  507-528. 
 
20 Inoue and Costa Vaz (2012). 
   
21 Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (July 2007). “South-South Cooperation Activities Carried Out 
by Brazil.”  Under – Secretariat General for Cooperation and Trade Promotion.  Accessed October 12, 
2016.  http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/421-South-
South_Cooperation_Activities_Carried_Out_By_Brazil.pdf 
 
22 Santiso, Javier (2013). The Decade of the Multilatinas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 232 
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engaged in international cooperation.23  Furthermore, Brazil did not sign on to a OECD 
declaration on aid effectiveness until the 2011 Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development Fourth High level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South 
Korea.24 Therefore, it can be expected that Brazil’s view of aid effectiveness (and 
accountability) will differ from traditional OECD-DAC countries.25  
Brazilian engagement in development cooperation with Haiti a LICs was strategic 
when considering other states in LAC which are considered lower middle and middle 
income countries, and which are a lower priority in terms of receiving development 
assistance from Brazil.26  Table 1 illustrates how priority was given to Haiti over other 
LIC in the area of structural projects from the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations 
between 2000 and 2014. 
 
Table 1 
Structural Projects of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (LAAC) and Africa 2000-2014 
   
Region/Country   Area    Investment in $US 
LAAC Countries 
Jamaica    Education   3,717,700,00 
Paraguay    Education   1,204,389.39 
                                                           
23 Costa Vaz, Alcides and Inoue, Cristina Yumie Aoki (2007).  “Emerging Donors in International 
Development Assistance: The Brazil Case,”  Ottawa: International Development Research Centre 
Partnership and Business Development Division. 
 
24 de Renzio and Seifert (2014). 
 
25 Quadir (2013). 
 
26 Nieto, W. Alejandro Sánchez (2012). Brazil's Grand Design for Combining Global South Solidarity and 
National Interests: A Discussion of Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti and Timor. Globalizations, 9(1), 161-
178.  
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Bolivia    Professional Formation 3,758,136.00 
Colombia    Professional Formation 1,334,233.00 
Guatemala    Professional Formation 2,760,764.17 
Haiti    Professional Formation 11,178,977.00 
Haiti    Health    10,725,116.00 
Haiti    Agriculture   6,084,140.00 
Total         37,045,755.56 
African Countries 
Ghana    Health    4,500,000.00 
Guinea-Bissau   Education   2,970,681.60 
Mozambique   Health    754.530.00 
Mozambique   Education   3,636,092.00 
Mozambique   Urban Development  1,236,006.00  
Mozambique   Education   488,797.00  
Mozambique   Social Security  615,475.00 
São Tomé and Príncipe  Education   4,073,428.00 
São Tomé and Príncipe  Social Development  1,250,393.83 
Senegal    Agriculture   1,889,378.00 
Total         20,660,251.43 
Source: Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (2012).  Webpage.  “Projectos Estruturantes.” 
 
At USD$27,988,233, Haiti received over 75% of Brazil’s investment in structural 
projects in LAAC and more than the entire African region at USD$20,660,251.43 
between 2000 and 2014. Brazil’s active interest in the interplay between security and 
development interventions characterizes the Brazil-Haiti framework of engagement.  In 
2004, Brazil joined Argentina, Canada, Chile, France, and the U.S. in forming the “Haiti 
core group,” which intervened following the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide.  Brazil extended its efforts in the same year with the management of the UN 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) peacekeeping mission.27  Starting in 2004, 
Brazil became the leader of MINUSTAH and played an important role in helping Haiti 
after the 2010 earthquake.28  In addition to its security interventions, Brazil had 31 
                                                           
27 Vieira and Alden (2011). 
   
28 Ibid.  
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bilateral projects in agriculture, health and education predating the 2010 earthquake.29  
Brazil’s presence in Haiti connected the role of security and development as a precursor 
to the country’s state-building and development efforts.  In the past 10 years, Haiti has 
been one of Brazil’s two largest recipients of humanitarian assistance; Somalia (USD$27 
million) and Haiti (USD$24 million).30    
President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva (Lula) declared Haiti one of eight priority 
recipients of bilateral horizontal cooperation by The Brazilian Cooperation Agency 
(ABC), responsible for international technical cooperation.31  This follows from Brazil’s 
focus on Southern relations and development cooperation, with other developing 
countries as a cornerstone of its foreign policy.  Nieto offered five reasons for Brazilian 
involvement in peacekeeping operations that by extension Haiti as a recipient partner for 
development cooperation.  The reasons include: (a) the International Good Samaritan 
Syndrome, where Brazil’s sense of duty motivates their participation; (b) National 
Interests-Driven Strategic Actor, representing an opportunity for Brazil solidify its 
chances to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and strategy to increase its 
international standing; (c) monetary compensation from the UN, which provides the least 
compelling reason as the compensation provided for troop deployment does not cover the 
total costs to keep forces in Haiti; (d) live-combat training, which offers Brazilian combat 
                                                           
29 Nieto, W. Alejandro Sánchez (2012).  “Brazil's Grand Design for Combining Global South Solidarity 
and National Interests: A Discussion of Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti and Timor.”  Globalizations, 
9(1):  173. 
  
30 Global Humanitarian Assistance (2015). Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2015. Bristol: Global 
Humanitarian Assistance.  Accessed December 16, 2016. http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/GHA-Report-2015_-Interactive_Online.pdf 
 
31 Inoue and Costa (2012). 
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troops with the opportunity train for real-life combat operations that it would otherwise 
have limited experience; and (e) national pride, which can be derived from successes 
gained around MINUSTAH operations, particularly its efforts in Cite´ Soleil.32  
Haiti is the only LIC and Least Developed Country (LDC) in the Western 
Hemisphere33 and located in one of Brazil’s priority regions.  Historically, Haiti has faced 
severe external impediments to full inclusion (diplomatic and economic) into what is 
considered the Westphalian international system of nation-states.  Also, there was the 
paradox of a formally enslaved colony seeking trade and commerce with slave-holding 
states resistant to a Black republic and the Haitian president Pétion suggesting the 
payment of an indemnity to France in 1814.  Haiti's relations with the Global North has 
since its inception contributed to its precarious domestic situation including arrested 
development, political correction, and military intervention by those same countries.34 
Historically, Haiti’s international context and affairs have contributed to its ongoing 
development dilemma and subsequent efforts.35  Today, the Caribbean island has 
approximately 10,485,800 inhabitants36 and is ranked number 10 on Foreign Policy 
                                                           
32 Nieto (2012) 166-69. 
  
33 World Bank (2017).  “Haiti Overview.”  (webpage).  Accessed February 27, 2017.  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview#1. 
34 O'Connor, Daniel, Brisson-Boivin, Kara and Ilcan, Suzan (2014).  “Governing Failure: Development, 
Aid and Audit in Haiti.”  Conflict, Security & Development, 14(3): 309-330; Ramachandran, Vijaya and  
Walz, Julie (2015).  “Haiti: Where Has all the Money Gone?.” Journal of Haitian Studies, 21(1):  26-65. 
 
35 O’Connor et al. (2014). 
  
36 Central Intelligence Agency (2016).  Haiti.  In The World Factbook.  Accessed February 15, 2017.  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html. 
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Magazine failed states ranking for 2015,37 despite a combined USD$17.3 billion aid 
pledged for humanitarian and debt relief, recovery efforts and private charitable 
contributions and 6.4 billion disbursed between 2010 and 2013 following the 2010 
earthquake.38  Haiti remains one of 31 LICs in the world, despite the number of bilateral 
and multilateral efforts to improve its development position.   
Napoleão and Kalil (2015) cited Waisbich and Pomeroy’s reference to Haiti as 
Brazil’s “laboratory of multi-sector engagement” to achieve greater influence as well as 
an “end in itself.”39  Haiti represented a test case by which Brazil could justifiably extend 
its influence on an international stage.  Each of Nieto’s reasons for Brazil’s engagement 
in peacekeeping could be applied to Haiti.   
Due to the complexity of South-South cooperation and its shifting development 
trajectories and relationships engender different types of analysis, one that occurs with 
the inclusion and governing auspices of the North, another between the emerging powers 
and that which occurs between emerging powers or MICs and LICs.  In the current study, 
I selected the latter as its focus.  The ideas and possibilities inherent in development 
cooperation between MICs and LICs suggest that the Global South has development 
potential heretofore not available for countries of the South.  For LICs, the burgeoning 
number of actors engaging in what the South considers development and development 
                                                           
37 Foreign Policy Magazine (2016).  “Fragile State Index.”  (webpage).  Accessed December 27, 2016. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states-index-2016-brexit-syria-refugee-europe-anti-migrant-boko-haram/. 
 
38 Civic Impulse (2016). S. 1104 — 113th Congress: Assessing Progress in Haiti Act of 2014. Accessed 
December 15, 2016. https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1104. 
 
39 Napoleão, Thomaz and Kalil, Mariana (2015).  “Stabilization as the Security of Peacebuilding? The 
Experience of Brazil and MINUSTAH in Haiti.” Brasiliana Journal for Brazilian Studies, 3(2).  Accessed 
on December 27, 2017.  http://ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/bras/article/view/19998/18191. 
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related projects and activities are positioned to gain or lose the most in terms of the 
quality and quantity of transactions for their engagement with MICs. 
 
KEY MILESTONES AND EVENTS IN SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION 
For countries of the Global South, South-South cooperation follows two main 
lines of thinking, the need for political cooperation and the need for economic and 
technological cooperation.40  According to Ugwuja et al., the reason for South-South 
cooperation is the “seemingly intractable asymmetry” between the North and the South.41  
The context that surrounds the central question follows from the Global South’s response 
to the larger socio-political and economic realities developing countries found themselves 
within the international system, vis-à-vis the Global North, leading up to and following 
the Cold War.   
Specifically, Cold War geopolitics, foreign policy, and political economy during 
that era led to the South’s organizing around the need for political cooperation and 
economic and technical cooperation.42  Without the requisite level of development, the 
South could not affect the economic changes necessary to compete and level the playing 
field with the developed economies of the world.  Therefore, South-South cooperation in 
terms of trade and economic cooperation “represented a more political aspiration than an 
economic reality.”43   
                                                           
40 IBON International (2014). 
 
41 Ugwuja, et. al (2014), 174. 
 
42 IBON International (2014). 
 
43  United Nations (2011), 3. 
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This situation was further buttressed by the need to counteract the influence of 
Cold War politics and military tensions between Western bloc (United States and its 
allies comprised of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO countries and 
Japan) Eastern bloc (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or Soviet Union and its allies 
among the Warsaw pact countries).  Many areas of the developing world served as the 
backdrop for Cold War political and military tensions.  The threat of war was poignant 
with the events surrounding the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the subsequent Cuban Missile 
Crisis.  Further, the United States used foreign aid under the guise of “mutual security” as 
a Cold War strategy to influence countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Thailand, India, Iran, Jordan and Pakistan in its foreign policy of 
containment of the spread of communism by the Soviet Union.44  Table 2 highlights key 
milestones and events in South-South cooperation during the Cold War era among 
countries and regions of the South. 
 
Table 2 
Key Milestones and Events in South-South Cooperation among Regions and States of the 
South during the Cold War Era 
 
 
Aspect of South-South 
Cooperation 
Trans-regional Conferences, 
Meetings & Agreements between 
Southern States 
 
 
Outcome(s) 
Economic & 
Technological 
The Arab League (1945)  Arab League Educational, Cultural 
and Scientific Organization 
(ALESCO) (1964) (Clements, 2001) 
Political The Asian-African Conference or 
Bandung Conference in Bandung, 
Indonesia (1955)  
New Asian-African Strategic 
Partnership (NAASP) (2005) 
Political Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity 
Conference; Cairo, Egypt (1957)[20]  
Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity 
Organization (1960) 
                                                           
44 IBON International (2014), 1. 
16 
 
Economic & 
Technological 
The Latin America Free Trade Area 
(LAFTA) (1960)  
The Latin American Integration 
Association (ALADI) (1980) (1980 
Treaty of Montevideo; Adopted by 
the LAFTA Council of Foreign 
Affairs, 1980) 
Political Preparatory meeting for the First 
NAM Summit Conference; Cairo 
(1961) (Trivedi, 2005)  
The First Conference of Heads of 
State or Government of Non-
Aligned Countries or the Belgrade 
Summit in Belgrade, Yugoslavia 
(1961)    
Political The First Conference of Heads of 
State or Government of Non-Aligned 
Countries or the Belgrade Summit in 
Belgrade, Yugoslavia (1961)   
The Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) with subsequent summits 
until the XVII NAM Summit 
Conference of the Heads of State at 
Algiers, Algeria in 2014 (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Algeria, 2014) 
  
The Cartagena Document on 
Methodology adopted at the XI 
NAM Summit Conference of the 
Heads of State; Cartagena, 
Colombia, 1995 (The Non-Aligned 
Movement, 2001) 
  
Promoted South-South cooperation 
for human development and 
international solidarity at the XIV 
NAM Summit of the Heads of State; 
Havana, Cuba, 2006 (IBON 
International, 2014) 
Economic & 
Technological 
Conference on Problems of 
Developing Countries; Cairo, Egypt 
(1962) (IBON International, 2014)  
Group of Seventy Seven (G77) and 
UNCTAD in 1964 (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and 
Development, 2013) 
Political Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
(1963) (Secretariat Organization of 
African Unity, 1963)  
African Union (2002) (African 
Union, 2014) 
Political The South Commission (1987) is an 
intergovernmental body of 
developing countries with observer 
status at the UN.  
Was replaced by with the South 
Centre (1995) (INSouth, 2008-
2014). 
Economic and 
Technological 
9th NAM Summit; Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia (1989)  
The G-15 is created 
Source: Partners in Population Development (n.d.). “Chapter 1, South-South Cooperation:  A Pathway for Development.”  
Development except where indicated. 
 
The Need for Political Cooperation 
The Asian-African Conference or Bandung Conference (1955) is one of two key 
trans-regional conferences of the leaders of the developing world in response to the 
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socio-political realities of the Cold War.  This conference is commonly cited by writers 
as the starting point for South-South cooperation45 and represents the South’s entrance 
into international affairs.  The conference was attended by 20, mostly newly independent 
countries from the continents of Asia and Africa under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Nehru with Prime Ministers Soekarno and Nasser to promote economic, political, and 
cultural cooperation between the regions of Africa and Asia, as well as to promote world 
peace.  
Many of the scholars writing about South-South cooperation have cited the 
importance of solidarity among developing countries and Global South as an aspect of 
South-South cooperation.46  As a representative body of developing countries, attendees 
contributed to an understanding of a solidarity based on a shared historical reality 
(colonialism and dependency) in addition to commonalities around their regions, cultures, 
and religions.  This new reality reinforced a burgeoning awareness of regions whose 
identity were considered underdeveloped or developing within the international system.  
After this conference, references to solidarity were attributed to developing countries' 
efforts to affect change in international affairs as well as a recognition of their efforts to 
improve their social, political, and economic prospects.   
The conference resulted in the adoption of the “Principles of Bandung.”  A 
summary of the 10 principles espoused at the conference are listed in the Table 3 below. 
                                                           
45 IBON International (2014); Rosseel, Peter, De Corte, Erik, Blommaert, Jan and Verniers, Elke (2009).  
“Approaches to North-South, South-South and North-South-South Collaboration:  A Policy Document.”  
Ku Leuven.  Accessed November 26, 2014.  https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/229636. 
46 IBON International (2014); Roy, Rathin, and Andrade, Melissa (2010).  “South-South Cooperation? The 
Same Old Game or a New Paradigm?.” Poverty in Focus.  International Policy Centre for Inclusive 
Growth, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP, 25. 
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Table 3 
The Ten Principles of the Bandung Conference, 1955 
The Ten Principles of Bandung, 1955 
1. Human rights 6. “[A]bstention from the use of arrangements of 
collective defense to serve the particular interests 
of any of the big powers”  and “[a]bstention by any 
country from exerting pressures on other 
countries.” (non-alignment) 
2. Sovereignty and territorial integrity of all 
nations 
7. Non-aggression 
3. Equality (races of people, large and small states) 8. The peaceful settlement of international dispute 
per the Charter of the United Nations 
4. Non-intervention and non-interference in 
internal affairs 
9. “Promotion of mutual interests and co-
operation” 
5. Right to single or collective defense of each 
country per the Charter of the United Nations 
10. Justice and international obligations 
 Source:  Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung (24 April 1955).  
These principles have served as a working template for South-South mandates, 
initiatives, and perspectives for countries in the Global South such as the emphasis on 
sovereignty, non-interference, and non-alignment.  Further, the Principles have set the 
tone for political self-determination among developing countries and served as a template 
for succeeding iterations of South-South cooperation principles and platforms in South-
South and North-South dialogue.  
In the broadest sense, the conference reflected the depth of the problems the South 
occasioned upon becoming independent states during the Cold War, as well as those the 
South continue to face in the post-Cold War era as countries seek help and assistance 
among themselves.  This conference serves as an early indicator of how the South viewed 
itself and its role in the international system.  As the first inter-regional conference 
between developing states, the conference signaled the importance developing countries 
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placed on acting jointly on common issues.  Along with recognizing the importance of 
working together cooperatively as developing states, the South also established a 
precedence of adopting positions, principles and recommendations calling for actions to 
be governed within or in support of the United Nations (UN) and its declaration of 
programs. 
Common negotiating positions within the United Nations system were referenced, 
including the call for bilateral and multilateral arrangements that stabilize the 
international prices and demand for primary commodities through the United Nations 
Permanent Advisory Commission on International Commodity Trade, the support of the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the standard for human rights, 
and the support of the Arab people in Palestine in accordance with the United Nations 
Resolutions on Palestine per the UN Charter’s  principle of self-determination of all 
people.  The Conference also regarded the United Nations as essential for the 
establishment and maintenance of world peace.  Specifically, the Bandung Conference 
called for universality in the make-up of the UN body by admitting all qualified states 
into the UN and greater equality of representation on the UN Security Council.47  The 
issue of fair and adequate representation on the UN Security Council would continue as a 
political quagmire into the post-Cold War era, including the politics surrounding the G-4 
countries which includes Brazil and India’s quest for reform and a bid for permanent 
seats on the Council.  Though the countries representing the Bandung Conference were 
                                                           
47 Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung (24 April 1955). (n.d.).  Centre Virtuel 
de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE).  Accessed October 14, 2014.  
http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/final_communique_of_the_asian_african_conference_of_bandung_24_april_19
55-en-676237bd-72f7-471f-949a-88b6ae513585.html. 
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discussing the need for Council reform in 1955, the UN Security Council itself did not 
begin formal debates on reform until 1993. 
The Bandung Conference represented the end of one era and the beginning of 
another in the developing world when for the first time, leaders from developing 
countries of Asia and Africa outside the auspices of the United Nations spoke out 
unequivocally against colonialism and racism and supported liberation from Western 
colonial powers.  Overall, the Bandung Conference signified the voice of the Third 
World and developing countries in general. According to UNCTAD (2010), the Bandung 
Conference “provided inspiration and impetus for the development of various South–
South alliances in the 1960s and 1970s.”48  Tan and Acharya (2008) identified three 
normative outcomes for the Conference: (a) a code of conduct in international relations, 
(b) compromise and consensus-building on questions of alignment with rival power 
blocs, and (c) informal and consensus-based diplomacy.49  
The second pivotal trans-regional conference was the First Summit Conference 
(1961) which finds its origins in the Bandung Conference.50  The First Summit 
Conference of 1961 provided a forum to discuss and promote a view of international 
relations from the perspective of states who were not aligned with the either the Eastern 
                                                           
48 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2010).  “Economic Development in 
Africa Report 2010:  South-South Cooperation – Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnership.”  
United Nations Publication.7.  Accessed November 16, 2016. 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Publications/EconomicDevelopmentinAfricaseries.aspx. 
 
49 Tan, See Seng and Acharya, Amitav (2008).  Bandung Revisited:  The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African 
Conference for International Order. Singapore:  NUS Press, National University of Singapore.  
  
50 Trivedi, Sonu.  (2005). Handbook of International Organizations. New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and 
Distributors. 
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or Western blocs at the height the Cold War and the creation of the Non-Aligned 
Movement or NAM.  NAM adopted the Principles of Bandung as its goals and objectives 
in its policy of non-alignment and criterion for membership.51   The criteria for 
membership in the movement as well as an invitation to the Summit were established at a 
preparatory conference in Cairo, Egypt prior to the Summit.  
The criteria for membership in NAM included: 
1. The country should have adopted an independent policy based on the coexistence 
of States with different political systems and non-alignment or should be showing 
a trend in favor of such a policy; 
2. The country concerned should be consistently supporting the Movements or 
National Independence; 
3. The country should not be a member of a multilateral military alliance concluded 
in the context of Great Power conflicts; 
4. If a country has a bilateral military agreement with a Great Power, or is a member 
of a regional defence pact, the agreement or pact should not be one deliberately 
concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts; 
5. If it has conceded military bases to a Foreign Power, the concession should not 
have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts.52 
                                                           
51 Ministry of External Affairs; Government of India (2012).  “History and Evolution of Non-Aligned 
Movement.”  Accessed October 20, 2014.  https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-
article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement. 
 
52 The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).  “Background- The Non-Aligned Movement:  Description and 
History.” (webpage).  Accessed October 20, 2014.  http://www.nam.gov.za/background/history.htm. 
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Twenty-five countries met the criteria and attended the Summit including:  Afghanistan, 
Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, 
India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, 
Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen, and Yugoslavia, with Bolivia, Brazil, and 
Ecuador as observers.53  Yugoslavia under President Josip Broz Tito was only one of two 
European states represented at the conference; however, President Tito is credited along 
with Nehru (India), Sukarno (Indonesia), Nkruma (Ghana), and Nasser (Egypt) as the 
originating leaders of NAM.54  
The First Summit Conference of 1961 provided a forum to discuss and promote a 
view of international relations from the perspective of non-aligned states.  The 
Conference called for democratization of international relations, including fair 
representation within the UN system including reform of the UN Security Council to 
reflect the growing UN membership body as well as economic redress for the 
asymmetries stemming from colonialism and imperialism.55  Further, the Conference 
advocated for legitimacy of the PRC56 as the one representative of China and non-
interference in the affairs of Cuba.57  The politics of colonialization, imperialism, and the 
                                                           
53 Belgrade Declaration of Non-Aligned Countries, 1961 (Excerpts) (n.d.). 6.  Accessed October 20, 2015. 
http://pustakahpi.kemlu.go.id/dir_dok/01st%20Summit%20of%20the%20Non-
Aligned%20Movement%20-%20Final%20Document%20(Belgrade_Declaration).pdf.  
 
54 Ghosh, Peu (2013).  International Relations.  Delhi:  PHI Learning PVT. LTD. 164. 
   
55 Belgrade Declaration of Non-Aligned Countries, 1961 (Excerpts), 9. 
 
56 Ibid. 10. 
 
57 Ibid. 8. 
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Cold War feature prominently in the identity formation of the NAM, as it sought to 
address leading issues of the era. 
The NAM movement was centered on summitry work among non-aligned 
members with subsequent advocacy on behalf of non-aligned countries.  The NAM 
believed the best way to accomplish its objectives with such a broad, diverse group of 
states with different political ideologies would be to continue as a movement with “no 
charter, no permanent secretariat or headquarters, or, for that matter, a permanent 
website.”58  This anti-formality stance to institutionalization would take root and grow 
into a defining characteristic of South-South cooperation with the North’s call for greater 
formality in information gathering, data, analysis and evaluation of South-South 
activities, whereas the Global South and its institutions continue to reserve the right to 
proceed with a degree of informality and flexibility.  The NAM squarely placed the bulk 
of world problems on the U.S. and Soviet management as the two leading Great Powers 
in the bi-polar world, particularly in the area of world peace. 
Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana and one of the fathers of the Non-
Aligned Movement, extended the concept of non-alignment to embrace non-alignment as 
a revolutionary force in world affairs.  Table 4 illustrates the progression in Nkrumah’s 
rhetoric of non-alignment with quotes from Nkruma found in Das Gupta and Shahid 
(1981) article, “Ghana’s Non-Alignment Under Kwame Nkrumah.” 59 
                                                           
58 Potter, William and Mukhatzhanova, Gaukhar (2012).  Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement: 
Principles vs Pragmatism.  Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge for the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 23. 
 
59 Das Gupta, Anirudha and Shahid, A. S. (1981).  Ghana's non-alignment under Kwame Nkruhma.  
International Studies, 401 and 407. 
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Table 4 
A Brief Compilation of Kwame Nkrumah’s Perspectives on of Non-alignment between 
1958 and 1973 
 
Year Perspective Quote 
1958 Political 
strategy 
This policy of non-alignment we have interpreted to imply that the 
Government would act as it sees best on any issue in the light of the country’s 
obligations to the UN Charter, our position in relation to the African continent 
and the Commonwealth, our adherence to the principles enunciated at the 
Bandung and Accra conferences, and our determination to safeguard our 
independence and sovereignty.  Ghana Today (Accra), September 17, 1958 
1960 Third World 
organizing 
tool 
I will even be bold to offer the proposal that all uncommitted non nuclear 
countries of the world, particularly of Africa and Asia, should summon 
themselves into a conference with a view to forming a non-nuclear third 
force---a war-preventing force between the two blocs of the so-called East and 
West.  Kwame Nkrumah Address to Parliament, July 1960 
1968 Alignment 
with 
Socialism 
The world struggle, and the cause of world tension, has to be seen not in the 
old political context of the Cold War, that is, of nation states and Power blocs, 
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary peoples.... If we are to achieve 
revolutionary Socialism, then we must avoid any suggestion that will imply 
that there is any separation between the Socialist world and a "Third World".  
Labour Monthly (London), October 1968 
n.d. 
given 
A call to 
action 
Old beliefs die hard.  Although  non-alignment is an anachronism, there are 
still a few politicians and heads of state who cling to the idea of neutralism 
and who advocate e holding of more conferences of non-aligned states.  Their 
thinking a form of political escapism—a reluctance to face the realities the 
present situation (Kwame Nkrumah as cited in Das Gupta and Shahid, 1981, 
402) 
1973 Basis for 
policy 
We are all here as non-aligned nations, but the term ‘non-aligned’  as applied 
to us has not yet covered every form of policy which it connotes. We came 
into existence as a protest and a revolt against the state of affairs in 
international relations caused by the division of the world into opposing blocs 
of East and West. We came into existence as a revolt against imperialism and 
neo-colonialism, which are also the basic cause of world tension and 
insecurity.  Kwame Nkrumah in Revolutionary Path, 1973 
Source:  Das Gupta, Anirudha and Shahid, A. S. (1981).  “Ghana's Non-alignment under Kwame 
Nkruhma.”  International Studies, 20(1-2):  401and 407. 
 
Nkrumah’s remarks reflect an evolution in this thinking.  Nkrumah found that the Cold 
War and subsequent neo-colonialism did not improve the relative position of non-aligned 
countries vis-à-vis the Great Powers (former colonizers).  His view of non-alignment 
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went from moderate (conferencing) to more revolutionary policy proposals (Socialism). 
Nkrumah’s view of non-alignment transformed beyond rhetoric to the idea of a social-
political project and policy. 
In conclusion, the need for political cooperation by the Global South during the 
Cold War era presented recurring themes around colonialism/decolonialization, 
imperialism/neo-colonialism, disarmament, as well as democratization of international 
relations and global governance structures.  The ideas and concepts emanating from the 
Bandung Conference would inspire the Non-aligned Movement which would in term 
influence and mark the political rhetoric of the Global South.  As the need for political 
cooperation did not negate the inclusion of the North, the need for economic and 
technological cooperation also included a role and place developed countries and 
Northern institutions. 
 
The Need for Economic and Technical Cooperation 
South-South economic and technical cooperation has been a joint effort between 
the South and the North.  The South has a long history of organizing as a bloc within the 
UN System and pushing for changes to close the economic and technological divide 
between the North and the South.  Table 5 highlights the key milestones and events in 
South-South cooperation through North-South dialogue and discussions during the Cold 
War era. 
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Table 5 
Key Milestones and Events in South-South Cooperation during the Cold War Era within 
the United Nations System 
 
 
Aspect of South-
South Cooperation 
Trans-regional conferences, 
meetings, and agreements on 
behalf of the South 
 
 
Outcome(s) 
Economic & 
Technological 
The United Nations Expanded 
Programme of Technical 
Assistance (EPTA) (1949) 
Adopted by the ECOSOC in 1949) and “taken 
up in a Resolution of the United Nations 
General Assembly” in 1949 (United Nations 
Education Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO)) 
Economic & 
Technological 
The United Nations Special 
Fund (UNSF) (1958)  
Merged with the EPTA creating the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 
1965. (Auerbach and Yonekawa) 
Economic & 
Technological 
The Group of  at the first the 
United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (1964) 
The Charter of Algiers (1967) (First 
Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77); the 
New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
(1967) 
Economic & 
Technological 
United Nations Development 
Programme (1965) 
United Nations Capital Development Fund 
(UNCDF) in 1966 (United Nations). 
Economic & 
Technological 
UN Working Group for 
Technical Cooperation among 
Developing Countries (TCDC) 
(1972), (United Nations Office 
for South-South Cooperation) 
Recommended the creation of a special unit for 
TCDC within the UN system 
Economic & 
Technological 
The UN General Assembly 
endorses the establishment of a 
special unit within the United 
Nations Development 
Programme to promote TCDC 
(United Nations) 
United Nations Office for South-South 
Cooperation that manages the UN Fund for 
South-South Cooperation and the PGTF 
(United Nations Office for South-South 
Cooperation) 
Economic & 
Technological 
The UN Conference on 
Technical Cooperation among 
Developing Countries; Buenos 
Aires, Argentina (1978) 
Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) (1978); 
the Special Unit for TCDC strengthened to 
promote, coordinate and support South-South 
and triangular cooperation globally within and 
outside the UN 
(http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/faq.html) 
Economic & 
Technological 
High-level Conference of the G-
77; Caracas, Venezuela (1981) 
Caracas Programme of Action on Economic 
Cooperation among Developing Countries 
(1981) 
Economic & 
Technological 
The Perez Guerrero Trust Fund 
for Economic and Technical 
Cooperation among Developing 
Countries (PGTF) (1981) 
 
Economic & 
Technological 
Ministerial Meetings of the 
Group of 77; Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia (1988) 
Ratified the Agreement on a Global System of 
Trade Preferences among Developing 
Countries (GSTP) (1989) 
Source:  Beeby, C. E. (1992).  “The Biography of an Idea: Beeby on Education.” Wellington (N.Z):  
Council of Educational Research, as cited on the UNESCO webpage.  Accessed November 24, 2014. 
http://www.unesco.org/education/educprog/50y/brochure/aid/226.htm unless otherwise noted. 
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Though countries in the Global South met and organized outside of the established 
system of governance such as the UN, they would take their united efforts of solidarity to 
push for changes within and not against these institutions.  This trend would continue 
after the end of the Cold War with the creation of new, wholly South-South entities such 
as the BRICS and India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue (IBSA). 
 
The North and Northern Institutions 
From the perspective of the developed countries of the North, cooperation 
between countries was not initially conceived of as North-South cooperation or the 
fostering of South-South cooperation, but that of directly supporting other European 
countries and allies.  Events that took place prior to and during the Cold War contributed 
to the creation of the international aid architecture and development cooperation between 
Northern donors and Southern recipients.  Northern aid influenced politics leading to and 
surrounding the Cold War. 
The United States 
In 1896, the United States used food surpluses to “alleviate suffering” abroad and 
“open future markets” for U.S. farmers.60  Food shortages in Europe led the United States 
to pass the U.S. Lend-Lease Act of 1941, creating the U.S. Food for Freedom Program.  
The Act extended the right to “sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise 
dispose of, to any such government [whose defense the President deems vital to the 
                                                           
60 Van Bilzen, Gerard (2015).  The Develpoment of Aid.  Newcastle upon Tyne, UK:  Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 53.  
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defense of the United States] any defense article.”61  The program transferred food and 
supplies to allied countries (United Kingdom, Belgium, Norway, Poland, and China) 
considered Allies between 1941 and 1945 and considered key in winning the Second 
World War. The program benefited the United States by increasing its overall food 
production and capacity levels. 
Britain 
During the 1920s, Britain provided oversees assistance in the areas of technical 
assistance and scholarships for their colonies.  Their focus shifted to agriculture and 
industry with the Colonial Development Act of 1929.  The Act earmarked regular funding 
for the development of colonies for the first time.  The British Colonial and Welfare Act 
of 1940 sought the promotion of development which included conditions for assistance 
and cancellation of debts.  One conditionality placed on colonial governments was that 
their proposals for assistance also support of the European war effort.  A limited number 
of colonial governments chose to submit proposals until the end of the war was 
approaching.  The British Colonial and Welfare Act of 1945 increased funding and 
extended assistance to the colonies until 1964.  Rather than discontinue funding, the 
Commonwealth Development Act of 1963 was passed and introduced the possibility of 
soft loans. 
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Creation of Multilateral Institutions 
Key multilateral organizations were established during this period in anticipation 
of the international monetary and financial implications of the conclusion of the Second 
World War.  The United Nations Monetary and Finance Conference or Bretton Woods 
Conference in 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire was held where the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which would later become a part of 
the World Bank Group as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were created.  
Their creation specifically supported the European economies devastated by war. 
 
Marshall Plan of 1948 
Another reference point for the United States was the support of its allies with the 
European Recovery Program (ERP) or the Marshall Plan of 1948.  The Marshall Plan 
(1948) proposed by U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall in 1947 was part of a 
larger world recovery plan by the U.S. government and called for European countries to 
participate in a joint program of reconstruction (means of production, international trade) 
in exchange for U.S. financial support.  The aid was for the purpose of assisting European 
countries in adjusting to post-war conditions.  The offer was extended along the two 
blocs, with the Western countries accepting it and Eastern European ones who were the 
Soviet Union and its allies not.  According to Robert D. Schulzinger (1990), the Marshall 
Plan (1948) evidenced U.S. Cold War policy of containment with the assertion that: 
[T] he beauty of Marshall’s plan was that it did not appear on the 
surface to be directed against the Soviet Union.  The secretary of 
state never mentioned the dangers of communism or the Soviet 
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Union, and he opened the program to all European nations.  He 
knew, however, that the Soviet Union would reject the invitation as 
a transparent attempt to penetrate Eastern Europe with American 
commerce.  The State Department expected the Soviets to prohibit 
their Communist-dominated governments of Eastern Europe from 
joining others for aid.  The onus for dividing Europe into two 
hostile camps would fall on Moscow, not Washington.62  
Schulzinger’s remarks suggested that the Soviets were to blame for the Cold War through 
the influence of aid from the U.S.-backed Marshall Plan. 
 
The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEEC) and The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
 
The Organisation for the European Economic Cooperation (OEEC; 1948) 
originated in the Marshall Plan and the Conference of Sixteen or Conference for 
European Economic Co-operation.63 The OEEC was established by the Conference for 
European Economic Co-operation (Conference of Sixteen) to administer the Marshall 
Plan’s European Recovery Program for the joint recovery and restoration of European 
economies and allocation of U.S. financial aid in the form of Marshall Aid dollars.64  The 
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OEEC had 18 participating countries, and zones and put forth plans and proposals for the 
integration of European economies.  The OEEC had a hand in the creation of the 
European Productivity Agency (1952) and European Nuclear Energy Agency (1957) as 
well as the framework for setting up a European Free Trade Area (1957).65   
 By 1960, the EEEC included the United States and Canada and the same year the 
creation of the Development Assistance Group (DAG)66.  Led by the United States, the 
DAG served as a forum of aid donors of assistance to less-developed countries.  When 
the OEEEC was reformed as the OECD in 1961, the DAG became the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC).  OECD then included non-European member countries.  
The DAC began to collect data on flow of bilateral aid from committee members to 
recipient countries.67 These same recipient countries subsequently became eligible 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) recipients by 1961.68 
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U.S. President Harry Truman’s 1949 Inaugural Address 
 In President Harry Truman’s 1949 Inaugural Address, Truman presented the idea 
that development assistance should come primarily from the North as represented by the 
United States, other developed European states and the UN to each other and by 
extension the developing world.  Specifically, Truman spoke about Americans (from the 
United States) and Europeans as the standard bearers of “civilization” with the 
responsibility of “contributing once more to the security and welfare [after the Second 
World War] of the world.”  Excerpts on this line of thinking include: 
Almost a year ago, in company with 16 free nations of Europe, we 
launched the greatest cooperative economic program in history. 
The purpose of that unprecedented effort is to invigorate and 
strengthen democracy in Europe, so that the free people of that 
continent can resume their rightful place in the forefront of 
civilization and can contribute once more to the security and 
welfare of the world (Truman, 1949, para 28). 
This means [programs for world economic recovery], first of all, 
that we must keep our [US] full weight behind the European 
recovery program.  We are confident of the success of this major 
venture in world recovery.  We believe that our partners in this 
effort will achieve the status of self-supporting nations once again.69 
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Several expectations regarding the European “aid recipients” and their economies were 
conveyed through Truman’s statements: (a)  European states are “partners,” not “aid 
recipients;” (b) European states’ economies can recover and become “self-supporting;” 
and (c) it was the responsibility of the United States to reaffirm Europe’s “rightful place” 
to lead—alongside the United States—the rest of the world: Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America.  Truman’s statements supported the approach of Northern assistance to other 
Northern countries, and foreshadowed how the North would proceed with North-South 
cooperation.  
In addition to advocating for European economic progress, Truman also 
contributed to the “making of the Third World” (Escobar).  This was accomplished when 
he identified the need for the “underdeveloped” areas of the world to be developed by the 
North, with the United States taking the lead in the effort.  The four point programmatic 
action under the guise of peace and freedom were outlined.  It proposed a role for the 
United States and the United Nations to bring the benefits of “industrial” and “scientific” 
progress to the underdeveloped areas of the world (Truman).  The following are excerpts 
from Truman’s Address on this issue: 
The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial 
and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for 
the assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in 
technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible. 
I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of 
our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for 
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a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital 
investment in areas needing development. 
Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, 
to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more 
mechanical power to lighten their burdens. 
We invite other countries to pool their technological resources in this undertaking. 
Their contributions will be warmly welcomed. This should be a cooperative 
enterprise in which all nations work together through the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies wherever practicable. It must be a worldwide effort for the 
achievement of peace, plenty, and freedom. 
With the cooperation of business, private capital, agriculture, and labor in this 
country, this program can greatly increase the industrial activity in other nations 
and can raise substantially their standards of living.70 
Two key ideas on the future of development cooperation are inherent.  First, the idea that 
Northern states and institutions should collectively help the underdeveloped help 
themselves. It held a role for the North in the affairs of the South.  Second, it 
simultaneously pointed to a “common identity”71 among developing countries and 
regions predicated on their level of development.  De facto discourse on the topic of 
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developed countries and regions (i.e., “North”) versus developing or underdeveloped 
ones (i.e., “South”) could be made for the purpose of comparison. 
 
Principal-Agent Model of Development Cooperation 
The OECD-DAC initial model of development cooperation was premised on a 
Principal-Agent model of development cooperation.  With this model, the “principals” 
are equated with donors and “agents” developing countries.  According to Gore (2013), 
donors use “money,” “conditionality,” and “advice” to “persuade,” “buy,” or “force” 
developing countries to “implement” policies donors believe they need.72  This top-down 
model of development for developing countries of the South reinforced a subordinate 
status relative to the North and trajectory outlined for Southern countries to seek out and 
emulate Northern development. 
 
SIGNIFICANCE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Much has been written about the contentious development relationship between 
the North and the South as well the long history of cooperation between countries and 
regions of the South.  There has been limited empirical study of South-South cooperation 
within the Global South73 as compared with North-South cooperation.  I aimed to address 
this gap in the literature by exploring the benefits, challenges, and strategic rationale for 
the application of SSC framework to Brazil and Haiti. 
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This study is significant because it targets the diversity and expansion in the arena 
of development cooperation occurring in the South despite the developing countries 
significant, on-going development challenges.  Specifically, poverty remains an issue in 
the Global South. “[R]ecent research shows that 72 per cent of the world’s poor, or 960 
million people, live in middle-income countries, while only one quarter, roughly 370 
million, live in low-income countries”74  Development remains a problem for the South; 
thus, the findings of this study can provide data and information for decision-making in 
the area of development cooperation between countries in the Global South. 
According to Quadir (2013), South-South cooperation has the potential of 
“constructing a new aid paradigm that focuses more on the strategic needs of the partner 
countries than on advancing the ideological interests of the donor countries.”75  The 
diversification of development practices and choices by the South suggests a level of 
competition or choice not possible before due to the economic and political position of 
the Global South.  The motivation for the South to engage in development cooperation 
differs from previous development eras.  Their formerly restrictive economic and 
political conditions have changed given their gross national products and thus their 
representational impact within international fora.  The findings of the study may be able 
to provide insights into the mechanisms involved when countries engage in South-South 
cooperation. 
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However, the study was guided by the basic notion that national interests drive 
development cooperation between and on behalf of states in the South.76  North-South 
and South-South cooperation models have an empirical foundation in the preservation of 
national interests thus both models can be expected to similarly seek to promote and 
preserve their national interests.77   Self-interest, and not ethical responsibility, explains 
the existence of South-South cooperation.78  This dissertation proceed from the 
assumption that Global South countries engage in South-South cooperation because of 
national interests.  
On the matter of decision-making in international relations, L. Andy Afinotan 
wrote that decision making “deals with the trends which lead to or build up into choices 
and consensus.  It analyses [sic] the relationships among policy makers, between them 
and the public, between officials and the press and between goals and issues…Decisions 
lead to policy, produce conflict and foster cooperation.”79  It is also assumed that the state 
and the international system are a “natural framework” for analyzing and understanding 
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decision making by decision makers.80  Applying this line of logic to decision-making in 
international relations to the SSC framework between Brazil and Haiti, both countries 
choose to engage in South-South cooperation because the context by which its decision 
makers make their decisions would anticipate benefit from their bilateral relationship that 
support their national interests.  The overall assumption was that Brazil and Haiti engage 
in South-South cooperation because it is in their self-interest to do so. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this dissertation, I took an instrumental versus conceptual view of development 
cooperation between Southern development providers and development recipients by 
identifying development cooperation in concrete terms: (a) peacekeeping operations, (b) 
technical assistance, (c) humanitarian assistance, and (d) commercial interests.  When 
operationalizing development cooperation in this manner, it allows a way of examining 
the impact of the SSC framework as strengthened, weakened, or of no impact over the 
course of two countries’ bilateral relationship.  Specifically, a convergence of factors led 
to the prioritization of Haiti as a development partner by Brazil in the early 2000s and 
subsequent vitalization of their SSC framework and development cooperation between 
2004 and 2017.   
For Brazil, the Lula administration took a more assertive and proactive foreign 
policy position that included the use of the Brazilian military to accomplish United 
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Nations peacekeeping to accomplish their regional and global aspirations.81  Brazil’s 
activism came after an important juncture in Inter-American relations with the 
consolidation of “South America” separate from “Latin America” in the early 1990s that 
set up the context for Brazil to pursue a Southern Cone-based approach to regional 
integration, regional defense and peacekeeping cooperation through political 
integration.82  Haiti provided an opportunity for former military authoritarian states to 
“refocus” and “recivilianize” their governments and militaries on external rather than 
internal security issues,83 and provided Brazil the ability to project an image of a global 
power ready to take a more active role at the international level.  President Lula’s 
minister of foreign relations Celso Amorim articulates the importance Brazil’s 
participation in MINUSTAH on the question of peace as an international good: 
Our participation in the UN mission in Haiti also arises from the principle 
that peace is not a free international good:  the maintenance of peace has a 
price.  That price is participation.  To be absent from or to evade giving an 
opinion or to act in a crisis situation can signify exclusion from the 
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decisionmaking process or worse, dependency in relations to other states 
and regions.84 
Amorim’s statement suggested that Brazil’s participation in MINUSTAH addresses the 
collective goods problem while at the same time asserting Brazilian influence.  
At the same time, Haiti provided the context for Brazil to exercise regional and 
international leadership as it faced severe issues of security.  According to Gregg Beckett 
in “Rethinking the Haitian Crisis” in The Idea of Haitian Crisis, the international 
response to crises in Haiti has been the repatriation of those Haitians who flee the country 
and international intervention (humanitarian, international-designed economic and 
political policies and foreign military intervention).85  MINUSTAH emerged from the 
controversy sounding the ouster of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and 
establishment of a transitional government in 2004.  Previous UN missions in Haiti were 
under Northern leadership; however, MINUSTAH leadership was led by Brazil and a 
mostly Latin America peacekeeping contingency.  The humanitarian situation in Haiti 
continued to worsen, especially after a category 7.0 earthquake hit the already 
impoverished island, resulting in the deaths of over 200,000 people and effecting an 
estimated 3 million people in January 2010.86  Though MINUSTAH’s main concern has 
been security, its development and humanitarian activities increased especially after the 
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2010 earthquake.87  William Michael Reisman argued that “credibility or legitimacy” of 
the UN and the United States were at risk if people perceived that free and clear elections 
could not be protected.88  Thus, the confluence of Haitian security, economic, political, 
and electoral issues in 2004 anchored the attention and intervention of the international 
community in particular thus introducing development cooperation by Brazil comprised 
of peacekeeping operations, technical assistance, humanitarian assistance and commercial 
interests.  In the analytical chapters, the current researcher will further explore the 
rationale behind Brazil and Haiti’s bilateral relationship. 
 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND METHOD 
The purpose of this study was to examine the overall cooperation framework 
between Southern countries through the central question of why Southern countries 
engage in South-South cooperation.  Southern countries engage in development 
cooperation with each other despite domestic challenges and the possibility of North-
South cooperation and alliances to strengthen their positions.  Further, the North-South 
framework remains the prevailing framework in the area of development cooperation.   
According to Fahimul Quadir, the SSC framework driven by the BRIC countries 
has the potential of developing a new paradigm of aid that deviates from the more 
conditionality-driven motivation of the North-South framework;89 however, there is 
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limited empirical study of South-South cooperation within the Global South.90  Countries 
in the Global South who engage in South-South cooperation do not follow traditional 
mechanisms, underscoring the need to further explore the SSC framework.91  According 
to Baranyi, Feldmann, and Bernier (2015), South-South cooperation has both strengths 
and weaknesses that are primarily unexplored in empirical studies.  Baranyi et al. 
contended that the SSC framework is not necessarily an improvement of the North-South 
framework, but only an alternative to the more traditional approach to the provision of 
economic and political aid. 
This study addresses a void in the development literature that has not devoted 
much time to understanding or measuring the impact of this framework on the 
development of countries in the South that were and still are beneficiaries of assistance 
from the North.  I examined the promise and the shortcomings of South-South 
cooperation through the lens of the impact of South-South cooperation on development 
cooperation.  The specific problem was that it is not known how the SSC framework is 
beneficial, challenging and strategic for the development cooperation between Southern 
countries.  Based on this gap in the literature, I specifically explored why Brazil and Haiti 
engage in South-South cooperation, including how this framework is beneficial, 
challenging, and strategic to both countries.  Case study research is used when flexibility, 
comprehensiveness, and complexity are present or needed to understand a phenomenon 
as well as when investigating “how?” and “why?” questions.92  The total sample size for 
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the study was 16 participants.  For the semi-structured interviews, a combination of past 
and present leaders and officials from Haiti and Brazil participated.  For the seven-item 
open-ended survey, scholar-practitioners on Latin America, Brazil and Haiti participated.  
I collected data using semi-structured interviews, open-ended surveys and archival data 
sources.   
I used components of development cooperation—(a) peacekeeping operations, (b) 
technical assistance, (c) humanitarian assistance, and (d) commercial interests—to 
examine whether the SSC framework strengthens, weakens or has no impact on 
development between two Southern countries.  The way in which the international 
development strategies works for the Global South depends on whether the country under 
study is a development provider or development recipient or development equals (MIC-
MIC or LIC-LIC).  In this dissertation, Brazil served as predominately the development 
provider and has employed a number of leadership strategies around peacekeeping, 
South-South and regional fora such as the BRICS, IBSAs and development banking 
including the IBSA fund, New Development Bank (formerly BRICS Bank), and the 
Brazilian National Development Bank or BNDES.  Haiti is the development recipient 
whose international development strategies focus on its participation in the development 
of actions plans for its national recovery and development and poverty reduction plans 
led by multilateral entities such as the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF).  Additionally, 
Haiti’s concerted willingness and efforts to secure foreign investments in 2011 under the 
slogan “Haiti is open for business” is also considered an international development 
strategy that did not preclude Southern states.  The main hypothesis was that the South-
South cooperation affects development cooperation by strengthening, weakening or 
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having no impact on development in Brazil and Haiti.  Figure 1 below provides a visual 
presentation of the intended direction of the research framework:  
 
Figure 1. Intended direction of the research framework. 
I developed three sub-questions of the study to examine the impact of the SSC framework 
and its likely outcome on development for the case countries: 
1. How do Brazil and Haiti benefit from engaging in the South-South cooperation 
framework? 
2. How challenging is the SSC framework for Brazil and Haiti? 
3. How is engaging in the SSC framework strategic for both Brazil and Haiti?  
Addressing these questions is a descriptive task when examining benefits, challenges, and 
strategic rationale for the Brazil-Haiti SSC framework. 
SSC
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• Agreements, Statements, Rhetoric
Development
Cooperation
• Peacekeeping operations
• Technical assistance
• Humanitarian assistance
• Commercial interests
Possible 
Outcomes
• Strenthen
• Weaken
• Has no impact
45 
 
Qualitative methods involve the use of tools that will lead to rich and detailed data 
to explain a phenomenon.93  The interconnected relationship between phenomenon and 
context is one of the key features that define case study research.  Thus, this study gathers 
data through several methods.  The first contribution of data comes from an explanatory 
framework that serves as a review of the literature that situates South-South cooperation 
within the discourse surrounding the emerging donor challenge to the traditional aid 
architecture for development assistance and the nature of South-South cooperation in 
Latin America.  The second contribution of data stems from a qualitative exercise 
whereby I interviewed and surveyed leading experts and practitioners engaged in Brazil-
Haiti cooperation who have experience in being involved in making decisions or 
implementing policies pertaining to South-South cooperation or have relevant experience 
and knowledge of South-South cooperation in Brazil, Haiti or Latin America.  
Specifically, I collected data using semi-structured interviews with past and present 
Brazilian and Haitian career diplomats, high-level government officials, advisors, 
consultants, political appointees and academics.  I administered a seven-item open-ended 
survey of scholar-practitioners on Latin America, Brazil and Haiti.  Given Haiti’s long-
standing relationship to the United States and multilateral organizations, several survey 
respondents also included officials from the World Bank, the U.S. government and 
contractors.  The final contribution included archival data sources including government 
records, newspapers, speeches, and press releases and academic writings. 
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The study’s respondent pool was focused on elite and expert-level interviewees94 
because of their ability to structure accounts on the topic of South-South cooperation and 
what is considered important and relevant for consideration in a research study.  This 
group is an authority on South-South cooperation due to their specialized knowledge and 
decision-making functions past and present as political, government, and academic 
experts.  Many have assumed responsibilities and carried out actions for and on behalf of 
the state.  
Also, in compliance with case study research design, three or more data sources 
are adequate for triangulation and to generate a detailed description of the phenomenon 
and context of the study.95 I used archival data sources including government records, 
newspapers, speeches, and press releases to place the data and information collected from 
the aforementioned sources enable me to understand and contextualize the connection 
between South-South cooperation and the ensuing issues of development cooperation for 
Brazil and Haiti.  The methods of explanatory framework, in-depth interviews, survey 
questionnaires and archival data served to address the hypothesis that the South-South 
cooperation affects development cooperation by strengthening, weakening or having no 
impact on development in Brazil and Haiti. 
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HYPOTHESIZED OUTCOME AND OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION 
Overall, it is expected that South-South cooperation affects development in the 
Global South if one looks at the volume of technical agreements, policy statements and 
political rhetoric about the importance of South-South cooperation by Northern and 
Southern actors.  The soundness of the SSC framework as a strategy for development is 
an important consideration when the outcome on development most likely differ when it 
is a MIC-LIC partnership, the return on investment is not highly instrumental for the 
development provider, and development remains a problem in the Global South when 
over 70% of the world’s poor live in middle income countries.  Comparatively speaking, 
Brazil, China, India, South Africa are not immune to many of the development issues 
their recipient partners face.  This again raises the central question of why Southern 
countries engage in South-South cooperation when each of the emerging donors have 
development problems of their own and the North remains the primary dispenser of 
development assistance to buttress their development.  Though it is hypothesized that the 
South-South cooperation framework affects development cooperation it is expected that 
the effect will strengthen development cooperation because the framework has not been 
based entirely on domestic conditions.  The remaining chapters are dedicated to 
examining the Brazil-Haiti SSC framework in order to examine its role and impact on 
their development cooperation. 
 
Chapter Overview   
Chapter Two provides an explanatory framework that situates the topic of South-
South cooperation within a trajectory of literatures on the emerging donor challenge, 
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discourse on development cooperation, and the nature of South-South cooperation in 
Latin America.  Chapter Three specifies the research method employed in the dissertation 
that includes the data collection, data analysis, assumptions, and limitations of the study.  
Chapter Four presents the findings of the data analysis, which captures the nature of 
Brazilian and Haitian engagement in South-South cooperation through the perspectives 
and experiences of the study respondents.  Chapter Five includes a deeper discussion of 
the findings presented in previous chapter.  The discussion will focus explaining the 
hypothesized relationship between South-South cooperation and development 
cooperation and address the study’s central research question and overall contributions of 
the study.  Chapter Six serves as the conclusion, in which I look at the implication of the 
findings on development cooperation in Haiti by Brazil.  The chapter aims to contribute 
to rethinking development through South-South cooperation in Latin American and 
Caribbean, and by extension, the Global South.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK  
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter serves as an explanatory framework based on literature that 
contextualize expanding notions of South-South cooperation as an alternative 
development strategy for developing countries of the Global South in order to contribute 
to the explanation for why Southern countries engage in South-South cooperation.  The 
works of scholars and practitioners of South-South cooperation are covered as well as 
development cooperation.  Two major themes in the literature shed light on what is 
known about the potential of the SSC framework: (a) discourse surrounding the emerging 
donor challenge to the traditional aid architecture and (b) the nature of South-South 
cooperation in Latin America. 
The aim of focusing the literature review in this manner was to highlight the 
perspectives of scholars and practitioners in the literature on South-South cooperation 
and Southern donors and contrasting Northern perspectives for comparative purposes.  
The chapter concludes with an overview of those aspects of the literature that the current 
researcher that I used to explain Southern countries engagement in South-South 
cooperation.  Before reviewing the literature based on the major themes, I will begin with 
an explication of the term Global South and will address the main issues that differentiate 
the thinking of scholars and practitioners from the North and the South. 
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EXPLICATION OF GLOBAL SOUTH 
Bullard offered a binary explanation of the Global South as a political concept 
and political actor.96  As a political concept, the Global South reflects and informs the 
conditions resulting from “global patterns of domination and resistance” and as a political 
actor “all groups with a common experience of exploitation, alienation, and 
marginalization under neoliberal globalization, both the dominated and the resisters.”97  
This view of the “global South” takes the concept outside of strict notions of 
geographical location, economic theory or government policy because this collectivity 
represents states with different systems of governance and development positions from 
middle income to least developing located in the regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America.  In the work of Marco Antonio Vieira and Chris Alden, a similar line of 
thinking to that of Bullard can be found when discussing India-Brazil-South Africa 
Dialogue or the IBSA’s as a political actor(s) who choose to employ the term the South as 
a political concept that represents their “mobilizing symbol” and “ideological expression” 
of their governments unique development challenges.98   
Matthew Sparkle recasted the Global South as a concept-metaphor that 
“reterritorializes global space in the interests of repossession by the dispossessed” and 
that is “located at the intersection of entangled political geographies of dispossession and 
repossession.”99  This notion of the Global South served the function of a euphemism for 
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political resistance and political resister among states and actors who have been 
dispossessed.  Thus, this view of political resistance combined the political concept and 
political resister basis for the concept of political actor.  Conversely, Krüger called 
specific attention to the common experience of colonial subjugation as an important 
marker of the “anticolonial identity” prevalent in the South.100  Kruger elaborated that 
beyond the structural aspects that define the North-South divide, “… a political analysis 
of the North-South conflict has to deal with the emergence of different coalitions and 
institutions, representing the interests of South or North in the domain of international 
politics.”101  This would include formulations such as the IBSA, BRICS and the Group of 
77 (G77).102  The emerging economies and regional powers have pushed for changes in 
international governance through their collective action under the rubric of the Global 
South or the South.  
The early 2000s witnessed a reaffirmation of the Global South’s solidarity 
politicized outwardly through its rhetoric, policy positioning within multilateral forums 
and institutions and with the formulation of new institutional arrangements by and for the 
Global South.103  Leading emerging economies and regional powers emerged as the 
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spokespersons for the Global South through their criticism of the established international 
system of governance and efforts to reform it through negation and reform including the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the UN Security Council.  
Vieira and Alden called this a “new wave of politicization” that challenges the North and 
represented the type of Third World solidarity of the 1970s.104 
The question of how well regional hegemons such as Brazil, China, India, and 
South Africa serve as Global South spokespersons of other developing countries in their 
respective regions and among LDCs and LIC in particular is problematic.  Unlike the 
formative years of solidarity, the Global South is comprised of a mix of states and regions 
with different economic and development positions.  Despite the fact that countries of the 
Global South share a common history and identity, the introduction of middle income 
countries and regional powers that heretofore did not exist to the level they do today 
(politically and economically) under the rubric of “developing” brought about an 
emergent paradox with respect to their motives by neighboring states in their regions.   
According to Vieira and Alden, the end of the Cold War provided an opportunity 
for the South’s emerging powers to gain legitimacy, leadership, and soft power through 
their interaction with each other, while at the same time purporting to represent the 
interests of all developing countries.105  The regional leadership role of the IBSA states 
has been embraced by Northern powers however less so by the neighboring countries in 
their respective regions.  “The diplomacies of Brazil, India and South Africa have faced 
varied degrees of resistance from weaker neighbors while attempting to assert regional 
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influence.  India poses the most complex case in South Asia in terms of its long-standing 
conflict with Pakistan and strategic competition with China.  Brazil's and South Africa's 
regional leadership roles are also far from consolidated.”106  Vieira and Alden follows 
that Brazil’s investment in “regional public goods” has demonstrated relative progress.107   
The paradox is that certain Southern countries like Brazil, China, India, and South 
Africa have been accepted as regional leaders by Northern powers and multilateral 
institutions, although the states they appear to led tend to resist for geopolitical, 
geostrategic reasons.  Pinheiro and Gaio (2014) stated that Brazil exercises two different 
leadership forms: inwards regional leadership and outwards regional leadership.108  
Inwards regional leadership is informed by Brazil’s ability to articulate rules and patterns 
of behavior in South America and outwards regional leadership defines its ability to 
leader other regional partners on global level issues.109  In a sense, Brazil regards itself as 
a regional leader without necessarily garnering being viewed as such by its neighbors.110 
The competing approaches to coalition-building among states in South America 
between Brazil and Venezuela points to the paradox of leadership within the Global 
South in South America in the 2000s.  According to Burges (2007), Brazil takes a 
pragmatic, market-friendly, self-interested view of creating economic opportunities by 
way of state supported national firms in the spirit that its efforts may also benefit their 
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regional partners.111  Brazil wants South America to serve as a market and resource site to 
meet the needs of its economy.112  “The neostructuralist state is not charged with bringing 
about results, but with clearing barriers—resulting either from market failure or excessive 
interventionism—to private sector activities in the selected areas and providing a small 
measure of protection during the unstable initial years.”113  In addition, Brazil has made it 
a point to engage and negotiate with and on the behalf of other Southern countries 
through formulations including the BRICS, G20, ISBA, and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).   
Alternatively, Venezuela’s approach to coalition-building is less market-driven 
and more socialist through its historical and contemporary use of petroleum with its 
partners to fuel an overtly leftist hemispheric vision of Latin American unity based on a 
Bolivarian solidarity and ODA.114  The manner in which each country is inserted in the 
global political economy is what anchors their vision of Latin American and Southern 
relations vis-a-vis the global system.115  Burges (2007) cited that each country’s vision 
makes obtaining regional leadership nearly a defensive necessity and argued that Brazil’s 
emphasis on independent business decisions is more sustainable than Venezuela’s statist 
strategy.116   
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Bullard, Vieira and Alden, Sparkle, and Krüger each contributed to some aspect 
of the political concept-political actor binary explication of the Global South and 
provides a useful tool for describing the immaterial and conceptual aspects of the Global 
South by giving it meaning outside of geographical location(s).  However, the issue with 
explaining the Global South and/or the terms the South, Third World and developing 
countries within a political concept/political actor binary is that it does not fully capture 
the complexity of the interactions between Southern states or the role of the North within 
these interactions; thus, the ongoing paradox of southern leadership remains.   
Global South network of relationships is both internal and external to the “South.”  
There are relationships, institutions, and coalition between emerging powers such as 
Brazil China, India, and South Africa, and their interactions with the North and Northern 
institutions for and on half of themselves and the Global South.  In addition, these leading 
powers interact with each other and other MICs and LDCs independent of the North and 
Northern institutions. 
 
APPROACHES TO SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION 
The works of scholars and practitioners of South-South cooperation have also 
addressed the matter of development cooperation.  Bry (2016) evaluated South-South 
cooperation from the perspective of southern countries.  This author referenced a set of 
“basic values, goals, structure, capacity, and forms and areas of actions” that define 
South-South cooperation which southern countries choose to emphasize and weigh 
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differently in their implementation.117  Additionally, Bry cited that Southern countries 
also purport principles and approaches around South-South development cooperation118 
that prioritizes principles and approaches in a manner that is contradictory to the 
traditional aid paradigm, including Southern donors’ absence with regard to monitoring 
and evaluation which is in direct conflict with Northern donors focus on “forecasting” 
and “aid[ing]” effectiveness.119  Conversely, the North also promulgate their view and 
idea of South-South cooperation.  The United Nations has reported on different aspects of 
South-South cooperation and the role the United Nations has and should potentially play 
in defining the concept and typology of South-South cooperation.120  The United Nations 
has called for the identification of “intervention categories” such as “technical, scientific, 
and cultural cooperation,” “humanitarian and peace cooperation,” and “financial 
cooperation.”121  These are key areas of concern for Southern countries in their models of 
South-South cooperation, and areas which Brazil emphasizes in its development 
cooperation. 
Northern donors’ integration of South-South cooperation principles and 
approaches vis-à-vis development is problematic when it comes to implementation.122  
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Bry cited the example of the incompatibility regarding Northern donors need to forecast 
their activities and action versus the South’s “demand-driven approach,” which is calls 
for recipient ownership (at least rhetorically).  Also, Northern donors’ view of “aid 
effectiveness” emphasizes the importance of evaluation-based framework for determining 
results of development, which is incompatible with Southern countries’ lack of emphasis 
on measurement or monitoring.  Bry viewed the actions of Southern countries in the area 
of development cooperation as a function of their historical desire to create an alternative 
model to the traditional aid paradigm.  The incompatibility of the Global North’s efforts 
to harmonize their principles and approaches with those of the Global South is 
fundamental to examining how Southern donors choose to frame their cooperation with 
recipient partners. 
Abdenur and da Fonseca (2013) also problematize the North’s ongoing 
engagement in South-South cooperation as the North’s way of expanding its influence in 
development cooperation.  These authors identified several ways the North engages with 
the South:  the creation of new or reinforced South-South cooperation related fora within 
multilateral organizations, the promotion of triangular cooperation with Southern 
countries, and the “ad-hoc arrangements” for the purpose of gaining more knowledge 
about South-South cooperation.123  Abdenur and da Fonseca argued that the North’s 
growing role in South-South cooperation persists despite declines in Northern aid reflects 
Northern donor’s need to influence how Southern donors set about and conduct South-
South cooperation.  Bry held the view that the actions of Southern countries in the area of 
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development cooperation serves as a function of their historical desire to create an 
alternative model to the traditional aid paradigm.  The Global South’s concern with the 
hegemonic influence of the Global North points to developing countries drive to 
implement alternative models of cooperation independent of the North.124  The issue of 
incompatibility between Northern and Southern approaches to development cooperation 
also contributes to understanding why Southern donors choose to frame their cooperation 
with recipient partners differently. 
Gosovic (2016) took the position that the process of engaging in South-South 
cooperation needs updating and provided suggestions for doing so by looking at the 
evolution, ascendency, and experience of South-South cooperation by the South.  For 
Gosovic, South-South cooperation as a framework is not static; thus, the prospect for 
improving developing countries through South-South cooperation is possible.  Gosovic’s 
position is grounded in the idea that South-South cooperation as a modality can allow for 
“independent action” and “initiative” by states in the South.  Unlike Bry, Gosovic did not 
focus on the manner in which South-South cooperation differs from North-South 
cooperation or the comparative dilemmas that ensue from analyzing those differences 
over the course of the evolution of South-South cooperation.  Instead, the author 
recommended “tapping the promise of South-South cooperation”125 by taking lessons 
learned over the 5 decades of experience with South-South cooperation for the purpose of 
recasting South-South cooperation for a contemporary context.126  Gosovic cited the 
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project of Venezuela’s ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) and 
the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation as examples of contemporary alternative South-
South policy frameworks from which lessons can be drawn.127  Gosovic’s view of South-
South cooperation as an active and dynamic project pointed to the desirability for 
countries to seek improvement and expansion in manner that best address their current 
needs.  As an emerging country, Brazil took South-South cooperation and made it a 
centerpiece of its foreign policy through a series of independent actions and initiatives at 
the domestic, international, and global levels. 
Bry and Gosovic viewed the evolution of South-South cooperation as their 
starting point for examining the prospects for development cooperation; however, Milani 
and Echart Muñoz looked at the history of North-South cooperation.128  For Milani and 
Echart Muñoz, the history of North-South institutions reproduces a “status quo” within 
the international order; as a result; South-South cooperation has emerged among 
developing countries in an attempt to change it.129  Their logic supported the notion that 
North-South cooperation is inherently incompatible with South-South cooperation and 
that South-South cooperation emerges directly out of the history of developing countries 
efforts to change their conditions through development cooperation.  The history and 
evolution of South-South cooperation intersects with 21st-century socio-political and 
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economic realities in a manner that leads to a “promise of solidarity” and creates 
“incentives” for developing countries (mainly the big ones) to engage in development 
cooperation.130  Looking at the incentives for solidarity through South-South cooperation 
is especially important when considering the rationale for the application of SSC 
framework among countries of the Global South. 
 
EMERGING DONOR CHALLENGE TO THE TRADITONAL INTERNATIONAL 
AID ARCHITECTURE 
Kindornay and Samy (2012) broadly defined  the international aid architecture as 
“the set of structures and institutions for delivering aid [that] is often described as 
dysfunctional and uncoordinated” that suffers from issues of ‘legitimacy.”131  Their 
legitimacy is predicated on a lack of recipient country participation in their development 
cooperation with donors.132  This international aid architecture is lead by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the OECD-DAC and the participation of mainly 
Northern donors. 
 
Rise of the South 
The early 2000s were characterized by rapid, high, and sustained economic 
growth rates and industrialization by developing countries such as Brazil, China, and 
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India that resulted in a shift in global economic and political power.133  These economies 
are considered emerging because their presence has been felt at the global level in key 
sectors such as trade, investment, and development.134  The pace at which these 
developing economies recovered from the global economic crisis of 2008 is the meaning 
behind the term “rise of  the South.”135   
Generally, the optomistic short- and long-term economic forecasts on the Global 
South following the 2008 crises supported the prominence of BRICS in development 
circles.  In 2011 and 2012, developing countries were expected to grow by 6.5% 
(compared with 4.4%  in 2011 and 4.5% in 2012 globally) and account for almost 60% of 
world GDP by 2030.136  The big economies of the Global South were held as the 
foundation for the shift in economic and political power toward the developing countries 
of the South of which Brazil was considered a leader.137  
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DAC member countries remain the primary donors of development assistance 
with USD$128.5 billion a year in official development assistance to the South in 2010.138 
According to the World Bank (2012), 2010 Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
represented a record high level; however, disbursements fell by 2.7% in 2011, and aid 
effectiveness goals have not been met by DAC member countries since this high point.139  
Generally, data on emerging donor development assistance is hard to find.140  When non-
DAC country data are reported by the OECD, the data may come from multiple sources, 
account for different types of assistance across different areas, or lack consistency across 
reporting periods.  Table 6 illustrates the intermittent and imprecise accounting of  “Key 
Partners” concessional finance or “ODA-like flows.”141  
 
Table 6 
Estimates of Gross Concessional Flows for Development Co-operation ("ODA-like" 
Flows) from OECD Key Partners 
 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Source 
Brazil 500 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Institute of 
Applied 
Economic 
Research 
(IPEA) and 
Brazilian 
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Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Source 
Cooperation 
Agency 
(ABC) 
Chile 16 24 38 44 49 Ministry of 
Finance 
China 2564 2785 3123 2997 3401 Fiscal 
Yearbook, 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Colombia 15 22 27 42 45 Strategic 
Institutional 
plans, 
Presidential 
Agency of 
International 
Cooperation 
Costa 
Rica 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 21 24 Annual 
budget laws 
India 708 794 1077 1223 1398 Annual 
reports, 
Ministry of 
foreign 
affairs 
Indonesia 10 16 26 49 56 Ministry of 
National 
Development 
Planning 
Mexico n.a. 99 203 529 n.a. Mexican 
Agency for 
International 
Development 
Cooperation 
(AMEXID) 
Qatar 334 733 543 1344 n.a. Foreign aid 
reports, 
Ministry of 
Foreign 
Affairs 
South 
Africa 
154 229 191 191 148 Estimates of 
Public 
Expenditures, 
National 
Treasury 
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Note. Reprinted from OECD webpage Statistics on Resource Flows to Developing Countries, Estimates of 
gross concessional flows for development co-operation ("ODA-like" flows). 
The OECD repored that Brazil’s exact figures on development cooperation is 
“significantly higher” than even the Brazilian government’s officially published figures.  
This is due to bilateral peacekeeping activities and also due to Brazil not including some 
activities that would be considered DAC eligible.142  Specifically, DAC-ODA excludes 
development assistance involving private sector financing, which includes commercial-
purpose loans and grants, export financing and foreign direct investment.  Further 
multilateral institutions who are engaged in South-South cooperation from the 
perspective of the South may not be included on the list of ODA-eligible international 
organizations.  As a result, critical amounts of development assistance flows by major 
non-DAC countries of the South such as Brazil, China, India, and South Africa are not 
included OECD-DAC official ODA. 
The OECD has made efforts to encourage non-DAC emerging donors to become 
DAC member countries.  The OECD referred to certain non-DAC countries as “key 
partners” and referenced the inclusion of their aid flow and assistance as “ODA-like.”  
Additionally, the legitimacy gap Kindornay and Samy refer to has been addressed by the 
OECD through the sponsorship of High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness in Rome 
(2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008), and Busan (2011).  These fora were multi-
stakeholder events attended by recipients, emerging donors, and civil society for the 
purpose of better understanding why development aid is not getting desired results and to 
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coordinate efforts to meet Millennium Development Goals targets.143  However, non-
DAC member countries have persistently refused to join the OECD. 
Overall, Southern countries provide different types of aid including technical 
cooperation, bilateral peacekeeping, and “in-kind” contributions (medical equipment, 
personnel, training, etc.), thereby making South-South cooperation development 
incomparable across countries.144  An exception would be Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates, who report their aid flows to the OECD.145  Data that indicate 
increases in non-DAC aid does not adequately capture the significance of emerging 
donor development cooperation or the degree to which the Global South is actually 
engaged in South-South cooperation.  The difficulty in accounting for emerging donor 
development assistance works to absolve the emerging donors from taking greater 
responsibility in global aid effectiveness and accountability. 
 
Rise of Emerging Donors 
 Traditionally, development cooperation has been equated with official 
development assistance provided by OECD-DAC member countries as the primary 
                                                           
 
143 OECD (2016). 
 
144 Hagedoorn, Paulien and Beets, Gijs (October 2011).  “New Donor Countries.” The Hague: Netherlands 
Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute & United Nations Population Fund.  Accessed June 26, 2016.  
http://resourceflows.org/sites/default/files/RF%20Report%20New%20donor%20countries%20_Oct2011_.p
df. 
 
145 Ibid.  
 
66 
 
donors of development assistance146 with a narrative driven by conditionality.147  By the 
late 1990s, the number of non-DAC development provider countries began to increase; 
and  according to the OECD twenty-four non-DAC providers can be identified.148  
Contributors to the literature on development cooperation have made reference to 
emerging donors as “new development partners,” “new donors,” “rising donors,” 
“Southern donors,” and “Southern development actors.”149  Their presence and 
engagement in development cooperation have been cited by Bilal (2012); Burges (2012); 
Cabral, Russo, and Weinstock (2014); Chandran and Cooper (2015); Chin and Quadir 
(2012); Dreher et al. (2010); Fues (2013); Gore (2013); Janus, Klingebiel, and Paulo 
(2014); Manning (2006); Milani and Echart Muñoz (2013); Smith (2011); Stuenkel 
(2013); The Reality of Aid (2010); Quadir (2013); and Woods (2008).   
 The observation has been made by Richey and Ponte (2014) and Quadir (2013) 
that new actors in development are not actually new to international development 
cooperation.  The meaning of “new” in this instance signifies “newly studied” by 
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international development scholars.150 Chin and Quadir posited that the traditional ways 
of looking at development is ‘insufficient’ for understanding the dynamics surrounding 
these new development actors.151  Therefore, for emerging donors, development 
cooperation is thought to be guided by the principles of South-South cooperation such as 
horizontality and equality, mutual benefit, non-intervention in domestic affairs, 
ownership, solidarity, and sovereignty.  Individual Southern states also have South-South 
models of development.  Brazil’s model of development focus on technical cooperation 
and knowledge sharing on the basis of commonalities such as shared history, culture and 
language.  Regional and geopolitical considerations are also strong motivators for 
development cooperation.  According to Gore, South-South principles result in common 
tendencies that can be summarized as “bundling official assistance with trade and 
investment activities, tying aid to access to natural resources and/or purchase of provider 
goods and services, little or no policy conditionality (particularly around promoting 
liberalization, human rights, etc), focus on infrastructure and production, use of 
concessional loans even in poorer countries, stress on knowledge sharing, training and 
technology transfer over technical cooperation to make aid delivery happen smoothly.”152  
The South’s foreign policy interests are couched in discourse that promotes “solidarity” 
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and “mutual benefit,”153 rather than “charity” and “benevolence.”154  In practice, 
Southern actors can be identified by their ‘institutional independence’155 within the 
existing international aid system.  They resist OECD-DAC principles,156 promote the idea 
that South-South cooperation is an alternative development model,157and accept the 
legitimacy of a small group of middle-income countries as the representative leaders of 
the South within multilateral organizations. 
Regional powers such as Brazil have acted as spokespersons for the Global South 
through criticism of the established international system of governance and have mounted 
efforts to reform the system through negation and reform.  Vieira and Alden (2011) 
described the reaffirmation of the Global South’s sense of solidarity as being politicized 
outwardly through rhetoric, policy positioning within multilateral forums and institutions, 
and new forms of resistance.158  Dreher et al. (2010) conducted a multi-country project on 
16 new donors through statistical modeling (Probite and Tobit) between 2001 and 2008 
and found that new donors (including Brazil) exhibited the following five characteristics: 
“(a) focus on closer neighbors, (b) care less for recipient need, (c) exhibit a weaker bias 
towards badly governed countries, (d) respond to disasters, but with fewer resources than 
old donors, and (e) do not pursue commercial self-interest [at a greater rate than 
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traditional donors].”159   Taken together, these characteristics seem to explain emerging 
donors engagement in development cooperation as a reflection of their capabilities, 
practices that are highly questionable (at least in theory), and in ways that support their 
national interests. These authors stated that “[f]or most new donors, any greater 
familiarity with recipient need does not translate into needs-based targeting.”160  This 
finding does not support what is commonly understood to be a benefit South-South 
cooperation.  A limitation of the study is that it did not include the key development 
providers of China and India.  Studies such as those by Dreher et al. (2010) showcased 
the discrepancies surrounding the implementation of development cooperation and draws 
a parallel with the criticisms the South levy against the North.161 
 
Discourse on the Emerging Donor Challenge 
The writings of a number of scholars and practitioners of South-South 
cooperation and development cooperation consider emerging donors a challenge to the 
international aid architecture including Burges (2012), de Renzio and Seifert (2014), Fues 
(2013), Mawdsley (2011), Six (2009), and Woods (2008).  The challenge emerging 
donors pose is that they operate outside the existing DAC driven international aid 
architecture.162  Southern-bred multilateral forums that exclude the North such as the 
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India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA), BRICS and G20 initiatives (BRICS Development 
Bank) have begun to recognize the benefit of policy dialogue among themselves.163  They 
are considered a threat because they bring attention to the inadequacies of the 
international aid architecture by representing the needs of the South in an inclusive 
way.164 
The Southern brand of development cooperation brings to the traditional DAC-
driven international aid architecture contrasting norms and practices.165  At the global 
level, Southern donors do not have the incentive to report to traditional global institutions 
or to adhere to the reporting standards of DAC donors.166  Whether as a collective unit or 
individual state, emerging donor countries have not been forced to adhere to norms and 
practices of the North.  Thus, the extent of this challenge to the traditional aid 
architecture is contested in the field of international development cooperation.  In the 
following section, I examine the different perspectives authors hold regarding the 
influence of the emergence of emerging donors with their style of development 
cooperation and practices.   
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Quadir reported the possibility that Southern providers can create a “new aid 
paradigm” by focusing on the “strategic needs of partner countries” rather than 
“advancing the ideological interests of donor countries;” however, the author also 
concluded that emerging donors will not be able to fundamentally alter the existing 
framework without the provision of “more international aid and creation of a common 
vision for development among emerging donors.”167   Chin and Quadir continued with 
the assertion that it is unclear whether the BRIC donors represent a “clear departure” 
from the practices of the North.168  This idea raises the question of whether it makes a 
difference for recipient countries that emerging donors are now an option for partnership.  
According to Burges (2012), emerging donors would not be considered a threat to the 
OECD-DAC if the standard is the delivery of “effective official development 
assistance.”169  Currently, emerging countries such as Brazil, China, and India continue to 
remain outside the DAC.  Rowlands agreed with Quadir that emerging donors present the 
opportunity to create a new aid architecture that attends to their concerns; however, 
Rowlands extended Burges (2012) assertion that emerging donors are not a threat to the 
existing aid architecture with the rationale that the emerging donors are “too 
heterogeneous” to pose a “collective” challenge.170  Gore’s contribution bridged that of 
Quadir, Chin and Quadir, and Rowlands with his assertion that that the traditional aid 
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architecture is actually being replaced by a more representative development cooperation 
with considerations beyond aid, as well as a new development cooperation architecture.  
Six (2009) found that development cooperation and the development paradigm function 
differently for non-Western donors (mainly from the Global South) because they do not 
have the same relationship with “colonial and postcolonial relations” as the Western 
donors.  Non-Western donors “do not use historicist development rhetoric to legitimise 
their interventions[…] and for historical reasons cannot apply the same pseudo-
emancipatory rhetoric as Western development paradigm does.”171  This logic suggests 
that Southern donors’ development cooperation and practices do not necessarily translate 
into development outcomes that are better for their recipients.  Six asserted that 
development and the development cooperation paradigm is altogether questionable as a 
construct for non-Western donors.  He characterized China’s development cooperation in 
Africa as an example of “Realpolitik” and that the Chinese development paradigm 
presents “new programmes’” and paradigms of “world development.”172   The notion of 
world development adds another dimension to the discussion on the challenge emerging 
donors present to the current international aid architecture. 
All of these cited scholars supported the idea that the existence of active Southern 
donors bring with them a qualitative difference that challenges the traditional DAC 
dominated international aid architecture.  Yet, with the exception of Six, these 
researchers did not find Southern development cooperation sufficient to replace or 
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significantly alter what currently exist.  Six’s work tackles the issue of the incompatibility 
of the historical experience of non-Western states with the West.  As the non-Western 
states and the ones upon whom development was done during the colonial and post-
colonial past, they call into question the concept of development of cooperation and the 
development paradigm as a whole.  Rather than assert that Southern donors have the 
potential to act similarly to traditional donors, they could be acting out of their own 
experiences.  Six not only offered an alternative way of looking at the challenge Southern 
donors present to the international aid architecture, but also added to the rhetoric of 
solidarity and mutual benefits commonly found in Southern donor rhetoric. 
 
SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
Latin American countries share the same basic principles of South-South 
cooperation as other Southern countries that includes a discourse on solidarity.173  These 
countries use development cooperation in a way that serves foreign policy interests.174   
Robledo credited the implementation of the import-substitution industrialization model of 
the 1950s as the starting point for Latin American cooperation and the ideological 
positioning against foreign intervention.  By the 1970s, some countries became involved 
with Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC).175    Generally 
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speaking, South-South cooperation has been used by the region as a mechanism to 
achieve development in Latin America and represents a modality that is broad and 
diverse.  For example, South-South cooperation has been used as a means to achieve 
Millennium Development Goals and as a regional development platform to tackle social 
inequality, weak institutions, and poverty.176  Robledo identifies the following South-
South cooperation principles as the ones that guide Latin American development 
cooperation (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7 
Principles of South-South Cooperation that Guide Latin American Development 
Cooperation 
 
South-South principles/schemes used Examples 
Regional integration Mesoamerica Project, ALBA, MERCOSUR 
[or Mercado Comun do Sul (Portuguese)], 
UNASUR 
 
Self-reaffirmation through good 
citizenship and provision of global 
goods 
Global governance sharing-Chile 
Image & global leadership around fighting 
organized crime and governance building- 
Colombia 
Strengthen their regional and global 
leadership 
Foreign policy tool and platform -Brazil 
Petro-cooperation-Venezuela 
Reduce economic dependency & 
consolidate their autonomy 
Technical assistance/training in exchange for 
resources/technology-Cuba 
Non-alignment through alternative 
initiatives 
Proyecto Mesoamerica, the Mexico-Chile 
fund, 
Banco do Sul, the IBSA fund, BRICS bank 
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Leverage in international 
organizations & foster international 
coalitions 
Undermine Western dominance- IBSA 
Global aspiration & reform- Brazil seeking 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council 
Self-legitimization View development cooperation not as 
traditional aid but a developmental approach 
Source:  Robledo, Carmen (2015).  “New donors, Same Old Practices? South-South Cooperation of Latin 
American Emerging Donors.”  Bandung:  Journal of the Global South, 2(3), 1-16. 
Xalma (2013) presented major trends on South-South cooperation between 2007 and 
2011 in Ibero America (including Spain and Portugal): 
Despite a downward trend over the time-period studied, there is an 
average of 800 South-South cooperation projects in the region. Not 
every country reported findings for each year which is a reflection 
of the overall weakness of South-South cooperation record-
keeping.  ie. Venezuela who provided 20% of total for 2009 
however did not report for 2010. 
Six countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba and 
Mexico) tend to represent 95% of the ‘bilateral horizontal South-
South cooperation’ projects and the top six recipients (primarily 
Paraguay, and the Andean and Central American nations) account 
for less than 40% of the total projects received.177 
These trends indicate that the region is dominated by six development providers and that 
60% of the time, these donors engage in bilateral projects with a recipient country who is 
not one of the top recipients. 
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 Muhr (2016) cited South-South cooperation as a function of the “interventionism” 
of “left-leaning” Latin America and Caribbean governments (Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Uruguay, Bolivia) and the pursuit South-South cooperation as “Third World 
emancipation and liberation.”178  Muhr argued that Latin American and Caribbean 
countries have shifted the South-South cooperation focus from the international or 
multilateral level to the regional level through “regionalisms;” the creation of regional 
projects like the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples’ Trade 
Agreement (ALBA-TCP) and sub-regionalist initiatives Petrocaribe, the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), and the 
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).179  Due to the number and level of 
regional and subregional multilateral fora, regionalism is regarded as a major cornerstone 
for Latin American development.180  
Despite commonalities found in the region, there exist two distinct approaches to 
the leadership strategies by the regional forerunners Brazil led by President Lula and 
Venezuela under President Chavez.181  Both countries offer countries in the region 
opportunities to collaborate; however, Venezuela does so through a “statist path” for the 
benefit of a unique brand of socialist development, whereas Brazil offers a “market-
friendly” use of national firms.182  Specifically, Venezuela employs an “ODA-driven 
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foreign policy” premised on the distribution of the country’s oil where the delivery of 
“rents” helps gain and strengthen its partnerships in the region, and Brazil seeks to create 
conditions that are beneficial for its domestic actors first “that might also be attractive to 
key constituencies in partner countries.”183  Both countries engage in bi-lateral and 
regional development assistance; however, Brazil’s approach “requires active 
engagement with the global system”184 and has done so through what Hirst (2010) 
described as “enhanced” multilateral initiatives, particularly through the UN system since 
the 1990s.185 
For example, Brazil was the first country to contribute to the Haiti Reconstruction 
Fund, a multi-country, multi-donor fund in the amount of USD$55million186 and second 
behind the United States at USD$125 million in the amount of dollars donated as 
reported by the HRF.187  The main idea behind the fund is to support the Government of 
Haiti’s “Action Plan for the Recovery and Development of Haiti” and under the Haiti’s 
leadership with a pool of bilateral and multilateral donors for receipt and delivery of 
resources in the areas of post-earthquake recovery, reconstruction, and development.  The 
fund also includes participation with multilateral partner entities who are the Inter-
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American Bank, the United Nations, and the International Finance Cooperation (IFC) of 
the World Bank.  
In contrast, Chavez’s foreign policy rhetoric heavily criticizes multilateral 
financial institutions and threatened to withdraw from all World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreements in 2007.  Like Brazil, Venezuela also 
provided development cooperation for Haiti after the 2010 earthquake through a fund.  
The fund was operated under the umbrella of the regionally based Bolivarian Alliance for 
the Peoples of Our America - Peoples' Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP)-Haiti (ALBA-TCP-
Haiti).  As a part of the ALBA-TCP-Haiti, the Haiti-Cuba-Venezuela Tripartite 
Commission along with Ecuador and Nicaragua worked with the Haitian government to 
create the Alliance for Haiti.  The Alliance for Haiti served as the project for the 
reconstruction of Haiti under the “Plan for the Solidarian [sic] Contribution of the ALBA 
Countries to the Effort of Reconstructing Haiti” action plan which the ALBA Bank 
funded through the “ALBA Humanitarian Fund for Haiti.”188  Despite the fact that Cuba 
and Venezuela were the only “material” contributors to the ALBA-TCP-Haiti initiative, 
they considered it a “collective” action.189  Table 8 below illustrates the institutional 
process and outcome for carrying out this action. 
 
Table 8 
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Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America - Peoples' Trade Treaty (ALBA-
TCP)-Haiti Institutional Process and Outcome   
 
Institutional  Process Result 
Framework ALBA-TCP-HAITI 
Commission Haiti-Cuba-Venezuela Tripartite Commission 
Coordinating Body ALBA National Coordination 
Establishment of Fund ALBA Humanitarian Fund for Haiti funded by the ALBA 
Bank 
Project Alliance for Haiti 
Plan Plan for the Solidarian Contribution of the ALBA 
Information compiled from Paul Amar (2013).  Global South to the Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian 
Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue Industries.  New York:  Routledge, 153-154. 
At each point, the partner countries of ALBA with the Haitian government had control 
over the receipt, delivery or disbursement of funds, services and in-kind donations.   
 
Latin American Approaches to Haiti 
The work of Heine and Thompson (2011) provided a context for approaching 
Haiti on the matter of Latin American involvement in the only low-income country in the 
region.190  Heine and Thompson reported that Haiti as a state in the international system 
and the region of Latin America and the Caribbean is no longer an “outlier”191 for study 
based on a historically rooted “social formation.”192  Instead, they proposed that Haiti, as 
a country, engenders an “altogether different unit of analysis.”193  The study of Haiti did 
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not become a serious subject of study for political scientists and economists until the 
concept of the failing, failed, and fragile state became a concept in 1990s.194  
The rise in the study of failed states as an area of study by scholars coincided with 
the end of the Cold War and a largely democratic Latin America.  It was at this point that 
countries in the region were willing to engage their militaries in peacekeeping operations 
through the UN including ten different countries around the world.195  An ideological 
shift occurred when some Latin American countries began to join the UN peacekeeping 
operations in Haiti, thereby creating a new lens from which to study inter-American 
relations and the issue of what to do about failed states.  
The Foreign Affairs articles by Cressweller (1971) Mintz (1995) were two 
seminal works providing additional insight on the idea of considering Haiti a failed state 
in the region and Latin American involvement in the country.196  It is not uncommon for 
scholars on South-South cooperation and development cooperation to acknowledge 
Haiti’s unique distinction of being the first slave colony to establish its independence.  
Both Cresswller and Mintz acknowledged the relevance of Haiti’s historical experience 
but in a way that analyzes the perspective of its impact on the country’s socio-political 
and economic conditions inside the country.   
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France’s refusal to grant full diplomatic recognition (without indemnity) is an 
example of a punishment exerted on Haiti for liberating itself from white rule and seeking 
to establish itself in the international system on the basis of equality.197  Further, Mintz 
concluded that the resulting ‘polity’ that formed after the unification of the families of the 
former free people of color and the military after independence does not have a 
comparable context in France or the United States.  Other historical experiences for 
consideration include the nexus between the Vodun religion and the power of the 
structures of the regime198 and the role of wageless familiar and cooperative forms of 
farm labor among the peasant class199  Mintz’s analysis stressed that the failure to 
consider Haiti’s historical experience leads to the possibility of plans that are de facto 
unworkable.  At the time of Crassweller’s writing, the Duvalier government was in power 
and offered that the United States should avoid deep engagement in Haitian affairs, but 
instead called for a multilateral approach.200  Mintz wrote nearly 25 years later that North 
American countries default to inattention when it comes to its engagement with Haiti; 
however, the U.S. intervention on the island in 1915 has served to “confirm, sustain, and 
underwrite” the asymmetry already present within Haitian society following the 
independence with their military-based occupation.201  During the 21st century, there was 
a multilateral non-U.S.-led peacekeeping operation approach to Haitian political crisis.  
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The works of Crassweller and Mintz provided a socio-political and economic perspective 
on Haiti by suggesting that the country’s historical experiences that occurred as a result 
of gaining its independence from France should be taken into consideration when making 
plans and developing solutions on Haiti’s behalf.  The logic of all three authors was that 
Haiti as a state should be approached differently by providers of development (North or 
South) because of the country’s historical experiences within the international system. 
Prior to 2004, the main international actors in Haiti were the United States, 
France, and Canada.  Following the political crises and ouster of President Aristide, the 
United Nations Security Council authorized the deployment of a U.S.-led Multinational 
Interim Force comprised of forces from Canada, Chile, France, and the United States for 
a period of three months to help secure the capital city of Port-au-Prince.  In February, 
Brazil voted for Resolution 1529 creating the interim force; however, Brazil did not join 
the deployment of troops.202  In April 2004, UN Security Council passed UN Resolution 
1542 transferring the authority of the Multinational Interim Force to the UN Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) led by Brazil and mainly Latin America forces and police 
from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile who are commonly referred to as the “ABC” countries.  
Chapter VII of the UN Charter grants MINUSTAH to act on behalf of peace, security, 
and human rights for the purpose securing a stable environment in Haiti; however, it also 
authorizes the use of force.   
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ABC countries involvement in MUNUSTAH reflected each of their individual 
country’s “foreign policies and international interests.”203  Feldman, Lengyel, Malacalza, 
and Ramalho (2011) argues that the ABC countries missed an opportunity to utilize their 
participation in MUNUSTAH as a platform to display their international development 
cooperation programs and South-South cooperation activities in Haiti.204  ABC countries 
engagement in UN peacekeeping activities in Haiti marked an ideological change in 
Inter-American relations.   
Between February 2004 and April 2004, Brazil shifted away from its 
constitutional principle of non-intervention and embraced the principle of in-
indifference205 when it agreed to join peacekeeping operations in Haiti.  According to 
Ekström and Alles, “non-indifference is a selective incorporation of assumptions 
concerning preexisting analytical frameworks adapted to Brazilian needs.”206  Brazil had 
taken on the demeanor of the superpowers during the Cold War years who “didn’t 
hesitate to intervene either directly or indirectly in the countries of their respective 
spheres of influence.”207 
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Ekström and Alles wrote that President Lula received a call from the French 
President Jacques Chirac requesting Brazil to assume leadership of MINUSTAH 
(although Brazil had already committed to a future U.S.-led peace keeping operation in 
Afghanistan and Iraq).208  Brazil’s shift in foreign policy around non-intervention is 
attributable to its interpretation of Chapter VII of the category of ‘peace enforcement to 
peacekeeping.’209  Brazilian engagement in MINUSTAH is tied to its quest for candidacy 
to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.210   
Bernabé Malacalza (2014) identified three models of international cooperation in 
Haiti after the 2010 earthquake.211  The three models or approaches to Haiti are as 
follows: (a) public and business diplomacy model (the U.S. is the main actor); (b) the 
alternative solidarity politicization model (mainly aligned with Venezuela and the ALBA 
countries); and (c) the neo-developmentalist diplomacy model (the ABC countries led by 
Brazil).212  According to Malacalza, after 2004, the United States began to “outsource” 
the role of military intervention and  took the position of restructuring and diversifying its 
presence in Haiti in the areas of trade, investment, humanitarian aid, logistical support, 
security cooperation, institutions, electoral monitoring, environmental protection, etc.213  
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Additionally, Malacalza cited the personal impressions of Hillary and Bill Clinton for 
contributing to greater activism in public policy in defense of Haiti.214  Following the 
earthquake, the author noted that The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) pursued a strategy to counteract state weakness in through an 
intersection of defense, development, and diplomacy.215  Both the United States and the 
European Union used Haiti as “pilot case” case for policy assistance in fragile state. 216  
Though the States sought to have a dominant presence in Haiti following the 2010 
earthquake, it was the Clinton Global Initiative with the more dominant presence with 
MINUSTAH and the advisors and operators for private investment in the country.217   
Between 2010 and 2013, the decentralized process of program implementation in the 
United States incentivized NGO participation in development cooperation that by passed 
the Haitian government.218   Overall, the U.S. model is articulated through the U.S. State 
Department, USAID, private investments, and contractors, with special note given to the 
USAID contractor in Haiti Chemonics International.219 
 The alternative solidarity politicization model is rooted in the “Venezuela-Haiti 
political nexus” dating back to Latin American independence.220  Venezuela, Cuba, and 
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Mexico did not participate in MINUSTAH.  Chavez worked directly with then Haitian 
president Rene Preval to provide PetroCaribe funded initiatives around energy and oil.221  
Chavez espoused a strong rhetoric on the importance of supporting Haiti because he 
viewed the Island as a victim of capitalism and imperialism and deserving of Venezuela’s 
assistance due to their historical linkages.  After the 2010 earthquake, Venezuela 
“amplified” its efforts to include actions through Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of 
Our America (ALBA).222  Venezuela provides direct budgetary supports to partner 
country governments, which distinguishes their approach from other models.223   
Between 2010 and 2013, it is estimated that USD$1,007,288, 456 has been transferred to 
Haiti from Petrocaribe.224 
 The neo-developmentalist diplomacy model follows from the Lula’s decision to 
lead MINUSTAH in 2004.225  Lula “acknowledged development thinking” in their 
approach to Haiti including public investment, development, energy, transportation, 
telecommunications and housing construction as the basis.226  Malacalza attributed the 
model mainly to Brazil over Argentina and Chile because Haiti is a priority in Brazil’s 
foreign policy.227  According to Abdenur and de Souza Neto (2014), Brazil has been 
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criticized for “securitization of development,” which means bringing together security 
and development in a way that legitimizing its “security pursuits” rather than 
“socioeconomic development.”228 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This study grounded the idea of South-South cooperation as an alternative 
development strategy for developing countries in the Global South through an 
explanatory framework.  Through this explanatory framework-based literature review, I 
offered a way to work with and contextualize the relationship between South-South 
cooperation and development cooperation to better understand the potential of the South-
South cooperation framework and reasoning for the main hypothesis that South-South 
cooperation effects development cooperation to the extent that the SSC framework can 
strengthen, weaken or have no impact on development on the study’s case countries.  
Through this literature-based explanatory framework, I emphasized the intersectionality 
of past, present, and future when addressing contemporary development cooperation 
between Southern countries.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 This research study originated from the understanding that Brazil and Haiti’s 
antithetical development positions serve as the foundation for interrogating the nature of 
South-South cooperation as an alternative development strategy.  In this study, I 
employed a qualitative, non-experimental research design to explain the rationale for 
Brazil’s collaboration with Haiti through an exploration of the benefits, challenges, and 
strategic rationale for the application of SSC framework between the two countries.  The 
selection of qualitative research approach was appropriate because of the exploratory 
nature of the study.229  Consistent with the qualitative research framework, the purpose of 
the study was to examine the overall cooperation framework between Southern countries 
through answering the central question of, “Why Southern countries engage in South-
South cooperation?” through the Brazil-Haiti case.  The endeavor of uncovering the 
underlying reasons or motivations for the existence of a complex, contemporary 
phenomenon within a particular context is qualitative in nature.  The results of 
quantitative data are often based on numbers that reflect the strength or weakness of the 
relationship of two or more variables.230  The quantitative research method would not be 
able to provide the same data needed to explain the central phenomenon South-South 
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cooperation when Southern actors do not follow systematic reporting mechanism to 
evaluate and assess outcomes on development. 
The specific research design that I used was multiple case study.  Since context is 
a part of the research design, there would be too many variables to control when 
considering the phenomenon of South-South cooperation.231  The selection of two 
countries in a single region from two highly divergent development positions allowed for 
research on MIC and LIC without cross-regional considerations.  China is the remaining 
BRIC from the Global South that offers the possibility of a MIC-LIC pairing (with 
Cambodia, North Korea, or Nepal), similar to that of Brazil and Haiti.  Overall, the 
objective of the study was to examine the rationale for Southern countries engagement in 
South-South cooperation through the case of Brazil and Haiti.  Thus, I sought to capture 
the professional, diplomatic, and political experiences of high-ranking officials, leaders, 
and experts on South-South cooperation and Latin American and Caribbean relations. 
In Chapter 3, I will detail the key aspects of the data collection process and data 
analysis, including the methodology employed to identify patterns located in the data that 
served as the basis for the political analysis put forward in the concluding chapter. 
 
DATA COLLECTION 
In qualitative studies, the researcher acts as the main instrument in the collection 
and analysis of data.232  As the main instrument of the research, I was responsible for 
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recruiting participants, collecting data, and generating findings through data analysis.  For 
the semi-structured interviews and survey questionnaires, I attempted to create a 
participant pool with adequate representation from both case countries so that the ideas 
and sentiments of South-South cooperation would be balanced and representative of the 
provider and recipient perspectives.  For the open-ended surveys, I gave participants the 
option of a phone-in or an e-mail version of the survey questions in the language of their 
choosing (Spanish, English, or French).  I provided this option for those with English as a 
second language who felt that speaking would better convey the intent of their answers 
than writing outside their native language.  One non-English speaking participant 
responded to the survey-questionnaire provided to him in Spanish.  For the collection of 
documents, I searched for as many relevant documents available online in order to 
complement the data from the semi-structured interviews and the open-ended surveys. 
As previously mentioned, the population for the study included current and 
former leaders, government officials, advisors, consultants, and political appointees of 
Haiti and Brazil who have professional experience or knowledge of South-South 
cooperation and scholar-practitioners on Latin America, Brazil, and Haiti.  Additionally, 
the participant pool included individuals from the World Bank and the U.S. government.  
The first group of participants completed individual semi-structured interviews and the 
second open-ended surveys.  The total sample size for the study was 16 participants.  
Table 9 below provides information about the demographic backgrounds and expertise of 
the participant pool. 
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Table 9 
Participant Demographic 
Participant   Credential/Position 
Participant 1  High-level advisor to the Haitian government 
Participant 2   Former high-ranking Haitian official and political appointee 
Participant 3       High-ranking Haitian government official and elected official 
Participant 4  High-ranking Brazilian government official and career diplomat 
Participant 5  Scholar-practitioner and Latin Americanist 
Participant 6  High-ranking official with the U.S. government 
Participant 7  A monitoring and evaluation specialist and contractor with USAID 
Participant 8  Scholar-practitioner on international development 
Participant 9   Latin-Americanist scholar 
Participant 10   Scholar-practitioner on Brazil 
Participant 11   Brazilianist scholar 
Participant 12   World Bank development and disaster relief specialist and scholar-
practitioner 
Participant 13  High-ranking Haitian government official and career diplomat 
Participant 14   Scholar on development and security* 
Participant 15   Scholar-practitioner on Haiti 
Participant 16   High-level consultant to the Haitian government 
* Recommended a document in lieu of directly answering survey-questionnaire. 
 The adequacy of sample size in qualitative studies is often assessed using the 
concept of data saturation, which is the point in which the data no longer produce new 
information that has not been uncovered in the earlier participants.233  Although data 
saturation is not fixed for every study and can be different every time, scholars have 
generally indicated that data saturation can occur as early as six participants.234  During 
the course of this study, data saturation was achieved by adding survey questionnaire 
respondents to the participant pool. 
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 I collected the study data using an explanatory framework of literature, semi-
structured interviews, open-ended surveys, and archival data sources.  The rationale for 
using multiple sources of data was to generate findings that are comprehensive and in-
depth.235  Prior to the recruitment and collection of data, I submitted an online application 
to the university’s Internal Review Board (IRB), which the IRB reviewed and deemed 
Exempt with no special conditions under 46.101 (b) (1) of the Florida International 
University Common Rule’s Exempt Review process.   
I was able to achieve IRB approval; however, I was unable to begin the 
recruitment and collection of data until approximately 1 year later, due to extenuating 
circumstances and the political and economic crises in both case countries during 2015 
and most of 2016.  Although the IRB deemed this study Exempt with no special 
conditions under 46.101 (b) (1) of the Florida International University Common Rule’s 
Exempt Review process, I provided the interviewees and survey questionnaire participants 
a basic description of the study, copy of the IRB approval letter and contact information 
for the chair of the dissertation committee and myself as the researcher. 
Data collection began with developing an explanatory framework on the 
phenomenon of South-South cooperation.  This task required bringing together a variety 
of works that could frame the explanation of why Southern countries engage in South-
South cooperation.  This included academic literature, materials, and reports from 
international and multilateral organizations, institutes, and conferences.  I used findings 
from the literature review to fill in information on the phenomenon and context of South-
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South cooperation that ensued from the findings of the interviews and survey 
questionnaires.    
I scheduled the semi-structured interview discussions and dial-in survey-
questionnaires based on the availability and preference of each of the participants.  I gave 
each recruited participant a specific due date in order to ensure that data collection could 
be completed by the project data collection end date (early October).  I informed all 
participants before the start of the interviews and phone-surveys that the sessions would 
be digitally recorded.  The delay in data collection directly impacted the direction of the 
project to include analysis on the influence of the political and economic crises the 
countries were embroiled on the phenomenon of South-South cooperation.    
The use of multiple sources of data is aligned with the framework of case studies 
wherein various perspectives or tools are used in order to arrive with a comprehensive 
understanding of a phenomenon.236   The selection of a combination of officials, leaders, 
and subject matter specialists at the expert level for the purpose of accessing credible, 
authoritative data sources to strengthen the project’s final conclusions.  Interviews allows 
researchers an opportunity to gain more in-depth information on specific policies and 
initiatives, as well as a way of way to examine the “processes, motivations, and reasons 
for successes or failures.”237  I used primary resources such as newspapers, speeches, and 
validated government documents to provide context and fill the gaps in timelines 
presented by the participants.  In this way, I utilized multiple data sources, which were 
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thereby instrumental in the generation of a narrative that helped to explains the 
phenomenon of contemporary South-South cooperation. 
 
Semi-structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were the primary data collection sources for the study.  
Semi-structured interviews are used in qualitative studies to explore the perceptions or 
experiences of participants using a series of open-ended questions.238  Semi-structured 
interviews are different from structured interviews in terms of flexibility.  I prepared an 
interview guide before the interview so that a set of open-ended questions could serve as 
the main framework of the data collection process.  Consistent with the flexibility of 
semi-structured interviews, I asked follow-up and probing questions to further gain a 
deeper understanding of the responses of the participants.239  I grouped the questions 
thematically to encourage a coherent line of reasoning promoted by the order of the 
questions.  The main task of the interviews was to provide information about why Brazil 
chooses to be in a bilateral cooperation with Haiti, and understand how the South-South 
cooperation framework is beneficial, challenging, and strategic to both Brazil and Haiti.  
The responses of the leaders and other key individuals in the study served as the 
foundation of the themes that I generated during the data analysis.  These themes that 
were based on the analysis of the interview responses were instrumental in answering the 
central research question and the corresponding sub-questions.   
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Open-ended Survey Questionnaires 
Open-ended survey questions served as another source of data for the study.  
Open-ended surveys involve the participation of individuals who are asked to answer 
questions in order to illuminate the diversity of the topic within a population.240   Gillham 
states that “open questions can lead to a greater level of discovery.”241  One of the main 
advantages of the survey questionnaire is the low cost and time involved in gaining 
greater participation rates over a short period of time.242  These factors serve as the main 
differences between individual interviews and open-ended survey questionnaires. 
For the survey questionnaires, scholar-practitioners received seven questions from 
the interview guide that aligned with the main framework of the data collection process.  
The scholar-practitioners shared a common interest or characteristic around South-South 
cooperation, and the open-ended question format offered them the ability to provide 
insight and feedback based on their experience of the phenomenon.  When participant 
preference became an issue around ability to express complex ideas in the written format, 
I offered the questionnaire on a dial-in basis.  I transcribed the audio responses using the 
digital recording and typing into Microsoft Word.  Otherwise, survey-questionnaire 
participants emailed their written responses at a date and time prior to the data collection 
project deadline. 
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Archival Data Sources 
Archival data sources were the last set of materials used for this study, beginning 
at Brazil and Haiti’s initial attempt at technical cooperation in 1982 through November 
2016 and the confirmation of Haiti’s elections and Brazilian presidential scandal around 
corruption.  These documents included key government renderings though documents, 
manuals and statistics on Brazil-Haiti cooperation.  Newspaper articles, official 
statements and press releases and academic writings provided additional background and 
context.  
 
Government Records 
 Government records were an important source of official information and 
statistics on technical cooperation and South-South cooperation between Brazil and Haiti.  
The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations generates extensive data on Brazil’s South-
South cooperation between 2000 and 2014 through its Agência Brasileira de Cooperação 
(ABC) website.  This period highlights the rise and subsequent fall of Brazilian activism 
in technical cooperation including its exceptional years of engagement with Haiti 
beginning in 2004.  Though searches of the Haitian government website did not produce 
the same level of data and information, its Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation 
provided valuable background on the history of planning and position on foreign 
cooperation. 
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Newspapers 
In this study, newspapers were an important source of historical information and 
account of contemporary events.  The press as a source of socio-historical data has been 
used in social science research.243  Leading newspapers with national or international 
circulation from the case countries were selected to provide background, context and 
collaborative findings for the study: in Brazil Folha de S. Paulo (founded 1921) and O 
Estado de São Paulo (founded 1875) and in Haiti Le Nouvelliste (founded 1898) and 
HaitiLibre.  With the exception of HaitiLibre, each newspaper has been in circulation for 
95 years or more.  The South-Florida paper, the Miami Herald (founded 1903), also 
covers issues of importance to both case countries and offers the added benefit of U.S.-
Latin American relations. 
I collected newspaper articles by accessing their online databases and conducting 
a combination of keyword issue area searches.  I used data obtained from the key word 
searches to retrieve information and cross-reference, contextualize, and situate the 
interview and survey questionnaire findings of the respondents.  Taken together, the 
newspaper articles offered a combination of hard facts, national and international 
sentiment, and information to fill in gaps in knowledge and understanding related to the 
main topics of the study. 
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Speeches and Press Releases 
 Speeches and press releases represent official sources and statements of policy 
and opinion.  Speeches in particular offer the tenor and thinking of public officials.  In 
this study, I accessed speeches and press releases from government websites and online 
newspaper databases.  Speeches from Presidents Lula and Martelley figured prominently 
in the discourse on Brazil-Haiti relations, along with statements from other leading 
political officials including Brazil’s Marco Aurelio Garcia and Celso Amorim.  In 
addition, press releases by the Brazilian government announced news and hard facts on 
Brazil’s engagement in Haiti.  Speeches and press releases augment government records 
and newspaper findings on each case country. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
After I collected all the data, I transcribed all transcripts of the interviews 
discussion and open-ended survey questionnaire responses in Microsoft Word, and 
imported, stored and organized the transcripts in ATLAS.ti.  I used ATLAS.ti qualitative 
software to support and facilitate data management, storage and analysis.  I transferred all 
the archival data sources that were collected to the qualitative software for the data 
analysis. 
 I analyzed data using qualitative content analysis in order to generate themes 
central to the research phenomenon of exploring the benefits, challenges, and strategic 
rationale for the application of the SSC framework to Brazil and Haiti.  Qualitative 
content analysis is the systematic examination of data in order to interpret their 
99 
 
meaning.244  The specific procedure involved in the qualitative content analysis was the 
system created by Philip Mayring.245  Qualitative content analysis commenced with 
determining how many data points could be identified.246  This step entailed scanning the 
data for key words and phrases by reading all the data collected from the participants.247  
After acquiring an understanding of the data, I assessed the direction of the analysis.  
 The next important step in the qualitative content analysis procedure is the 
inductive generation of categories through coding.248  The creation of categories and sub-
categories involved assigning labels to different portions of text based on their meaning.  
After generating the list of codes, I grouped the findings into themes and categories.  For 
instance, the participants made multiple mentions of “military and security,” and I noted 
the number of mentions with the assistance of ATLAS.ti.  These categories were 
instrumental in the generation of themes central to the understanding of the benefits, 
challenges, and strategic rationale for the application of SSC framework to Brazil and 
Haiti.  Using the previous example “military and security,” I determined that “military 
and security” was a benefit that Haiti receives from the South-South cooperation.  After 
analyzing all of the data, I also identified “social benefits” and “economic benefits” as 
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part of the “socioeconomic” benefits Haiti receives from South-South cooperation; hence, 
the codes “military and security” and “socioeconomic” were identified under the theme 
“benefits for Haiti,” which addresses the first research sub-question.  I handled and 
analyzed all of the gathered data from all of the data sources with the same procedure.  
The final stage in the qualitative content analysis was the process of interpreting 
the findings.249  I analyzed the results of the coding process within the context of the 
research questions and the purpose of the study.  The end result of the analysis was the 
creation of an explanation of the benefits, challenges and strategic rationale for the 
application of SSC framework to Brazil and Haiti.  The narrative of the case study was 
based on the categories and the sub-categories that were developed from all the data 
collected in the study. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
Limitations pertain to aspects of the study that can be considered as weak or 
potentially problematic to the results250 The first limitation of the study was that the 
effectiveness of South-South cooperation cannot be determined because no 
experimentation or manipulation of independent variables were performed.  I could not 
identify a cause-and-effect relationship because of the limitations of the selected case 
study research design.  The research design mainly explained the benefits, challenges, 
and strategic plans of Haiti and Brazil in engaging in the South-South cooperation.  Case 
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studies only focus on explaining or understanding how or why a phenomenon exists 
within a specific context.251  
The second limitation of the study was that the case study was primarily based on 
the perceptions and experiences of leaders, officials, and scholar-practitioners on Haiti 
and Brazil.  Failing to include the perceptions of other key stakeholders in South-South 
cooperation between Brazil and Haiti may have led to a less comprehensive 
understanding of the case study.   
Lastly, the study was limited to Haiti and Brazil, two member countries of LAC 
that share some common cultural and historical affinities, however are not representative 
of the pairings of other LAC countries who would be categorized as strictly middle 
income.  The study findings may not be generalized to other LAC countries or other 
countries in the Global South with significantly different political and cultural 
background or middle-income. 
 
OVERVIEW OF DATA AND ANALYSIS CHAPTERS 
In the second half of the dissertation, I will present the findings, discussion, and 
conclusion of the study.  In order to understand and interpret the study’s findings, I will 
present important historical factors in Brazil-Haiti relations. 
 
  
                                                           
251 Yin, (2014). 
102 
 
CHAPTER 4 
A TWIN CASE OF EXCEPTIONALISM 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In this chapter, I will analyze the collaboration between Brazil and Haiti.  As 
discussed in Chapter 1, I approached South-South cooperation as a strategy and a 
framework employed by Global South countries in the exploration of the benefits, 
challenges, and strategic rationale for the application of the SSC framework.  The chapter 
opens with an analysis of the differences in application of crisis by the international 
community to Haiti and Brazil in order to contextualize the major themes and sub themes 
that emerged from the data collected.  The chapter then covers the findings of the study in 
sub-sections according to the sub-questions of the research.  The three sub-sections are: 
(a) benefits of engaging in the SSC framework, (b) challenges from engaging in the SSC 
framework, and (c) strategic plans for engaging in the SSC framework.  Under each sub-
section, the themes and sub-themes are presented according to the number of mentions, in 
which the theme with the most number of mentions is presented first.  Summative tables 
are provided after each sub-section.  The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
chapter findings, addressing the role of crisis and the rise of Brazil as a development 
provider in the context of the participants’ findings. 
 
CONTEXTUALIZING CRISIS - HAITI 
Beckett (2013) asked, “Is it possible to speak of Haiti without speaking of crisis?” 
and cited three ways crisis has been applied to Haiti:  (a) crisis as a historical 
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categorization of “decline rather than progress,” (b) crisis as a political norm of the 
nation-state, and (c) crisis as diagnosis by foreign experts “that is used to justify repeated 
foreign invasion and intervention.”252  According to Beckett, Haiti’s social, political, and 
economic problems are rarely viewed as descriptive, but instead intrinsic to Haitian 
society.253  Further, Beckett argued that the problem of state weakness and failure in Haiti 
are more likely caused by political and economic relationships at the international level. 
On the part of Haiti, in the years leading up to the first invasion—between 1888 
and 1915—ten presidents failed to complete an entire term in office due to a combination 
of political assassinations, military coup d’état, and one death by natural causes.  In 
December 1990, Jean Betrand Aristide became the first democratically elected president 
after a 186-year period of authoritarian rule in Haiti; however, Aristide was overthrown 
by military coup d’état in September 1991.  Despite the successful election of President 
Aristide, the long-standing cycle of Haitian economic and political upheaval the use of 
foreign invasion and foreign intervention has continued to be the response of the 
international community throughout 21st Century.  Table 10 lists foreign invasions and 
foreign interventions into Haiti between 1914-present. 
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Table 10 
Foreign Invasions and Foreign Interventions into Haiti:  1914-present 
Year Invasion/Intervention 
1914 U.S. Marines sent to Haiti to remove $500,000 from the Haitian National 
Bank for “safekeeping.”254   
1915-1932 U.S. occupation of Haiti authorized by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson 
with the deployment of the Marines 
1990 United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in 
Haiti (ONUVEH) for the preparation and observation of elections 
1993 United Nations Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti or MICIVIH civil 
mission joint operation between the United Nations and the Organization 
of American States (OAS) for the organization of the presidential 
elections and promotion of human rights 
1997 United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti or UNTMIH for the 
professionalization of the Haitian National Police 
1999 The United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti or MIPONUH for the 
professionalization of the Haitian National Police 
1993-1996 United Nations Mission in Haiti or UNMIH to assist with stabilizing the 
country, professionalizing the arm forces, the creation of a separate police 
force and support of democratic elections 
2004 United Nations authorized a 3-month Multinational Interim Force or MIF 
composed of troops from the U.S., France, Chile and Canada 
2004-
present 
UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti or MINUSTAH succeeded the MIF led by 
a Brazilian force commander and troops mainly of the Latin America (Brazil, 
Uruguay, Chile, Argentina).  Brazil continues to lead the mission.  
Source:  United Nations Peacekeeping, “Peacekeeping Operations.” (webpage access).  Accessed January 
4, 2017.  http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/ 
 
Some writers have considered the initial occupation of Haiti by the United States 
in 1915 (following their 1914 arrival) and subsequently others to be a violation of 
international law and departs from the notion of a country’s right to self-determination.255  
I would argue that the repetitive use of foreign invasion and foreign intervention by the 
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North (and South) as the prescription for resolving situations deemed crisis by the 
international community on behalf of Haiti breeds a combination of Haitian 
exceptionalism.  It establishes support and maintains a norm that foreign invasion and 
foreign intervention are the natural course of action for addressing Haiti’s problems.  
These actions in the eyes of the international community legitimately bypasses the 
Haitian government, the will of the Haitian people, as well as norms around sovereignty 
and right to determination applied to other countries. 
Reisman (1995) discussed five criticisms of the UN Security Council Resolution 
940, and called for the restoration of democracy and the return of President Aristide to 
power through intervention.  A summary of the criticisms were that (a) internal human 
rights violations are not the same as threats to peace, (b) UN military action violates 
Haiti’s sovereignty, (c) military actions in the Caribbean never work, (d) it is illegitimate 
to undertake UN-authorized military action where one country provides the bulk of the 
force, and (e) action in Haiti is not in the interest of the United States.256  He minimized 
these criticisms in favor of justifying the invasion and intervention with the following: 
Much more than Haiti is involved in this incident. The credibility of 
the United Nations, no less than that of the United States, is at stake 
here. The United States has a major interest in the maintenance of the 
United Nations as an effective and legitimate instrument of policy. If 
the United Nations fails to protect elected governments and their 
peoples from ruthless military renegades, especially when the United 
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Nations has certified the election of those governments as free and fair, 
it will have no credibility or legitimacy where it counts-with the 
peoples of the world.257 
The Haitian political and economic situation warrants intervention because of Haiti’s 
geopolitical significance to the North (United States and United Nations).  This political 
conundrum points to Haiti as exceptional because of what their crisis situation means for 
foreign interests, and not Haiti or its citizens per se.  Further, the criticisms Reisman 
identified and then dismissed are instructive for understanding the role of the 
international community and the United States in particular have in influencing what 
ultimately happens to Haiti.   
By the time Brazil came to lead the UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti, a 
longstanding pattern of historical and political crisis that justified foreign intervention 
had already been established.  However, Brazil’s participation in MINUSTAH was an 
exception because the mission contained a Chapter VII mandate allowing the use of 
force, which runs counter to Brazil’s position on non-intervention in the affairs of 
sovereign states.  For this reason, Brazil prefers to participate in Chapter VI engagements 
that limits the use of force.  According to Santos and Cravo (2014), the principle of non-
intervention is “perceived as responsible for keeping the peace in South America over the 
last 150 years and freeing the region from external influence.”258  Thus, the notion of 
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crisis has been applied to Haiti at the international, regional, and state levels in an 
exceptional manner in the case of Brazil. 
 
CONTEXTUALIZING CRISIS - BRAZIL 
 Brazilian crisis can be described by its cyclical political and economic instability. 
Brazil has also been described as the “once and future country,” signifying that it was 
once great and will be great again.  Brazil’s bouts with repetitive economic boom-and-
bust cycles and political difficulties have not warranted the application of crisis in a 
similar manner, as Beckett cited that the case is with Haiti.   
In 1964, the military seized power amidst a combination of political, economic, 
and social issues.  Between 1964 and 1989, Brazil was ruled by an authoritarian, military 
regime.  Additionally, a new constitution in 1967 and amendment in 1969 severely 
restricting political and civil rights and liberties.  The Brazilian military government held 
presidential elections in 1964, 1966, 1969, 1974, 1978, 1985.  The first free direct 
presidential election did not occur again until 1989.  The early years of this period (1968-
1980) are referred to as the “Brazilian Miracle” because of Brazil’s exceptional economic 
growth under military rule.  The height of the Brazilian Miracle coincided with the 
presidency of Emílio Garrastazu Médici between 1969 and 1974.  Under his leadership, 
there was heightened detention, censure, intimidation, and torture carried out by the 
Brazilian military and extrajudicial death squads. 
The late 1970s through the 1980s are referred to as the “Lost Decade” for 
countries in Latin America.  The Lost Decade represents a time of economic stagnation 
when these countries could no longer sustain the rate and level of indebtedness to 
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international banks stemming their macroeconomic policies of the 1970s.  According to 
Márcio Moraes Valença, Brazil’s indebtedness dates back to 1822 when it agreed to pay 
an indemnity to Portugal as a condition of its independence.259  “From that date until the 
early decades of this century, the British dominated the credit market to Brazil but were 
later overtaken by the Americans.260  However, the author specifically attributed Brazil’s 
1980s debt crises to two factors:  (a) “shady deals” the military dictatorship made and (b) 
“unfavorable” terms of agreement on loans that had to be rescheduled for non-payment.  
Arguably, the 1960-1980s can been seen as one of Brazil’s darkest economic, 
political, and social times, had it not been for the period of the “Brazilian Miracle.”  The 
international community did not make the diagnosis of foreign invasion or intervention 
despite clear evidence of economic and political crisis.  I would argue that Brazil’s 
economic successes between the 1960s and 1980s provides an example of the 
international community the application of the notion of crisis to Brazil differently than 
Haiti.  The notion of crisis is framed as a descriptive experience and is not necessarily 
viewed as intrinsic to Brazilian society. 
 
THE RISE OF BRAZIL AS A DEVELOPMENT PROVIDER 
 Following the Lost Decade of the late 1970s and 1980s, Brazil began a rise in 
stature politically and economically.  Politically, Brazil became more powerful in the 
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international affairs through soft power;261 similar to the Global South, Brazil 
experienced sustained economic growth.262  Brazil’s favorable status in the 2000s was 
reflected in its shift into becoming primarily a provider of development assistance to 
other Southern countries.263  According to Costa Vaz and Inoue, Brazil negotiated with 
the United Nations Development Programme for a gradual approach to phasing out 
countries that were donor countries receiving development assistance.264  Over the course 
of Lula’s administration, development cooperation with other countries increased.  Figure 
2 shows that Brazil increased its foreign assistance by 60% between 2005 and 2010 with 
an average growth of 8%.265 
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Figure 2. Brazilian foreign assistance (2005-2010). 
Source:  Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and Inter Press Service cited by Pete Troilo 
(2012) in “Setting Its Own Course, Brazil Foreign Aid Expands and Evolves.” DEVEX.  Accessed January 
20, 2017.  https://www.devex.com/news/setting-its-own-course-brazil-foreign-aid-expands-and-evolves-
78631 
 
Further, Brazil began to increase its numbers of new technical cooperation projects 
(through ABC its development agency) with other countries with 23 new projects in 2003 
to 413 in 2009, and increasing the number of recipient countries it provided technical 
cooperation to from 21 to 58.266   
Despite the fact that Brazil began to significantly increase the amount of resources 
allocated to technical cooperation with the South including supplemental peacekeeping in 
support of its participation in MINUSTAH, its investment in South-South cooperation is 
not indicative of a sustainable commitment.  According to Burges (2007), the Brazilian 
                                                           
266 Cabral and Weinstock (2014). 188. 
 
111 
 
government exhibits “a combination of unwillingness and inability” […] “to finance its 
South-South strategy in South America outright” during the Cardoso and Lula 
administrations.267  He continues that “Rather than subsidizing the production or purchase 
of goods with government payments, attention was again turned to the capacity-building 
and information lacunae-addressing precepts at the heart of the neostructuralist 
approach.”268  Cabral and Weinstock’s research study on Brazilian technical cooperation 
found significant operational weakness at ABC, the flagship development agency: 
Despite the growing number of SSC projects, ABC is understaffed, with only 160 
employees in total. Of these, approximately 100 are working directly on technical 
cooperation and managing more than 400 SSC projects across 58 countries. This 
shortage is aggravated by the fact that a significant number of employees comes 
from Itamaraty, being either career diplomats, chancellery officials or chancellery 
assistants […]. As such, they can be relocated to other areas according to the 
MRE’s needs and interests.269 
This expansionist period in development cooperation with other developing countries 
came at the expense of administrative planning and forecasting. 
I would argue that Brazil actively sought to distance itself from its authoritarian 
past and economic depressed years through its pursuit of South-South cooperation as 
foreign policy strategy.  Brazil’s middle income and middle power status was 
consolidated during the period of its active engagement in development cooperation with 
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a foreign policy driven by South-South cooperation.  The ongoing and internationally 
focused crisis situation in Haiti presented an opportunity for Brazil to be perceived as a 
big developing country versus struggling, crisis-ridden politically and economically.  In a 
sense, Brazil needed Haiti, and Haiti’s crisis represented a solution to Brazil’s crisis 
image abroad.  In the rest of this chapter, I will present the qualitative findings of the case 
study. 
 
FINDINGS 
This section includes the findings of the study derived from the qualitative content 
analysis described in the previous sections.  I used four semi-structured interviews, 12 
open-ended survey questionnaires, and archival documents as the data sources.  The 
information for the study came from a population of current and former leaders and 
officials in Brazil and Haiti who have professional, diplomatic, or political experience in 
engaging in the South-South cooperation and scholar-practitioners on Latin America, 
Brazil and Haiti.  I selected the participants through purposive sampling with the 
following criteria: (a) having a clear understanding of the SSC framework, (b) having 
experience in being involved in making decisions or implementing policies pertaining to 
South-South cooperation, (c) having relevant experience and knowledge of South-South 
cooperation in both Brazil and Haiti, and (d) being willing to participate in either face-to-
face or online individual semi-structured interviews or accomplish open-ended survey 
questionnaires.  I analyzed all of the collected data through qualitative content analysis 
following the guidelines of Mayring (2003).  The findings are organized into three sub-
sections, where each sub-section addresses a corresponding research question: 
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1. How do Brazil and Haiti benefit from engaging in the South-South cooperation 
framework? 
2. How challenging is the SSC framework for Brazil and Haiti? 
3. How is engaging in the SSC framework strategic for both Brazil and Haiti?  
The three sub-sections are: (a) benefits of engaging in the SSC framework, (b) challenges 
from engaging in the SSC framework, and (c) strategic plans for engaging in the SSC 
framework.  Under each sub-section, I will present the themes and sub-themes according 
to the number of mentions, in which the theme with the most number of mentions is 
presented first.  I will provide excerpts from the three data sources to support the 
findings.  A summative table is provided at the end of each sub-section. 
 
 
Benefits of Engaging in the SSC Framework 
This sub-section addresses the first sub-question, which includes the findings 
pertaining to the benefits of Brazil and Haiti for engaging in the SSC framework.  I 
divided the themes into benefits for Haiti and benefits for Brazil.  The sub-themes for 
Haiti are (a) socioeconomic and (b) military and security.  The third theme represents an 
anomaly with findings pointing to the benefit for Haiti as (c) more beneficial to Brazil.  
The themes and sub-themes are summarized in Table 11 at the end of this sub-section 
 
Socioeconomic Benefits for Haiti  
Being a low income, low development country, Haiti has benefitted from its 
cooperation with other Southern countries, particularly from Brazil, as stated by the 
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participants.  The majority of the participants mentioned multiple times that Haiti has 
received socioeconomic benefits from the SSC framework with Brazil.  The respondents 
shared how South-South cooperation has helped Haiti in socioeconomic issues on 
poverty, development of agriculture and infrastructures, and foreign investments.  A 
high-ranking Haitian government official and elected official said that: 
One of them main advantages of South-South cooperation would be the mutual 
understanding of what is needed.  As we [the South] have tackled poverty on all 
fronts, there's a deeper understanding of what it takes to deal with that poverty or 
target the people.  And they [Brazil] send in know how to allow for a better 
understanding based on the South-South idea. 
A high-level consultant to the Haitian government expanded upon the idea that the South 
offers Haiti’s options that were not present before when he stated: 
Traditionally, Western capitals namely Washington, Ottawa and Paris, and then 
obviously those of Europe, traditionally impose many times on Haiti.  At the end 
of the day the Golden Rule “he who has the gold makes the rules.”    Haiti has 
been under financial issues for as long as we can remember.  Haiti is not 
necessarily fully sovereign in its decision-making and has to respond to different 
supranational interests or international interests.  [Haiti] having a new partner like 
Brazil, who does not necessarily respond in the same fundamental way as the 
North in the elaboration of its policies… certainly gave a new impetus to Haiti to 
explore options in agriculture or energy or otherwise.  
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In a document on Brazil-Haiti cooperation received from the Brazilian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Division of the Caribbean of Itamaraty,270 the author outlined specific 
details on bilateral projects: 
In 2011, with the beginning of the  new government in the Caribbean country, 
Brazilian cooperation has managed to successfully complete the project "Water 
tanks to capture and store Rain Water in the Region of Ganthier- Phase I, " 
building 70 tanks in places of difficult access in the region of mountains, 
accompanied by the training of agents and local organizations in the technical 
construction and water management.  During the evaluation of the project, one of 
the most important contributions was the reduction of disparities between urban 
and rural areas in the municipality of Ganthier.  Its most significant social impact 
was releasing women and children from the obligation traditionally assigned to 
them to fetch water.  It is believed that in this way, the women of the region may 
exercise economically profitable activities, and children can attend school. 
Haiti has also benefitted from the creation of the HRF established by the Haitian 
government and the international community in order to finance post-2010 earthquake 
reconstruction of which Brazil is a leading contributor.  As of September 30, 2016, the 
HRF has received USD$401.40 million of USD$411.40 million pledged cash donations 
from 19 donor countries.271  As stated in Chapter 2, Brazil was the first to contribute to 
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the fund and second to the United States.  A high-ranking Haitian government official 
and elected official spoke on the import role Brazil has served with the fund, however 
expresses concern for the future of South-South cooperation for both countries when he 
stated: 
The other thing is Haitians have received [USD$]65 million dollars from the Haiti 
Reconstruction Fund from Brazil.  So, Brazil was very aggressive in the manner 
they contributed.  They have been one of the most visible partners in the post 
reconstruction era.  There have been two government changes in Brazil. We 
[Haiti] do not know what the future holds for it [South-South cooperation].  So, 
it’s difficult to say today what South-South cooperation is going to be when there 
is a different government for both Haiti and in Brazil. 
From the survey questionnaires, respondents spoke of the potential of the South-
South cooperation for Haiti.  A high-ranking U.S. government official claimed that: 
Haiti could benefit from the Brazilian expertise in critical areas that are central to 
the development of the Haitian economy e.g. agricultural development/food 
security, energy efficiency/climate change alleviation and more.  Brazilian 
technical experts can spend time in Haiti working with local leaders and experts 
in a progressive yet hands-on manner.  
A scholar-practitioner on Haiti added that: 
Politically, it’s about benefits, and I think it’s a particular type of capitalism 
framework that Brazil can offer Haiti.  It is my understanding that certain types of 
industry could be [an] important model to think about how and to harness South-
South cooperation [between the two countries].  They [Brazil] can provide 
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education, as in the ways they can think about agricultural industries and 
obviously, their airlines, airports and airplanes.  I would also say thinking about 
ways to promote sporting industries is also critical.  Brazil has been quite 
successful. 
This respondent also addressed Brazil’s inspirational role and potential to positively 
influence Haitian society when he opined that Brazil can inspire new ways of 
approaching public policy around education and race:   
I think there are different ways Brazil went through an affirmative action 
movement in the 1970s, which made some headway for many of the black 
Brazilians and Afro-Brazilian to enter into various sectors within the educational 
system and industries.  By no means is it [Brazil’s affirmative action movement] 
where it should be, but that [movement] could be quite influential for other 
nations and an inspiration for countries like Haiti to think about ways to educate 
its populations. 
The respondent also cited that:  
Haiti could benefit from engaging in South-South cooperation because there is a 
kind of a racial component emphasis of blackness, working class… the poor.  
That is critical.  And if other nations could understand how we [Haiti] can bring in 
the working poor, the people that have been marginalized into the working class 
and find ways to educate them, find ways to celebrate them culturally with what 
these peoples have contributed to the nation would be beneficial. That could mean 
bringing them in through the arts, media as well as into the political realm. […]  
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It’s about elections, it’s about class and it’s about promotion of agriculture that 
Haiti can learn from Brazil.  
Haiti benefits from South-South cooperation with Brazil in tangible and intangible ways.  
A World Bank development and disaster relief specialist and scholar-practitioner stated 
“Haiti benefits from Brazilian government and NGO development experience and by 
having professional soldiers, some of African origins, as MINUSTAH troops and 
officers.”  This draws attention to Brazil’s inspirational role in the SSC framework, 
particularly around inspiring the majority black population on the island when they see 
other black individuals in positive leadership roles.  
Though respondents found that the benefits the SSC framework offers Haiti are at 
once immediate and direct with great potential for more, their cooperation is also 
believed to be interrupted.  According to the high-level consultant to the Haitian 
government, “Haiti could have benefited technically with this corporation had it been 
taken to the end game… we would have had Brasilia invested in Haiti and creating jobs.”  
A high-level advisor to the Haitian government expressed a similar sentiment, citing 
examples of breaks in continuity: 
But, this [Artibonite River Dam project] is the biggest thing that Brazil had to 
offer Haiti.  That’s all that I can recall.  The Artibonite project used Brazilian 
engineering.  And they took a very holistic approach such as flooding an artificial 
lake that leads to generating energy that distributes energy.  Let's have systems in 
place so that people pay for the energy.  Let's have an irrigation system.  Let's do 
land titles.  The Artibonite plan was very very detailed.  It's a real shame what 
actually did happen.  The last I heard about this project was that the Haitian 
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government was looking into getting the Chinese to finance it with the Chinese 
Development Bank.  The project cost 160 million and Brazil basically said I will 
put up 40 but you [Haiti] will have to raise the other 120.  So, the 120 needs to 
come from somewhere else.  The only other tangible cooperation they had with 
Haiti was the donation of 30 or 40 ambulances they brought.  There was a little 
technical cooperation in agriculture and this and that. 
A 2014 news report by the Haiti Reconstruction Fund entitled “USD$38.6 Million for 
Budget Support from Haiti Reconstruction Fund” contextualizes the example given by 
the respondent.  The article states that “USD$38.6 million representing USD$US74 
million in funding between 2010 and 2014 had been disbursed to the Haitian government 
in support of its budget.272  However, the same report detailed that another USD$56 
million had been identified for energy, agriculture, health, and professional training 
projects through the reallocation of USD$40 million that had previously been set aside 
for a hydropower dam on the Artibonite River “at the request of the Brazilian 
government.”273  According to a 2012 new article reported by Folho de S.Paulo on 
September 1, OAS—a privately-owned engineering and infrastructure multinational 
conglomerate—intended to provide construction work on the Artibonite River Dam 
hydroelectric plant; however, OAS lost interest after setting up a logistics base in Haiti.274 
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This example points to a Brazilian inspired initiative that was interrupted before 
outcomes could be produced.  Brazil made an initial donation of USD$55 million to the 
HRF and then actively sought the remaining USD$40 million from the North to finish 
constructing the dam.  If Brazil, who initiated the Artibonite River Dam project, received 
USD$40 million from the HRF, it would have in effect represented a reimbursement on 
its initial USD$55 million donation to the HRF.  Ultimately, the Haitian government 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Chinese government to finance the 
Dam at USD$240 million.275  This example also points to Brazil’s exhibiting regional 
leadership through multilateral for a, which were closely related to gaining access to 
opportunities and markets in the region.  However, Brazil did not complete the project by 
either public sector or private sector trajectories. 
This same high-level advisor to the Haitian government also gave another 
example of the introduction of a social-economic program for women and children that 
began as a bilateral initiative between Brazil and Haiti and grew to include the 
Dominican Republic and required Venezuelan financial assistance.   
[Haiti] sent teams to Brazil to learn and understand Fome Zero/Zero hunger and 
Bolsa Familia. This was really the first time in Haiti's history any social program 
had been instituted.  It’s great.  It was being funded by Venezuela's oil money. It 
was their first time ever…that people were getting monthly stipend when moms 
would send their kids to school with the conditional cash transfers.  So they kind 
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of built the program on the Brazilian model.  But do you know who gave the 
technical cooperation to set it up?  It was the Dominican Republic.  That's 
interesting…well I guess interesting but makes sense since they're right there and 
they do it as well.  But the whole idea was if Lula lifted forty-something million 
people out of poverty into the middle class we can to.  But now they're [Brazil] 
sliding back into maybe not poverty but certainly not where we would hope they 
would be. 
Brazil is well-known for the success of its national hunger programs such as Bolsa 
Familia (Family Purse) and Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) and is with providing technical 
assistance to other governments throughout the South.  Analogous to the Artibonite River 
Dam Project, implementation of this Brazilian initiative required financing from another 
country. 
 
Military and Security Benefits for Haiti 
 Aside from socioeconomic benefits, Haiti received military and security benefits 
from the SSC framework, especially after the massive 2010 earthquake.  A high-level 
advisor to the Haitian government stated that Haiti has received a significant sum of 
donation from international assistance; however, Brazil provided Haiti with additional 
military protection.  A high-level advisor to the Haitian government stated that: 
In Haiti after the earthquake, the entire world poured into Haiti.  It was a big deal 
to Lula and Dilma to say we're helping Haiti.  There are 3,000 Brazilian troops in 
Haiti that rotate every 6 months so after 5 years you're looking at 30,000 Brazilian 
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troops that have been through Haiti.  They go back and they talk about it and 
gives them the sense of Brazilian pride that we can take care of a few. 
Similarly, a high-ranking Haitian government official and elected official shared: 
The fact is that the Brazilians helped stabilize Haiti for over 11 years with their 
military presence.  We find that Brazil contributed greatly to the Haiti 
Development [Reconstruction] Fund.  It was another sign of success.  We 
achieved the clean energy with that as another sign of success.  We have the 
success when we define it as the successful implementation of these projects. 
Brazil’s  Division of the Caribbean from Itamaraty report on improving public security 
through training 30 Haitian police officers through courses such as “Technical training 
for instructors of defensive tactics: police self-defense” and “Training of the Haitian 
National Police” implemented in partnership with the Brazilian Federal Police.   A Latin 
Americanist scholar added:   
  Against this background, it should be emphasized that the size of the Latin 
American presence since 2004, both for the landing of peacekeepers as well as the 
large number cooperating in the region and the experience of interaction 
developed, is unprecedented in the history of the Caribbean country. 
However, not every respondent viewed Brazil’s presence in Haiti as positive nor 
its contributions to development impactful.  A former high-ranking Haitian official and 
political appointee strongly protested the military and economic presence of Brazil in 
Haiti, while making reference to Brazil as an “occupying force:” 
Going back to 2004…the situation has gotten worse in Haiti even though Brazil 
was the leading country that spearheaded the transition from the coup against 
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Aristide from the election in 2006 to 2010.  None of those areas from 2006 to 
2010 when there was the earthquake was the economy good…even with the 
election and Haiti having more money because of Petrocaribe from Venezuela.  
And, Brazil was a key partner in Haiti responsible for MINUSTAH, the 
occupying force.  The statistical information on health, jobs, economic 
development have not gotten better.  In fact, the country’s economic growth went 
down instead of going up.  So, therefore there has not been much of a change for 
Haitians for having Brazil there as a partner. 
Additionally, this respondent stated: 
Remember Brazil was an occupying force.  Brazil was the head of the occupying 
military force in Haiti.  Brazil had new markets.  Haiti is the largest country in the 
Caribbean basin and a large consumer market.  Brazil was there as an occupying 
military being the regional military power in the region.  Haiti provided Brazil an 
opportunity.  Now the obstacles…obviously the first one is there was no real 
massive grand plan for economic development when Brazil came in.  Brazil came 
in to contain the political situation that the U.S. did not like and the French did not 
like.  They used Brazil as a proxy to make sure that the ruling elite remain and 
there was no change in Haiti.  So, therefore they did not come with an agreement 
to do any kind of development in Haiti.  And besides we have to remember if 
Brazil wanted to bring development to Haiti, they had to compete with other 
companies that was already there… the French companies… the Dominican 
companies.  So, one wonders whether Brazil wanted to compete with those 
companies.  
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The high-level consultant to the Haitian government predicted that the likelihood of 
future Brazilian military assistance to Haiti would be weak:  
I don't think you're going to see Brazil again with what they did with Haiti leading 
the military component.  I don't think you're going to see that from Brazil for very 
long for at least a generation…if ever. 
A Brazilianist acknowledged the problem Haitians have with the presence of 
MINUSTAH by stating, “MINUSTAH is actually challenged by many Haitian voices.”  
However, a Scholar-practitioner and Latin Americanist cited that the benefits that Haiti 
receives from through cooperating with the international community cooperation includes 
Brazil outweighs the drawbacks: 
Haiti has benefited much from external cooperation including Brazil´s. 
MINUSTAH, which in my view has been an important mission. The fact that it 
has not accomplished many of the expectations Haitian´s might have had does not 
render its accomplishments and importance mute. 
Benefits for Haiti are More Beneficial to Brazil 
Some participants believed that Brazil received more benefits than Haiti for 
engaging in the SSC framework.  A high-level advisor to the Haitian government 
explicitly said that, “Brazil gets a whole lot more out of its cooperation with Haiti and 
still does.”  A high-level consultant to the Haitian government sought to explain how 
Brazil’s leadership of MINUSTAH was beneficial in the role of a provider of South-
South cooperation: 
Brazilian military leadership also brought with it other areas of corporation [such 
as] economic cooperation, police cooperation, agricultural infrastructure.  Now as 
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it relates to Brazil; South-South cooperation is an instrument of economic 
development for Brazil in countries.  Forget the last 12 to 24 months what you've 
seen with regards to Brazil [allegations of high-level corruption] and multilatinas.  
What we call multlatinas are Brazilian multinational conglomerates.  But, for the 
past 16 years the Brazilian companies have dominated in regions where they 
previously had no presence prior.  In Africa mostly but also in Latin America 
where usually European and North American Anglo-Saxon groups had all of the 
big infrastructure projects, all the big concessions or oil…of hydroelectric dams.  
Suddenly you started seeing the political agenda of South-South cooperation and 
[with it] came a lot of new deals for Brazil to expand internationally.  And grow 
significantly to the point of becoming some of the biggest engineering and 
construction firms in the world. 
This respondent addressed the importance of Brazil’s political and economic nature of 
Brazil’s South-South cooperation agenda in the Global South.  Thus, Brazil’s 
engagement in South-South cooperation with Haiti is regarded as instrumental in 
increasing the economic presence of Brazil by way of the expansion of Brazilian 
companies. 
 
Political Power Benefits for Brazil 
Some participants believed that engaging in the SSC framework has provided 
benefits for Brazil, although the benefits mainly lay on politics and market opportunities.  
One scholar-practitioner and Brazilianist wrote in the survey questionnaire that: 
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Looking at South-South cooperation today is something that helps Brazil to 
promote its internationalization.  It is easier for us [Brazil] to deal with people 
from developing countries; it’s easier than to deal with people from developed 
countries where they will be very worried. 
This scholar-practitioner and Brazilianist stated that Brazil used to be a closed country; 
however, Brazil’s engagement in South-South cooperation with Haiti allowed Brazil to 
“relate with developed countries as well, in a more proactive way.”  A high-level advisor 
to the Haitian government stated that “Brazil took great pride in being part of the Core 
group.  The Core group in Haiti are the top countries.  You have the U.S., France, and 
Brazil.” A high-level consultant to the Haitian government likewise stated that: 
First you have to understand why Brazil got into Haiti in the first place Haiti. 
Your go back to 2004 when Lula was just starting his first mandate and he was a 
year into his mandate.  He came with a very different and innovative social 
economic model in Brazil.  And he came also with the ambition to bring Brazil to 
the forefront of global governance.  
Two respondents referred to Haiti as a “laboratory” for South-South cooperation.  A 
scholar-practitioner and Latin Americanist stated: 
Haiti has been a great laboratory for Brazil and other Southern countries in the 
realm co cooperation as they have been able to try out their strategies in this area. 
I think Haiti has provided them with a great opportunity to test their credentials in 
a very challenging environment. 
 A high-ranking Brazilian government official and career diplomat claimed that 
the South-South engagement of Brazil was highly influenced by the Worker’s Party (PT), 
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and has contributed to an unconventional diplomacy. The respondent said that 
representatives were sent to Southern countries for initiatives that were “not exactly 
representative of professional diplomacy” as defined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
[Itamaraty]. 
 Six participants believed that Brazil’s involvement with South-South cooperation 
as a development cooperation provider would help with securing a seat in the United 
Nations Security Council.  A World Bank development and disaster relief specialist and 
scholar-practitioner stated in the survey that: 
Brazil’s gain is regional—and to a lesser extent, global—soft power, and it 
enhances its international profile as a relevant global player, which is compatible 
with its longstanding demand for a permanent seat at the UN SC. 
A Latin-Americanist shared:   
Brazil assumed military leadership of MINUSTAH knowing the possibility of an 
eventual success of the mission would involve greater recognition for itself within 
the UN system, something that could eventually favor their aspirations for a 
permanent presence in the Security Council.   
Another scholar-practitioner on International Development added:   
The benefit of engaging in South-South cooperation would go beyond Haiti.  
Brazil wants to identify itself as a key player in international relations.  It’s 
seeking a seat on the UN Security Council… it’s about being a regional 
hegemon…seeking to mobilize support to be viewed as a key actor.  They desire 
to emerge as a regional hegemon.  Brazil in the region is partly symbolic and 
political.  They want to be viewed as a key actor.   
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A high-level consultant to the Haitian government questioned the legitimacy of Brazil’s 
ongoing quest to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council when stating: 
Therefore, Brazil in keeping with their own long-term strategy to make the case 
for systemic reform of Security Council, decided to take on the leadership of the 
military component of the peacekeeping of 2004.  They wanted to demonstrate 
that they had the shoulders and the backbone of a permanent Security Council 
member.  Twelve years into it, obviously it's fair to say that the Security Council 
is not for Brazil and members systematically veto Brazil.  Brazil's leadership has 
been seriously eroded first and foremost at home.  And I think history will not 
absolve Lula and what we call the Amorim doctrine.  Celso Amorim was the 
foreign relations minister of Brazil for three terms under Lula and Dilma and then 
defense minister. 
This respondent connected Brazil’s unsuccessful quest to obtain a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council to Brazil’s overall foreign policy that seeks to reform the UN 
Security Council through its peacekeeping efforts. 
 
Market Benefits for Brazil  
Brazil’s presence in Haiti came to be beyond achieving a minimum level of 
stability and adopted an integrated approach focused on institutional strengthening, 
promoting development and new markets.  A former high-ranking Haitian official and 
political appointee stated that Haiti provided Brazil with new market opportunities.  
Specifically, this respondent said: 
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It depends on which side you're looking at it.  Brazil was looking at new markets 
in Haiti.  For Haiti it did not do that much because Brazil could not change the 
political landscape in Haiti.  There hasn't been much of a political benefit for 
Haitians.  But for Brazilians there's been an increase in their share of the market 
in Haiti by Brazilian companies. 
Table 11 summarizes the two sets of themes and sub-themes of benefits for Haiti and 
Brazil for engaging in the SSC framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Benefits of Engaging in the SSC Framework 
Themes Sub-themes Number of mentions  
Benefits for Haiti Socioeconomic 22 
 Military and security 11 
 More beneficial to Brazil 5 
 
Benefits for Brazil Political power 11 
 New market 8 
 
 
Challenges from Engaging in the SSC framework  
In this sub-section, I will address the second sub-question.  Brazil and Haiti 
encountered various challenges that were endemic of collaboration between two countries 
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that had not sorted out what it meant to engage with each other.  Challenges they held in 
common were (a) Haiti is disorganized, (b) economic challenges and (c) corruption. 
A high-ranking Brazilian government official and career diplomat indicated that 
the early years of Brazil’s South-South cooperation under the Worker’s Party was 
conducted as a “secret diplomacy” and in part with other governments like Cuba, 
Venezuela, and Bolivia.  A high-level advisor to the Haitian government mentioned 
issues of discrimination in South-South cooperation.  A scholar-practitioner on Haiti 
similarly shared that “the South-South cooperation framework has a lot to do with 
whether or not nations really truly see practically non-white nations within the Global 
South as their equals culturally and politically.”  A scholar-practitioner and Latin 
Americanist said that South-South cooperation cannot be taken at face value and it is a 
mistake that Southern countries make.  The participant cited that South-South 
cooperation has “failed to seriously build on the valuable experience of developed 
countries” and “has contented itself to criticize in ideological ways that are not always 
constructive and lucid.”  A high-level advisor to the Haitian government brought 
attention to the lack of diplomatic personnel: 
I think a larger diplomatic presence in Haiti would have been helpful.  There are a 
lot of troops and a lot of what they do is security-related so the diplomats focused 
on that.  I think what they could have done was to develop guys working at their 
embassy […].  The Brazilian diplomatic present isn't that strong in Haiti.  I'm not 
saying they don't have people there but they should have more of an emphasis on 
that.  But, their Brazilian ambassadors were consumed with their military troops 
than the development. 
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Nonetheless, the participants identified three themes as obstacles that Brazil and Haiti 
encountered as challenges in engaging in the SSC framework.  The themes are: (a) Haiti 
is disorganized, (b) economic challenges, and (c) corruption. 
 
Disorganization of Haiti 
The participants noted that an issue with the SSC framework is that Haiti is 
disorganized.  A high-level advisor to the Haitian government shared how the lack of 
coordination led to the failed launch of an energy project in Haiti and narrated that the 
lead up to Brazil’s presentation of the Artibonite hydro plant project for Haiti was an 
example of disorganization.  The Haitian president was “running late” to meet with “top 
Brazilian generals” to discuss the project.  It appeared to the Brazilians that the Haitians 
did not recognize the importance of the occasion as the Brazilian military had spent five 
or six million dollars putting the design together for the blueprint of the project.  
 A former high-ranking Haitian official and political appointee explained that the 
disorganization in Haiti was rooted in communication.  They said that, “communication 
is one of the most expensive development items in Haiti.  Therefore, it creates problems 
for businesses.” 
 
Shared Economic Challenges of Brazil and Haiti 
The participants identified funding and investment and allocation of funding as a 
challenge in the SSC framework.  A Brazilianist noted that Brazil is experiencing an 
economic crisis that affects the sustainability of providing for Haiti.  A former high-
ranking Haitian official and political appointee raised a similar concern, and stated that: 
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 But the big question for Brazil at the moment within Brazilian society is that their 
 economy has regressed.  Brazil is unable to support the projects as they used to 
 because there's no money anymore. 
A high-ranking Haitian government official and elected official stated that budgeting 
from other countries was an issue for the SSC framework.  This participant stated that: 
One challenge of South-South cooperation is the change of government and 
political will.  The [issue being the] budgeting involved for the helping of 
countries.  Brazil is going through a crisis with the political issues with the 
[Brazilian] oil companies.  There are all those scandals so that their foreign 
outlook is sometimes overshadowed by the domestic issues. The other challenge 
is that the funds that were given [to Haiti] for the reconstruction is from a global 
fund so it isn’t country-run or country-owned.  
A high-ranking official with the U.S. government elaborated in the survey questionnaire 
that: 
 Lately it may be more challenging given the recent economic downturn.  The 
 government may be hard-pressed to find the resources to invest in R&D and other 
 knowledge goods at the expense of recurrent expenditure.  
A high-level advisor to the Haitian government added that “Haiti had a really tough time 
and with the Chinese in Latin America” and that the Haitian officials were advised “to be 
careful” and expressed worry over who will “reap the benefits” of allowing the Chinese 
to bring “their Chinese workers to build whatever they need to.”  Furthermore, aid from 
South-South cooperation may have “created jealousy from other countries” due to having 
received “free money for Haiti that everyone else has to get as a loan.”  
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For several respondents, the severity of the economic challenges facing Brazil 
along with a change in political parties with the impeachment of the president whose 
party expanded South-South cooperation calls into question the sustainability and 
viability of Brazil’s continued engagement in South-South cooperation.  A scholar-
practitioner and Brazilianist stated:  
In the first Roussef administration, South-South cooperation had lost momentum 
– and budget.  The situation has aggravated in the past few years, with the acting 
President shifting foreign policy, in direct criticism to the Lula period. […]  I 
think that this could be a second challenge, and not only about finance but having 
more actors involved on South-South cooperation.  Brazilian society mainly.  So I 
think we need another framework.  The government doesn’t speak about South-
South cooperation anymore. 
A high-level consultant to the Haitian government added:  
[Brazil’s current administration] is sending a message to Washington and to the 
former allies that the former power has fallen.  He wants to reassure financial 
markets and political leaders in Western capitals that they are no longer flirting 
with the ALBA countries.  South-South cooperation is now an economic doctrine. 
 
Shared Challenge of Corruption for Brazil and Haiti 
Some of the participants perceived that Haiti faced a challenge in corruption that 
hinders the advances of the SSC framework.  High-ranking Haitian official and political 
appointee narrated that: 
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If you’re following the situation where Haiti was given millions of dollars 
between 2000 and 2015…a lot of that money was managed by [an NGO 
organization]. Some of that money went to the [NGO organization].  I don't know 
if you read the stories. They got two hundred million dollars and reallocated it.  In 
Haiti, the [NGO organization] workers were given money and were living on a 
cruise ship. 
The high-ranking Haitian official and political appointee continued that: 
The [NGO organization] managed the Haitian money to build an industrial 
complex in the North and they were supposed to hire 10,000 people but less than 
ten thousand people are in the park now.  They're supposed to also build public 
housing and never finished.  So maybe they will but you have to look at the 
agenda…they chose people with no knowledge about management who were 
[also] corrupt. 
 A high-level advisor to the Haitian government shared that international in-kind 
aid that went through Customs was often held up, and Customs officials “asked for 
money to let something through.” They said that donations such as ambulances could be 
held up in the Customs office at the airport. A scholar-practitioner on Haiti summarized 
Haiti’s challenge as a combination of political ineptness and issues related to the legal 
system: 
The challenge has been trying to wrestle and overcome the stigma of being 
politically inept [which includes the] stigma of political chaos and economic, and 
financial corruption.  The country is unstable, and that has been the challenge.  
How you think about cooperation impacts investment.  So, not knowing whether 
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the laws will be able to promote external foreign investments in favor of foreign 
partners has been a legal challenge for a long time.  It has been very difficult for 
foreign investors to own property, [or] run a company.  
 Conversely, a high-level consultant to the Haitian government believed that the 
challenges from engaging in the SSC framework mainly stems from the international 
community.  The respondent stated: 
I think that the international community knew going in to Haiti it would not have 
the capacity to absorb the programs and execute them highly, in a fiduciary 
acceptable way for whoever the donor owners may have been.  It was a way for 
the international community to also default on their own commitment because the 
engagement was for 10 years and 5 years into it nobody wants to give a dime 
anymore.  They say the Haitians spoiled an opportunity and in a great part is 
responsible for their own demise. But the thing is that it seems that Haitians have 
been in a state of post-traumatic stress disorder for so long that they don't know 
what it is to be normal.  We have stripped them of their sovereignty, which strips 
them of their identity, stripped of their sovereign capacity to respond to natural 
disaster.  We will not allow them to remobilize a military police force or a 
mandatory service for their youth to serve as a military force.  There is the total 
disintegration of the authority of state, local and municipal areas.  Basically, there 
is lawlessness.  There is survival of the fittest and Darwin at its most barest.  The 
international community is in a great part responsible, but not solely responsible. 
A scholar-practitioner on international development addressed Brazil’s historical 
role in South-South cooperation when making the observation that South-South 
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cooperation is not challenging for Brazil however questions the future of the SSC 
framework under new and different administrations.  The respondent stated: 
South-South cooperation is not challenging for Brazil …they have played an 
important part in the world of South-South cooperation historically.  Brazil serves 
as a voice for autonomy and independence.  For Brazil politically, South-South 
cooperation is the right framework for international relations and international 
development.  But given current economic and financial crises South-South 
cooperation would require them to be in the forefront and provide technical 
assistance.  They would have to be able to continue providing for Africa and Haiti 
and the crises would make it difficult.  You also have the leadership crises with 
the departure of the current administration if it happens.  A different 
administration would change their engagement with the developing world.  Lula 
was aggressive.  With a new government they may want to do something 
different.  We don’t know what the future engagement will be. 
The table below (Table 12) lists the challenges that Brazil and Haiti’s share in common.  
 
Table 12  
Challenges from Engaging in the SSC Framework 
Themes Number of mentions  
Haiti is disorganized 13 
Economic challenges 12 
Corruption 4 
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Strategic Plans for Engaging in the SSC Framework 
This sub-section contains the responses to third sub-question, in which the 
participants revealed the strategic plans of Haiti and Brazil in engaging in the SSC 
framework.  Three themes emerged as their strategic plan.  The first theme represents a 
shared plan to (a) cultivate partnership, the second theme (b) Haiti learning to be self-
sufficient, and the third theme (c) Brazil’s leadership in the South. The themes and 
number of mentions are summarized at the end of this sub-section. 
 
 
 
 
Shared Strategic Plan to Cultivate Partnership 
Some of the participants believed that Brazil’s help came from the Brazilian’s 
“willingness to help.” A high-ranking Haitian government official and elected official 
believed that Brazil and Haiti worked as partners, and stated that: 
By adding assistance to the country you get one more hand.  It is helpful having a 
partner in South-South cooperation because a lot times they are similar; culturally, 
historically, racially or otherwise…geopolitical similarity, so it helps.   
A monitoring and evaluation specialist and contractor with USAID believed that the 
partnership brought positive results to both countries, and stated in the survey that:   
In concept, the collaborative initiative is positive.  It can provide a level of 
cooperation among nations that respects culture, history and national interests.  
Given the recent challenges in Brazil (political, economic and social), a solid 
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partnership with another South hemisphere country, in this case Haiti, gives 
Brazil the opportunity to share its experience, knowledge and commitment as an 
alternative view to the issues it faces within its own country.  Haiti is a country in 
need of much partnership and extended cooperation with another South nation 
(Brazil) that understands, at least in part, the demographic, education, and 
economic infrastructure gives purpose to the larger nation with experience, 
capacity, and intellectual/experiential resources to share. 
 A high-ranking official with the U.S. government believed that by partnering with 
Brazil, “strategically, Haiti may be able to increase the pace of its development by 
learning from the experiences with the partner state.”  A scholar-practitioner and Latin 
Americanist perceived that Brazil partnering with Haiti resulted in “humbling challenges 
of partnering with Haitian stakeholders and that demonstrating sustainable development 
results could open the door to better cooperation practices.” 
A high-ranking Haitian government official and elected official added that the 
Brazil-Haiti partnership was strategic for both countries: 
Two countries decided to work together…So there is humanitarian on one side 
and geopolitical considerations on the other side to gain some votes.  Both 
countries can benefit and be to their advantage.  This cooperation can be 
beneficial. They have no reason not engage. 
 
Haiti Learning to be Self-sufficient 
 Strategically, Haiti aims to eventually attain self-sufficiency.  A monitoring and 
evaluation specialist and contractor with USAID stated that partnership through South-
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South cooperation allowed Haiti to achieve tangible short and long-term leadership 
stability goals, and added that technical assistance “is a key to building the human 
infrastructure that will give hope and possibility to its citizens.”  The framework offers a 
strategic, though ambitious, path of cooperation that can invest in long term reform.”  A 
High-level advisor to the Haitian government explained that Haiti did not only need 
financial assistance.  Haiti also needed “technical training.”  Member countries of the 
South tend to provide financial assistance, and Haitians welcomed the technical 
assistance provided by the United States.   
However, in the e-mail communication with the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; Division of the Caribbean for Itamaraty, technical assistance provided by Brazil 
was enumerated, dating back to the promulgation of the Basic Agreement on Technical 
and Scientific Cooperation in 2004 (signed 1982). The document showed that: 
From 2004 to 2009, several actions in the framework of technical cooperation for 
development were held between Brazil and Haiti.  Noteworthy is the project 
"Management and Reconstitution of Vegetation Cover of Mapou Basin" held in 
partnership with Spain, which aimed to increase forest and agroforestry for 
productive, ecological, energy and food purposes; as well as the recovery of 
degraded areas at risk of erosion, landslides and floods.  In its execution, it built a 
nursery from which 200,000 seeds of native plants were planted in Haiti.  It is 
also worth of notice the success of the project "Promotion of Sustainability 
vegetable production in the region of Kenscoff," lead by Embrapa and the 
Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR), 
which allowed the creation of a vegetable seed bank in partnership with the 
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Association AFE Neg Kombite.  They formed about 200 farmers and distributed 
150 kits of seeds adapted to soil and climate conditions of the region. 
The document also revealed that after the 2010 earthquake, Brazil committed to training 
Haitian health professionals, and continued with agricultural and infrastructure projects.   
A high-ranking Haitian official and political appointee narrated why there is a 
need for technical assistance and the potential of South-South collaboration with:   
Haiti has been very good in producing local peanuts that are organic peanuts.  
Peanuts are a basic staple for the people of Haiti and a good source of protein.  
The famers make money from it.  It creates rural jobs.  It has a lot of commercial 
value.  The U.S. had an overproduction of peanuts so they decided to put together 
an economic package that included bringing peanuts to Haiti.  Suddenly the 
farmers that were cultivating their own peanuts in Haiti could not survive on 
peanuts.  The U.S. peanuts are cheaper than the local Haitian peanuts.  The U.S. 
was saying they were helping Haitians with the package but they are killing local 
production.  And once you kill local production, farmers don't have the ability 
farm their land. So they farmers go to the city but there are no jobs and there are 
no opportunities.  This has been the U.S. policy since the 1980s.  The U.S. on 
behalf of economic aid has killed local production.  There is a difference between 
southern countries and the North.  In the 1980s, Thailand went to Haiti and you 
know what they did.  Thailand went to Haiti and opened a technical and research 
center.  They trained the Haitians in production.  They produced a variety of 
grains.  With the right production there was an increase production. This is what 
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south-south collaboration is.  Haiti as a result had large rice production because of 
the collaboration from Thailand. 
A scholar-practitioner on international development acknowledged that the North 
remains relevant to the South, but the South should seeking greater independence: 
It’s pragmatic and strategic and [however] you can’t get rid of the U.S. and other 
Northern states and institutions but moving away from depending on them in 
terms of geopolitics is good.  Haiti must be smart enough to play the game well 
and to not be dependent.  And they know how to play the game well. 
Furthermore, a monitoring and evaluation specialist and contractor with USAID claimed 
that partnership with Brazil provided Haiti with more opportunities, and a Brazilianist 
similarly expressed that “engagement with Brazil allows Haiti to diversify its donor 
contacts to both gain new experience and resources, and to reduce its dependence on 
traditional donors.”  Yet, a high-ranking Haitian government official and elected official 
reiterated the importance of “Brazilian private sector investment in Haiti” for the SSC 
framework to be sustainable and that “we tried to build efforts with Brazil but where not 
successful.”  […] For any development effort to be successful there is a role for the 
private sector that does the investment in the economy in strengthening the economy, job 
creation and profit-making.”  
 
Brazil’s Leadership in the South 
Although Brazil may be categorized as a middle-income country, Brazil is also 
considered a forerunner in South America and the Global South.  Some of the 
participants believed that aside from aspiring for a permanent seat on the UN Security 
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Council, the strategic plans of Brazil in engaging in the SSC framework also included the 
intention to lead the South.  A high-ranking official with the U.S. government claimed: 
This may allow Brazil to strategically position itself as a leader in the South in the 
provision of technical assistance and act as a knowledge center to other Southern 
states. This may also allow Brazil to gain diplomatic soft power when trying to 
advance topics important to its national interest in regional or international fora.  
A monitoring and evaluation specialist and contractor with USAID expressed the same 
belief: 
Brazil has a legitimate opportunity to be a leader in South nation growth and 
progress in the coming decades.  It can provide a strategy for others, though 
smaller, nations to embrace ideals, enterprises, and possibilities.  Among exports, 
Brazil can export its progress on human rights (still emergent), its economic (a bit 
challenged these days) and its commitment to the democratic future (now under 
close review with the impeachment proceedings).  How Brazil emerges from 
these internal challenges is critical to its role as a leader in the Southern 
Hemisphere. 
One participant looked at Brazil’s participation in South-South cooperation as greater 
than the promoting the principles of South-South cooperation and more in alignment with 
the realist view of power politics.  The scholar-practitioner on international developments 
cited: 
On the surface it appears to be about solidarity, horizontality… [however], it’s 
about realism.  Solidarity, that is what’s driving it initially.  It is about obtaining 
the Security Council seat.  They deserve the leadership role.  Their language 
143 
 
doesn’t support it.  It’s about classic realism, national interest within South-South 
cooperation. 
Further, a scholar-practitioner and Latin Americanist added: 
It raises its stature as a major southern power.  Brazil believes that by 
championing a new approach it is carving out space in the global existing 
architecture.  In my view this is important and many of the points advocated by 
Brazil are relevant to open up a frank conversation about the shortcomings of 
cooperation in general. 
However, one Scholar-practitioner and Brazilianist questioned how deliberate 
Brazil was in pursuing the SSC framework as a strategy.  The participant stated: 
I just don’t know to which extent this was a strategy.  In the literature about 
strategy, there is that may be called “imagined strategy.”  And, I think this could 
not be more liked imagined strategy.  I mean something that came spontaneously 
and that later the government identified it as useful for this mean and started 
promoting it you know.  I do not think it was planned from the beginning you 
know.  Maybe for some international organizations that promoted it [it would be 
true].  Maybe they had something like this in mind. But I’m not sure in the case of 
Brazil; it was something really, really planned. 
Table 13 contains a combination of themes that Haiti and Brazil hold in common 
(cultivate partnership) and individually (Haiti learning to be self-sufficient and Brazil’s 
leadership in the South). 
 
Table 13 
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Strategic Plans for Engaging in the SSC Framework 
Themes Number of mentions  
Cultivate partnership 11 
Haiti learning to be self-sufficient 7 
Brazil’s leadership in the South 4 
 
 
SUMMARY OF THE QUALITATIVE FINDINGS 
Based on the findings from the three sub-questions, several main themes emerged 
that can explain why Brazil and Haiti engage in a bilateral cooperation.  These reasons 
can be classified as the following (a) political, (b) economic, and (c) leadership 
aspirations within Latin America and the Global South for Brazil and increasing self-
sufficiency for Haiti. 
To address the first sub-question, data analysis revealed that the SSC framework 
has provided benefits for both Haiti and Brazil despite the economic standing of both 
countries.  South-South cooperation has provided mutual benefit in the socioeconomic 
market of both Haiti and Brazil.  Through South-South cooperation, Haiti has also 
received military and security aid from Brazil.  Nonetheless, some participants believed 
that Brazil received more benefits in the partnership due to the rise in political power, and 
the opportunity for a new market.  
 For the second sub-question, the challenges for Haiti and Brazil in engaging in the 
SSC framework were the disorganization of Haiti, economic challenges, and government 
corruption.  The expense for communication led to the lack of communication in Haiti; as 
a result, miscommunication and lack of coordination often occurred.  Haiti was 
considered the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, and Brazil has also been 
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experiencing an economic crisis, which made economic struggles as a challenge in the 
partnership.  Finally, Haiti’s government—particularly the Customs officers—were 
corrupt and took advantage of donations from international sources. 
 For the third sub-question, I identified three themes as the strategic plans of Haiti 
and Brazil in engaging in the SSC framework.  The first strategy of both countries was to 
cultivate partnership.  The participants generally regarded the partnership of Haiti and 
Brazil as mutually beneficial.  The second strategy was for Haiti to learn to be self-
sufficient.  In that way, Haiti may be able to develop its own manpower in the long run.  
The third strategy involved Brazil’s leadership in the South.  Brazil has been more 
economically powerful than other LAC countries, and providing for Haiti has contributed 
strategically to increasing Brazil’s political power in the region and by extension 
globally.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 Prior to the presentation of the study’s findings based on content analysis, I 
situated the application of crisis in political and economic histories of Haiti and Brazil 
and the rise of the latter as a development provider.  Brazil and Haiti both experience 
political and economic crisis, receive international development assistance, and have 
been regarded as “exceptional” within the international system.  Each country’s 
exceptionalism is regarded differently.  For Haiti, the notion of crisis is viewed as 
intrinsic to Haitian society and for Brazil descriptive of an economic and political cycle 
the country periodically face as a developing country.  Foreign invasion and intervention 
was applied to Haiti repeatedly between 1914 until the time of the writing of this study 
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2017.  Further, Brazil’s period known as the “Brazilian Miracle” could exist as the same 
time the Brazilian citizens experienced censorship of the media, political oppression, 
torture, exile, forced disappearances, rapes, and killings at the hand of an authoritarian 
regime and military dictatorships without the application of foreign invasion or 
intervention.  I would conclude that Brazil distanced itself from its experiences with 
political and economic crisis between the 1960s and 1980s through its foreign policy 
activism under President Lula, which called for an aggressive international cooperation 
strategy around development cooperation with other Southern countries.  Brazil no longer 
wanted be perceived as a crises-ridden, crisis-prone developing country in need of 
assistance from the North but one that could act as a regional leader and global player.  
Haiti figured prominently in Brazil’s plan to achieve international recognition and 
became Brazil’s top recipient of Brazil’s development assistance.  
 Contextualizing the notion and application of crisis to Haiti and Brazil anchors the 
analytical and political analysis of the remaining chapters.  First, only one respondent 
forcefully opposed the presence of Brazil as a legitimate response to the political and 
economic situation in Haiti.  Second, none of the participants suggested foreign 
intervention or invasion of Brazil while it grapples with it political and economic crisis 
underway since 2015.  Lastly, only one respondent (the same one who opposed Brazil’s 
presence) questioned the impact of Brazilian contribution to development cooperation in 
Haiti.  Overall, this section transitions into answering the central question of the study 
with a more in-depth discussion of the findings of the study’s contributions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A SOUTH-SOUTH SOLUTION? 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the overall cooperation framework 
between Southern countries through the central question, “Why Southern countries 
engage in South-South cooperation?” based on the collaboration between Brazil and 
Haiti.  Consequently, I divided the examination into three tasks.   
The first task began by discussing the findings presented in the previous chapter.  
The findings followed from the study’s sub-questions, which explore the benefits, 
challenges, and strategic rationale for the application of the SSC framework: 
1. How do Brazil and Haiti benefit from engaging in the South-South cooperation 
framework? 
2. How challenging is the SSC framework for Brazil and Haiti? 
3. How is engaging in the SSC framework strategic for both Brazil and Haiti?  
I sourced the findings from qualitative interviews and surveys with leading experts and 
practitioners on South-South cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean.  The 
study’s participants included high-ranking officials in the governments of Brazil and 
Haiti, including current and former cabinet members and diplomats.  They have been 
involved in commenting on, setting the agenda, making decisions on, and implementing 
South-South cooperation in general and Brazil and Haiti in particular.  These elite 
respondents were chosen because they have acted on behalf of the state or in the case of 
academics possess in-depth, expert knowledge of South-South cooperation in the region.  
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Specifically, this task involved discussing the findings within a larger social-political 
context.  This required the use of archival data sources and academic literature.   
The second task endeavored to explain the hypothesized relationship between 
South-South cooperation and development cooperation.  The goal was to ascertain 
whether South-South cooperation affects development cooperation in one of three ways, 
strengthening, weakening, or having no impact on development in Brazil and Haiti.  The 
findings were used to address the direction of the impact of South-South cooperation on 
development cooperation in terms of benefits, challenges and strategic rationale for the 
SSC framework.  Figure 3 provides a framework of the graphic representation of the 
approach taken to answer the directionality of the hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis South-South cooperation affects development cooperation by 
strengthening, weakening or having no impact on development in 
Brazil and Haiti. 
Purpose of 
the sub- 
questions 
 
To explain the hypothesized relationship between South-South 
cooperation and development cooperation through the Brazil-Haiti 
SSC framework 
 
 How do Brazil 
and Haiti benefit 
from engaging 
in the SSC 
framework? 
How 
challenging is 
the SSC 
framework for 
Brazil and Haiti? 
How is engaging 
in the SSC 
framework 
strategic for both 
Brazil and Haiti? 
Directionality 
 
Strengthen 
 
   
Weaken 
 
   
No Impact    
 
Outcome 
 
Figure 3. Graphic representation addressing the hypothesis framework. 
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In the third task, I set out to answer the main research question by connecting the 
study’s overall contributions.  The study’s contributions include the explanatory 
framework and qualitative findings.  Figure 4 provides a framework of the graphic 
representation of the contributions for the study’s findings. 
 
Central Research 
Question 
Why Southern countries engage in South-South 
cooperation? 
 
 
 Study 
Contributions 
 
Findings of the Explanatory 
Framework 
-literature 
Findings of the Qualitative 
Research 
-in-depth interviews 
-survey questionnaire 
-data source 
Overall Result of 
the Study’s 
Contributions 
 
Figure 4. Graphic representation addressing the central question framework. 
Overall, I took into account the three tasks of the chapter.  The tasks were based upon the 
findings of the study’s contributions and data sources.  The chapter then segues into the 
dissertation’s concluding chapter. 
 
DISCUSSION OF THE QUALITATIVE FINDINGS 
Benefits for Haiti Engaging in the SSC Framework 
Generally, the participants found that the partnership with Brazil provided Haiti 
with “socioeconomic” and “military and security” development.  Brazil provided Haiti 
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with humanitarian assistance amounting to USD$24 million in 2014,276 and has been 
providing military and security development since Brazil became the leader of the UN 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004.  Researchers have estimated that 
Brazilian spending in Haiti approximated USD$500-510 million as of 2011.277 
 Participants did not address Brazil’s technical cooperation with Haiti in 
significant detail.  Either the participants were unfamiliar with Brazil’s bilateral technical 
cooperation with Haiti, or did not deem Brazil’s technical cooperation with Haiti as 
relevant when responding to the question of benefits for Haiti engaging in the SSC 
framework with Brazil.  The Brazilian government provided an e-mail communication 
from the Division of the Caribbean for Itamaraty revealing that prior to the 2010 
earthquake in Haiti, the technical cooperation spearheaded by the Brazilian Cooperation 
Agency was largely focused on forestation and agricultural development of Haiti.278  
Additionally, the 2007 Brazilian Ministry of External Relations document entitled 
“South-South Cooperation Activities Carried out by Brazil” indicated that Haiti received 
technical cooperation towards democratic consolidation and organization of local and 
legislative elections (USD$1,000,000), electoral observation (USD$7,486.67), and access 
to new information and communication technologies (USD$365.40).279  In 2010, per the 
e-mail communication with the Division of the Caribbean for Itamaraty when the 
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earthquake devastated Haiti, the Brazilian government implemented health and safety 
projects such as a partnership with the Albert Einstein Hospital to combat cholera, and 
the "Study for Strengthening Actions for the Promotion of Family Agriculture and Food 
Security and Nutrition (Local Procurement)."   Road infrastructure projects also 
commenced in 2012, and technical training of the Haitian National Police was also 
conducted by the Brazilian government.280  Recently, Haiti completed the "Revitalization 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development of Haiti's Farm 
(MARNDR)" project with the donation of a weather station and an irrigation system, as 
well as assistance with farm infrastructure, all of which contributed to a higher number of 
corn production in Haiti for the year 2016.281  Negotiations for building a vocational 
training center were also finalized, and the project was proposed to begin in 2017.282  A 
project involving the training of the Haitian Health Authority signed in 2010 was due to 
be completed in 2018.283   
 Brazil is also well known and celebrated for its development cooperation with 
Haiti in the area of humanitarian assistance (particularly following the 2010 earthquake) 
and military and security development.  Moulin and Thomaz (2016) identified Haitian 
migrants as “humanitarian” immigrants who fled Haiti following the 2010 earthquake 
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and arrived in Brazil seeking a better life.284   Brazil received approximately 38,000 
migrants of Haitian descent between 2010 and 2015.285  In January 2012, Brazil’s 
National Council on Immigration began to issue prospective Haitian immigrants 5-year 
permanent humanitarian visas under the Brazilian National Immigration Council (CNIg) 
Normative Resolution n.97, which resulted in their issuing around 50,000 humanitarian 
visas between 2012 and 2016 and the Brazilian government another 43,871 permanent 
resident visas.286  The adoption of the humanitarian visas by the CNIg is considered a 
“special immigration policy.”287  A February 7, 2012 New York Times article reported 
that the Brazilian government sent over $500,000 in aid to the Acre and Amazonas to 
support these states who received an influx of Haitian immigrants.288  Given the sizeable 
Haitian immigrant population, I expected that the participants would focus upon and 
emphasize the importance of the Brazilian governments liberal immigration policy 
towards Haitians following the 2010 earthquake as a benefit for Haiti. 
Furthermore, the qualitative findings revealed little regarding Brazil’s existing 
technical cooperation activities with Haiti, although Brazil largely defines its 
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development cooperation as technical cooperation with Southern countries.  For the years 
2000-2014, the Ministry of Foreign Relations Brazilian Cooperation Agency online 
database documented 110 South-South cooperation projects with Haiti; all but four have 
since been deemed “complete.”289  Additionally, the Division of the Caribbean for 
Itamaraty stated that two bilateral projects have been scheduled for 2016, with one 
continuing through 2017.290  The scale of Brazil’s bilateral technical cooperation since 
2004 appears relatively small, given Haiti’s population that includes over 10 million 
inhabitants and scope of ongoing political, economic, and environmental issues.  It may 
appear that Haiti gained a great deal from engaging in the SSC framework with Brazil 
through the socioeconomic and military and security development benefits.  
Nevertheless, the qualitative findings of this study revealed that Haiti could have 
potentially gained a great deal more from their collaboration, had Brazil placed a greater 
emphasis on increasing its technical cooperation. 
Moreover, participants repeatedly referenced the potential of the SSC framework 
to benefit Haiti.  Participants were keen to address the role that race could play in 
improving the lives of Haitians through lessons learned from Brazilian innovative 
approaches to public policies in the realm of education, affirmative action, industry, and 
culture.  According the CIA World Factbook, Haiti is ethnically 95% black and 5% 
mulatto and white.291  A World Bank development and disaster relief specialist spoke to 
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mentorship through modeling with the presence of professional soldiers in the 
MINUSTAH of African origins.  A scholar-practitioner of Haiti summed up the potential 
of the Brazil-Haiti framework for Haiti when alluding to the possible translation of 
Brazilian successes with improving the social conditions of its Afro-Brazilian population 
in the context of the majority dark-skinned Black and impoverished Haitian population. 
The minority elite are mostly lighter-skinned and more affluent.  Modest success in this 
area could present a huge impact on conditions in Haiti—according to a 2012 World 
Bank household survey, “More than 6 million out of 10.4 million (59%) Haitians live 
under the national poverty line of USD$2.42 per day, and over 2.5 million (24%) live 
under the national extreme poverty line of USD$1.23 per day. It is also one of the most 
unequal countries, with a Gini coefficient of 0.61 as of 2012.”292 
 Included among the sub-themes on benefits for Haiti was the sub-theme that 
Haiti’s engagement with Brazil was “more beneficial to Brazil.”  The emergence of this 
sub-theme under “Benefit for Haiti” indicates that for some participants, the SSC 
framework between Brazil and Haiti does not fully adhere to one of the core principles of 
South-South cooperation which is “mutual benefit.”  Since the principles of South-South 
cooperation are more expansive than traditional Northern assistance, the SSC framework 
allows for public sector and private sector development.  Public sector and private sector 
development were not found to be a significant benefit that Haiti was either able to 
capitalize upon or be given the opportunity to develop in its collaboration with the 
Brazilian government or market.  Besides the technical projects mentioned by the 
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Brazilian government, the Artibonite River Dam project and the Viva Rio project were 
the only initiatives participants identified or mentioned by name.  Though the Brazilian 
model of development cooperation is based upon its provision of technical cooperation, 
this has not been so in its collaboration with Haiti since the initial signing of the Basic 
Agreement on Technical and Scientific Cooperation in 1982.  Technical cooperation has 
been modest between the two countries since the agreement was promulgated in 2004.  
Overall, the qualitative findings are consistent with Malacalza’s assertion that Lula is 
responsible for Brazilian development cooperation with Haiti with his decision to allow 
Brazil to lead MINUSTAH.  However, the findings contest the traditional notion that 
Brazil’s cooperation focuses primarily on technical cooperation, at least in the case of 
Haiti. 
 
Benefits for Brazil Engaging in the SSC Framework 
Predominantly, the qualitative findings revealed that Brazil opened up 
opportunities for political power and a new market through its partnership with Haiti.  
Some participants perceived that engaging in South-South cooperation was an easier 
framework for Brazil because coordinating with developing countries is easier compared 
to more developed countries in the Global North.  In addition, South-South cooperation 
with Haiti enhances the ability of Brazil to promote its internationalization within a 
political sphere.  The qualitative findings also revealed that Brazil’s engagement in 
bilateral cooperation with Haiti could lead to a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council.  A permanent seat on the UN Security Council could lead to Brazil gaining more 
diplomatic power, which would advance their own interests and priorities on a global 
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level.  There is a basic belief that Brazil’s involvement in Haiti could enhance the 
international profile of Brazil as a regional and global leader.   
Being a middle-income country, Brazil has been a donor and a recipient of 
development; nonetheless, in among the LAC countries, Brazil has gained a strong 
influence, specifically in Haiti.  Brazil played a role in intervening with the Haitian 
government following the political upheaval surrounding President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide when it was decided they would assume leadership of MINUSTAH after the 
U.S.-led Multinational Interim Force departed 3 months following his ousting.  Following 
the review of the document by Marroni de Abreu (2013) and Vazquez (2013), the 
Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) had supported the act of enhancing their leadership 
practices in low development countries of the South.293   Brazilian engagement in Haiti 
could show their effective leadership in a country that has lots of challenging problems.  
Specifically, the challenging case of Haiti serves as an opportunity for Brazil to 
experiment, test and apply leadership through its development cooperation activities.  
Hirst and Nasser makes mention of Brazil’s peacekeeping operation as a “challenging 
learning process” as it sought to develop and a “Brazilian way” of peacekeeping through 
its leadership command of the MINUSTAH.294   
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Further, pacification methods employed by the Peace and Pacification Units in 
Rio were “first experimented with in Port-au-Prince.”295  Since 2004, MINUSTAH’s 
Community Violence Reduction Unit has implemented violence reduction intervention in 
Haiti through its institutional support of a Rio de Janeiro based Brazilian NGO, Viva 
Rio.296   In 2006, in response to concerns of then President René Préval about the 
presence of security details (MINUSTAH and the National Haitian Police) in slum areas 
such as Cité Soleil, Viva Rio made the following recommendation given the situation on 
the ground in Haiti:   
The strategy suggested for MINUSTAH was to use Latin 
American expertise and to apply the experiences of the 
various UN peacekeeping battalions to the Haitian context.  
At the time it was initiated, seven of 12 troop contributors 
to the mission were South American states.  In the case of 
the Brazilian battalion, the Haitian situation was understood 
in terms of their experience of working in favelas and with 
gang violence in Brazil.297 
Thus, Brazil derived benefits that directly helped its domestic security situation while at 
the same time fulfilling its international responsibilities.  In this instance, the groundwork 
                                                           
295 Ibid. 
 
296 Yazdani, Mariam, Bercovitch, Daniela and Charles-Voltaire, Jane (2014).  “Knowledge Transfer on 
Urban Violence:  From Brazil to Haiti.  Environment & Urbanization.  International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED).  26(2): 457–468. 
 
297  Ibid. 459. 
 
158 
 
for the development cooperation emerged from experiences gained in Brazil and then 
later in Haiti through the nexus of UN peacekeeping and security.  
 The findings pointed to Haiti offering Brazil a new market for Brazilian goods.  A 
high-level consultant suggested forgetting scandals regarding Brazilian officials and 
“multilatinas” and instead focusing on what these multilatinas or Brazilian multinational 
enterprises (MNE)298 have accomplished in markets commonly reserved for “European 
and North American Anglo-Saxon” entities.  Brazil is largely regarded as a closed 
economy when compared to the more liberal economies in LAC such as Chile. Thus, 
engaging in bilateral cooperation with other Southern countries including Haiti could lead 
to an expanded market economy.  The study participants perceived that Brazil could 
increase its market share by engaging with Haiti as Haitian people continued to be 
influenced by Brazilian culture through popular media and goods.   
According to the Brazilian newspaper Folho de S. Paulo, in 2008, while on a trip 
to meet with Brazilian troops in MINUSTAH, President Lula sought to stimulate private 
investment in Haiti by inviting businessmen from energy and infrastructure as well as 
contractors.299  The news article elaborated that multinational conglomerates Odebrecht, 
Andreade Guitierrez, and Camargo Corrêa were invited.300  Previously, a Brazilian 
construction company (name not released at the time) received USD$80 million from the 
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European Development Bank for the initial phase of Haitian road construction.301  Four 
years later, Folha de S.Paulo named OAS as a company that won a bid to construct the 
highway however later stopped construction.302  OAS claimed that it had completed 60% 
of the project, but halted construction because the Haitian government had not fulfilled its 
contraction obligations to expropriate the area resulting in USD$42 in damages to resume 
construction.303  According to the news article, OAS was the only Brazilian company 
operating in Haiti in 2012.304 
 
Challenges for Engaging in the SSC Framework 
Twenty-four years transpired before Brazil and Haiti activated their SSC 
framework initiated in 1982.  The framework became operative under the Lula 
administration in 2004.  The departure of the U.S.-led Multinational Interim Force 
created an opportunity for Brazil to assume leadership of MINUSTAH, which is expected 
to continue through April 2017.  The Lula administration prioritized Haiti over other 
countries in 2004, and Haiti received additional humanitarian assistance during periods of 
natural disasters (2010 earthquake, Hurricane Matthew).  Despite that, as stated in the 
previous chapter, 106 out of 110 South-South cooperation projects between Brazil and 
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Haiti are considered “complete,”305 with only one continuing through 2017.306  Evidence 
of a shift in Brazil’s policy regarding South-South cooperation away from humanitarian 
and peacekeeping can be found in a speech given by Brazilian Ambassador Carlos 
Cozendey at the UN sponsored Third International Conference on Financing for 
Development in July 2015: 
[…] we are moving from an agenda focused specifically on 
developing countries and their most pressing needs, to one of 
universal nature, applicable to all countries, rich or poor, and 
which seeks to address a much more comprehensive set of policy 
objectives, such as trade, industrialization and sustainable patterns 
of consumption and production. A pending but urgent task will be 
to align the UN development system to this more complex and 
sophisticated agenda, based on a universal approach instead of a 
donor-recipient mindset. 
African countries currently are the main partners of Brazil in 
South-South cooperation. The Brazilian South-South technical 
cooperation has been developed with more than thirty-three 
African countries through bilateral channels, amounting to 
approximately USD$57 million. The Brazilian Agency for 
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Cooperation (ABC) runs about a hundred and fifty projects and 
short-term initiatives in Africa.307 
At no point during Ambassador Cozendey’s speech did he mention Haiti or Brazil’s long-
standing leadership of the ongoing UN-sponsored peacekeeping operation in Haiti.  
Nevertheless, several participants stated that South-South cooperation and the SSC 
framework between Brazil and Haiti was no longer representative of the one envisioned 
under President Lula.  One participant called the impeachment of President Dilma 
Roussef in 2016 an “institutional coup on Dilma” by the Brazil’s ultra-conservative 
officials, thus signaling the end of South-South cooperation as traditional South-South 
cooperation. Brazilian firms’ investments abroad thus indicate a much more pragmatic, 
economically driven SSC framework.  According to the Global Humanitarian Assistance 
Report 2014, Brazil’s international humanitarian assistance was among the top 10 donor 
decreases for 2013 at -97%.308 
Broadly speaking, the Brazil-Haiti framework of South-South cooperation has not 
developed independent of external actors; the overall findings indicate that the 
sustainability of the framework has been heavily dependent on who was president of 
Brazil (President Lula) and the policies of the governing party (PT).  However, the 
Brazil-Haiti SSC framework has been active over the course that MINUSTAH has been 
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engaged in their peacekeeping operations.  As mentioned by one of the study’s 
participants, a larger diplomatic unit whose focus expanded beyond security-related 
concerns of Brazil’s troops would have strengthened the SSC framework; however, 
“Brazilian ambassadors were [more] consumed with their military troops than the 
development.”  Even so, the main themes that emerged identified the challenges of the 
Brazil-Haiti SSC framework.   For example, Haiti is disorganized, both countries suffer 
serious economic challenges, and both are afflicted by severe corruption. 
 Haiti is not an equal partner to Brazil, who is a MIC in terms of development and 
resources.  Haiti is regarded as a fragile state and consequently exhibit characteristics of a 
country with challenges to governance.309  Though Brazil has extensive development 
cooperation with other LICs, particularly on the continent of Africa in Guinea-Bissau and 
Mozambique, there was the added cultural and language advantage of sharing the same 
Portuguese colonizer and language not present in a Brazil-Haiti framework.  In several 
interviews and survey responses, participants spoke to similar histories and cultures, but 
did not address the significance of different colonizers and language as factor that could 
affect the Brazil-Haiti SSC framework.  It was not clear for one respondent that SSC 
frameworks in fact exhibit fairness for visibly black populations.  Consequently, it is not 
apparent from the qualitative findings or the literature that Haiti is able to engage in a 
SSC framework with another country who is a MIC, such as Brazil, where outcomes on 
development could ensue that are mutually beneficial.  The theme of “Haiti is 
                                                           
309 Heine and Thompson (2011). 
163 
 
disorganized” was supported by examples of a lack of coordination, communication, and 
resources to fully engage in the SSC framework.  
The political and economic situation in Haiti presented an opportunity for Brazil 
to signal and project a positive image of the country as a regional leader and global player 
by capitalizing on its military might and its foreign policy that emphasizes international 
cooperation with strategic partners mainly in Latin America and the Portuguese-speaking 
countries of Africa.  Yet, Brazil has yet to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council, which calls into question its ability and efforts to reform and expand the UN 
Security Council membership beyond the current five permanent members:  China, 
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  On a state visit to India in 
2009, U.S. president Barack Obama endorsed India’s candidacy to a permanent seat on 
the UN Council, but did not do the same for Brazil the following year.  The U.S.’s lack of 
endorsement of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council came after Brazil’s June 
2010 vote against a U.S. proposal to impose sanctions against Iran for its nuclear 
program.  By August 2011, Celso Amorim, President Lula’s former Minister of Foreign 
Relations—and one of the main articulators of Brazilian participation in the peacekeeping 
mission in Haiti—came to support the departure of Brazilian troops from Haiti as 
Minister of Defense under Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff.310 
Among the questionnaire respondents, those who are primarily practitioners found 
the Brazil-Haiti SSC framework challenging for Brazil due to the country’s economic and 
political challenges.  These individuals have recent, on-the-ground experience 
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implementing and evaluating development cooperation, thereby observing the problems 
Brazil and Haiti encounter while engaging in the SSC framework.  In particular, Brazilian 
practitioners and scholar academics were direct in their statements that the SSC 
framework is challenging for Brazil and Haiti.  Specifically, they stated that Brazil should 
be more pragmatic in its relations with other nations because Brazil does not have money 
to invest and develop other countries given the country’s economic crisis.  A Brazilianist 
summed up the challenging situation by stating, “Haiti is not of strategic importance to 
Brazil.” 
Few academic scholars stated that the SSC framework is not challenging for 
Brazil despite political and economic crisis.  Mentions included, “It is not challenging at 
all, Brazil embraces it with great enthusiasm” and, “South-South cooperation is not 
challenging for Brazil.”  In the case of Haiti, all but one participant held the SSC 
framework as challenging.  Principally, most of the study’s participants regard the SSC 
framework as challenging for Brazil and Haiti. 
 
Strategic Plans for Engaging in the SSC Framework 
Based on the study findings, part of Brazil’s strategy in engaging in South-South 
cooperation was to increase the perception of its leadership in the South, while Haiti 
aimed to receive assistance for self-sufficiency.  As in the study of decision-making in 
international relations in Afinotan (2014), Southern countries engaged in South-South 
cooperation because it is in their self-interest to do so, which was also the case with this 
study’s qualitative findings on Brazil and Haiti.  The findings revealed that the decisions 
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of Brazil and Haiti to engage in South-South cooperation may be governed by national 
interests such as individual political and economic agendas.  
The qualitative findings of this study revealed that Haiti’s strategic plan in 
engaging in South-South cooperation involved the receipt of financial assistance, as well 
as technical assistance to gain greater self-sufficiency.  Financial assistance contributed to 
Haitian attempts to sustain their current situation in Haiti, while technical assistance 
allowed Haitians at the local level to be trained for long-term benefits and greater self-
sufficiency in the future.  Training involved, but was not limited to, health professionals 
for the well-being of the Haitians, military personnel for security, and farmers for the 
sustainable development of agriculture.  However, Brazilian military presence in Haiti 
through MINUSTAH has been perceived as an “occupying force” by some Haitians and 
study participants; this may have induced fear in civilians.  As mentioned by a high-
ranking Haitian government official and elected official, Haiti has been unsuccessful with 
garnering success with private sector investments by Brazilian companies.  Dady Chery, 
a blog writer whose work was posted on the Canadian-based Global Research Centre for 
Research on Globalization website, characterized Haiti’s “lead export” to Brazil as 
“overwhelmingly young, male, and educated” Haitian immigrants, somewhat reminiscent 
of slavery.311  Chery’s conclusion was based on a report in O Tempo on a 2014 survey 
requested by CNIg about the lives of 340 Haitian immigrants to Brazil.312  
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In any case, the strategic plans of Brazil in engaging in South-South cooperation 
involved enhancing Brazil’s leadership role, including the quest to secure a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council.  Despite having the status of a MIC, Brazil engages in 
South-South cooperation, and provides assistance for Haiti as an act of pursuing their 
national interest.  However, Brazil and Haiti both have strategic national gains in the 
partnership.  This finding is supported by Afinotan (2014), who views independent states 
as rational entities in which national decisions are governed by national interests. 313  
Closely aligned with the themes for Brazil’s strategic plans for engaging in the 
SSC framework is the previously mentioned finding that the SSC framework is not only 
political in nature, but perceived as an easier framework to employ as Brazil seeks to 
promote its internationalization on a global stage.  A permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council could lead to Brazil gaining greater diplomatic power, which could advance their 
own interests and priorities.  According to Kenkel (2013), the effectiveness of Brazil’s 
peacekeeping efforts in Haiti plays an important role in advancing Brazil’s interests,314 
most especially under the Lula Administration.  A high-level consultant to the Haitian 
government commented that the SSC framework is governed by an adage, “‘He who has 
the gold makes the rules.’ Since Haiti has long experienced financial issues, Haiti is not 
necessarily fully sovereign in its decision-making.”   
For Brazil, it may not be difficult to exhibit leadership with a partner country in a 
socio-economic position of Haiti, and it has been in both countries’ interest to cultivate a 
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partnership.  Brazil’s investment in technical cooperation activities outside of its role and 
participation in MINUSTAH has been small scale relative to its capabilities in the area of 
technical cooperation.  Yet, Brazil has experienced international recognition for its 
involvement in development cooperation in Haiti.  As previously mentioned in Chapter 4, 
Brazil was the first country to make a contribution to the HRF.  Brazil’s support of the 
HRF with a financial donation illustrates Brazil’s engagement with the global system 
through its financial support of a Haitian relief fund with direct ties to global, multilateral 
fund.  Following the 2010 earthquake and Brazil’s contribution, the country received 
accolades from the international community among which the World Bank Group 
President Robert B. Zoellick stated: 
Many promises have been made in support of Haiti’s reconstruction. Turning 
these into reality for the Haitian people is urgent. Brazil's has a long-standing 
history of friendship with Haiti and has provided critical support in peace-keeping 
and security efforts over the past years. Haiti and the international community 
will also benefit from Brazil’s vast development experience in the planning and 
implementation of reconstruction. We all look forward to Brazil's contributions in 
shaping the HRF into an effective mechanism for investing in a more prosperous 
future for the Haitian people.315 
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The Bank president’s sentiment is parallel with Burges’s assessment of Brazilian 
leadership strategy.316  Brazil negotiates on behalf of other southern countries through 
multilateral institutions.317  
Additionally, the structure of the HRF provides a context for Brazil to possibly 
assert its influence through its partnership with Haiti.  The HRF Steering Committee 
receives proposals for HRF funding for projects in Haiti.  Brazil is a member of the HRF 
Steering Committee that is made up two other countries—Haiti and Norway—and 
multilateral institutions that include the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the 
UN, and the World Bank.  The makeup of the committee is significant for Brazil in terms 
of its ability to influence decision-making regarding HRF project funding and approvals.  
Brazil is the only Southern country on the steering country besides Haiti, and is the only 
bilateral development provider other than Norway.  This membership structure reduces 
competing voices at the table should other development providers had voting privileges 
regarding project approvals.  Brazil also has the ability to submit proposals to the HRF 
for funding consideration, which it has done in the case of the Artibonite River Dam 
project; the funds were later approved and redirected.318  Thus, Brazil supports the 
conditions for the HRF as a valuable mechanism for supporting Haiti, as well as an 
opportunity to further its own interests.  Brazil has demonstrated that as an emerging 
donor country, it can capitalize on its development experience and work within the 
existing international aid architecture. 
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In Chapter 4, a scholar-practitioner and Latin Americanist cited that Brazil’s 
approach to development cooperation is creating a new space within the existing global 
architecture.  The results of the current study indicated that bilateral initiatives between 
Brazil and Haiti, as well as Brazilian private sector investment in Haiti (or lack thereof), 
are interrupted before completion, and/or are relatively short-term or short-lived. 
 
ADDRESSING THE HYPOTHESIS 
The main hypothesis was that South-South cooperation affects development 
cooperation by strengthening, weakening or having no impact on development in Brazil 
and Haiti.  To determine the direction of the hypothesized relationship, I analyzed the 
overall directionality of the responses of the study’s participants in relation to each of the 
sub-questions.  For the first sub-question, I analyzed the participants’ responses within 
three distinct categories: (a) “outstanding” or “positive” regarding the benefits of Brazil 
and Haiti engaging in the SSC framework; (b) “abnormal” or “negative” from engaging 
in the SSC framework; and (c) “normal,” “neutral,” or “exhibits potential.”  The study’s 
second sub-question also employed three categories of: (a) high, (b) low, and (c) neutral.  
The third sub-question followed the same pattern of the second sub-question.  
The categories that include responses that were “neutral” were participant 
responses that lacked significant direction regarding the impact of current SSC 
framework on development between Brazil and Haiti.  On the question of benefits, I 
added “exhibits potential” to capture the number of participants who opted to speak to the 
“potential” of SSC framework rather than the existing state of the SSC framework for 
Brazil and Haiti.  Additionally, categories on benefits included “normal” and “abnormal.” 
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Abnormal was included because one respondent averred that outcomes that ensued from 
the SSC framework were not to be viewed as normal and that the SSC framework would 
likely discontinue with ongoing administration and policy shifts.  “Normal,” “neutral,” 
and “exhibits potential” were grouped together because each does not reflect 
directionality on the current SSC framework.  Figure 5 shows the result of the analysis on 
the direction of the participants’ responses to the sub-questions.  For example, the 
number “5” represents five participants who provided responses in a given direction. 
 
 Respondent Indications 
 Outstanding/ 
Positive 
Abnormal/ 
Negative 
Normal/ 
Neutral/ 
Exhibits Potential 
 
How do Brazil and Haiti benefit 
from engaging in the SSC 
framework? 
 
5 
 
1 
 
9 
 
 Respondent Indications 
 High Low Neutral 
 
How challenging is the SSC 
framework for Brazil and Haiti? 
 
8 
 
5 
 
2 
 
 Respondent Indications 
 High Low Neutral 
How is engaging in the SSC 
framework strategic for both 
Brazil and Haiti? 
 
3 
 
4 
 
8 
Figure 5. Directionality of the qualitative responses to the dissertation sub-questions. 
In the next step, I combined the respondents’ indications on the sub-questions to 
determine if South-South cooperation affects development cooperation by strengthening, 
weakening, or having no impact on development in Brazil and Haiti.  I accomplished this 
by assigning a numerical strength to each of the outcomes from 0 to 9. The outcomes 
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were assigned in this manner because the maximum number of respondent indication in 
any category in Figure 5 was 9.  Figure 6 show the direction of the indication 
assignments. 
 
Responses Respondent Indications Assigned Direction 
n=0 – n=2 Abnormal, Negative, Low Weaken 
n=3 – n=5 Normal, Neutral, Exhibits 
Potential 
No impact 
n=6 – n=9 Outstanding/Positive/High Strengthen 
Figure 6. Indication assignment. 
To explain the hypothesized relationship between South-South cooperation and 
development cooperation each of the sub-questions received an assigned direction based 
on the strength of the indications of the respondents.  For the first sub-question, “How do 
Brazil and Haiti benefit from engaging in the SSC framework?” there was no impact.  
This indicates that participants did not find the SSC framework to be particularly 
impactful in either direction on the development of Brazil and Haiti.  A counterfactual 
assessment of Haiti without the presence of MINUSTAH or Brazilian development 
cooperation could provide a useful point of comparison.  In response to the second sub-
question, “How challenging is the SSC framework for Brazil and Haiti?” participants’ 
results were mixed regarding the challenge that the SSC framework presents for Brazil 
and Haiti.   Half of the participants regarded the SSC framework as highly challenging, 
and the other half deemed the challenge of the SSC framework to be low or neutral for 
Brazil and Haiti.  The findings of the study are thus inconclusive regarding how 
challenging the SSC framework is for Brazil and Haiti.  In response to the third sub-
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question, “How is engaging in the SSC framework strategic for both Brazil and Haiti?” 
the results were also inconclusive.  Half of the participants found that engaging in the 
SSC framework had no impact on development for Brazil and Haiti, and the other half of 
the participants held that the SSC framework was spilt between being highly strategic or 
not very strategic.  Overall, South-South cooperation affects development cooperation in 
a way that is inconclusive because the study’s respondents find that the SSC framework 
is both challenging in a way that is not highly beneficial or strategic for either country.  I 
concluded from the outcomes that the impact of South-South cooperation on 
development between Brazil and Haiti is not necessarily dependent on the benefits or 
challenges of the SSC framework.  These results call into question the strategic nature of 
the SSC framework.  Figure 7 presents a graphic representation of the results and 
outcomes of addressing the hypothesis.  
 
 
Hypothesis South-South cooperation affects development cooperation by 
strengthening, weakening or having no impact on development in 
Brazil and Haiti. 
Purpose of 
the sub- 
questions 
 
To explain the hypothesized relationship between South-South 
cooperation and development cooperation 
 
 How do Brazil 
and Haiti benefit 
from engaging 
in the SSC 
framework? 
How 
challenging is 
the SSC 
framework for 
Brazil and Haiti? 
How is engaging 
in the SSC 
framework 
strategic for both 
Brazil and Haiti? 
Directionality 
 
Strengthen 
 
  X 
Weaken 
 
 X  
No Impact X X X 
173 
 
 
Outcome 
The impact of South-South cooperation on development between 
Brazil and Haiti is not necessarily dependent on the benefits or 
challenges of the SSC framework and calls into question the strategic 
nature of the SSC framework. 
 
Figure 7. Graphic representation addressing the hypothesis results and outcomes. 
 
ADDRESSING THE CENTRAL QUESTION 
The final task was to answer the central research question by connecting the 
study’s overall contributions.  The study’s contributions include the findings from the 
explanatory framework (based upon South-South cooperation and development 
cooperation literatures) and the qualitative research. 
 
Contribution of the Exploratory Framework to Answering the Central Question 
The major findings of the Explanatory Framework can be encapsulated in 
prospects for an emerging donor challenge to the traditional aid architecture and the 
nature of South-South cooperation in Latin America.  Emerging donors from the South 
are considered a challenge to the international aid architecture because they operate 
outside the traditional aid architecture,319 represent solidarity among emerging powers 
within multilateral fora,320 and by presenting the case for a more inclusive international 
architecture that considers the needs of Southern countries.321 
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In the early 2000s, Global South countries became active agents in articulating the 
rhetoric of South-South cooperation, taking policy positions in multilateral forums and 
institutions and establishing new institutions (material and symbolic).  Emerging 
economies and regional powers became vocal critics of global governance and sought to 
reform its structures through their collective action at the international level.  Brazil is 
recognized as a spokesperson among and on behalf of Southern countries at multilateral 
fora as Brazil views itself as “development regional leader” in South America.322 
South-South cooperation appeared to be more suitable for Southern countries, as 
the SSC framework gave precedence to the principles and approaches of the Southern 
countries.  Kindornay and Samy (2012) wrote that the structures and institutions that 
deliver aid (international aid architecture) have been described as “dysfunctional and 
uncoordinated;” these authors questioned the legitimacy of these structures because the 
framework lacks recipient ownership.323  Northern countries tend to focus on 
“forecasting” and “aid effectiveness.”324   
 The emerging donor challenge to the traditional international aid architecture 
emerges from rise of the South economically and politically and driven by an ongoing 
need for political and economic and technological cooperation.325  Big developing 
economies such as Brazil, India, and China experienced rapid, high, and sustained 
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economic growth during the early 2000s326 and were recognized for their pragmatic and 
innovative trade, investment, and development.327  Moreover, Bry (2016) noted that 
Southern countries aspired to break away from the traditional aid paradigm, especially 
with the South’s lack of emphasis on an evaluation-based framework for their 
development cooperation.  Southern countries were believed to aspire to establish an 
alternative model of development cooperation.328  The establishment of an alternative 
model may also explain why Brazil as a Southern donor engages in South-South 
cooperation.329   
Gore (2013) posited that projects under South-South cooperation provided more 
representative development cooperation than assistance from North-South relations.330  
Brazil’s approach to South-South cooperation is more pragmatic through its focus on 
“market friendly” and “self-interested” economic opportunities that may benefit their 
regional partners.331  According to Malacalza (2014), Brazil led the ABC countries with a 
neo-developmentalist diplomacy model of cooperation in Haiti following the 2010 
earthquake.332   This model of development cooperation is characterized by public 
investment, development, energy, transportation, telecommunication, and housing 
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construction.333  Despite the ideological shift in inter-American relations that allowed 
engagement in UN peacekeeping activities in Haiti, Feldman et al. argued that the ABC 
countries missed an opportunity to distinguish its international development cooperation 
in Haiti.334  Brazil has pursued its national interest of enhancing leadership and has 
sought a seat in the UN Security Council.335  Vieira and Alden (2011) claimed that Brazil 
made progress in its leadership through investments in the provision of “regional public 
goods” as it seeks to influence regional politics.336  Exact figures on Brazilian 
cooperation do not exist due to the nature of its bilateral peacekeeping activities and 
incomplete or unreported aid and development cooperation.337 
Rowlands (2012) found that Southern donors’ norms and practices differ from 
donors that adhere to DAC-based development assistance.338  Following either Kenneth 
Waltz’ view of international politics that states exist within an anarchic international 
system339 (structure) or Alexander Wendt’s “anarchy is what states make of it”340 
(process), Southern donor countries have not been made to report their development 
cooperation activities to traditional global institutions or adhere to the North’s norms and 
                                                           
333 Ibid. 66-67. 
 
334 Feldman, et. al (2011), 11 
 
335 Ekström and Alles (2012), 18; Nieto (2012), 166-69. 
 
336 Vieira and Alden, 513, 516 
 
337 OECD (2016).   
  
338 Rowlands, 2012 
  
339 Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979).  Theory of International Politics.  Boston, MA:  McGraw-Hill. 79-106. 
 
340 Wendt, Alexander (1992).  “Anarchy is What States Make of It:  The Social Construction of Power 
Politics.”  International Organization, 46(2). 
 
177 
 
practices.  There are no incentives for Southern countries to follow the North in the 
capacity of development providers.341 
Scholars in the literature on development cooperation have offered a continuum 
along which to view the possibility of emerging donors creating a new, more 
representative aid architecture to its impossibility.  Quadir (2013) acknowledged the 
possibility of a more representative aid architecture if emerging donors focused on the 
needs of recipients.342   Burges (2012) suggested that emerging donors are not a threat if 
held to the same standards of OEC-DAC countries;343 while, Chin and Quadir (2012) 
asserted that it is not clear whether Southern donors are in fact that different from the 
North in their practices.344  Rowlands (2012) acknowledged that emerging donors can 
create a new paradigm that does not pose a threat to the traditional aid architecture due to 
the diversity of their paradigms and the heterogeneity of Southern donors.345  Gore (2013) 
offered the more optimistic analysis that the aid architecture is in the process of being 
replaced by a new development cooperation architecture that better reflects the 
complexity and diversity of the development cooperation landscape. 346  Six (2009) 
outlined that development and the development cooperation paradigm is incompatible 
with non-Western donors’ fundamental approach to development with new programs 
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such as China’s “world development” paradigm.347  Six’s view of development 
cooperation aligned with Gosovic’s (2016) suggestion that South-South cooperation 
needs updating in order to be more applicable to contemporary times.348 
From the findings of the explanatory framework that examines the emerging 
donor challenge to the traditional aid architecture and the nature of South-South 
cooperation in Latin America as a contribution to answering the central question the 
following can be determined.  First, Southern countries believe they are better equipped 
to help other Southern countries because they represent a diversity of perspectives and 
practices that may better assist recipient countries—as Southern countries, they have 
been where recipient countries are now in terms of development and are now middle-
income countries.  Second, Southern countries do not have the same restrictions as 
Northern donors on their development cooperation with other Southern countries in terms 
of OECD-DAC prescriptions and conditionalities—Northern institutions have been 
unsuccessful in getting Southern countries to adhere to Northern development practices 
which leaves out private sector financing, commercial interests and foreign direct 
investment. Third, Southern countries see South-South cooperation as an opportunity to 
pursue their individual national interests through the framework of South-South 
cooperation as an emerging donor —For Haiti, Southern countries have approached 
development cooperation primarily on an individual (or country)basis despite models 
and frameworks to the contrary (ie. ABC, ALBA). 
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Contribution of the Qualitative Findings to Answering the Central Question 
The first sub-question was, “How do Brazil and Haiti benefit from engaging in South-
South cooperation framework?” Although it may appear that Haiti has more to gain from 
engaging in the SSC framework, findings of this study revealed that both Haiti and Brazil 
received benefits from the SSC framework.  Generally, the participants found that the 
partnership with Brazil provided Haiti with socioeconomic, military, and security 
development.  Brazil has provided Haiti with approximately US$500-510 million in 
assistance between 2004 and 2011349 and military and security development since Brazil 
became the leader of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti.  Yet, the qualitative findings 
also revealed that Haiti could have benefited more in the SSC framework with Brazil, if 
Brazil had focused more on providing technical cooperation.  Participants made only a 
few references to non-peacekeeping initiatives including humanitarian visas for Haitians.   
However, a number of participants spoke to the potential rather than the current reality of 
the SSC framework when discussing the benefits for Haiti.  There was also the interesting 
sub-theme for Haiti, that Brazil’s engagement was more beneficial for Brazil than Haiti.  
This sub-theme calls into question the nature of the mutual benefit of the Brazil-Haiti 
SSC framework. 
Being a MIC, Brazil has been a donor and a recipient of development strategies; 
nonetheless, among the LAC countries, Brazil has gained a strong influence, specifically 
in Haiti.  Brazil played a role in intervening with the Haitian government following the 
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political upheaval surrounding President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 350 Following the review 
of the document by Marroni (2013) and Vazquez (2013), the Brazilian Cooperation 
Agency (ABC) supported the act of enhancing leadership practices in LDCs. Brazil also 
opened up opportunities for a new market and political power through its partnership 
with Haiti.   Of note, has been Brazil’s ability to exercise leadership in Haiti while at the 
same time promote its internationalization agenda, experiment with pacification methods 
in high crime areas of Haiti and develop a Brazilian way of peacekeeping. 
The second sub-question was, “How challenging is SSC framework for Brazil and 
Haiti?” The results of the analysis revealed that the challenges for Haiti and Brazil in 
engaging in the SSC framework were the disorganization of Haiti, economic challenges, 
and government corruption.  Northern countries that have been known to exploit Haiti 
have been the ones providing development, political and military aid.  Researchers have 
noted that Haiti’s international relations appeared to contribute to its development 
struggles.351   Abdenur and Da Fonseca (2015) pointed out that Northern countries and 
institutions continue to play a significant part in the South-South cooperation despite 
reductions in Northern aid to the Global South following the 2008 financial crises.  The 
authors claimed that the North desired to hold influence over Southern donors and South-
South cooperation.  
For Brazil, according the study’s qualitative findings, challenges for the SSC 
framework have been attributed to the economic and political crisis surrounding the 
economy and political corruption.  These were factors that were not present when Brazil 
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first began to prioritize SSC framework in 2004.  Furthermore, half of the study’s 
participants find the SSC framework challenging for Brazil and Haiti and that the 
framework lacks sustainability due to Brazil’s economic crisis, the fact that President 
Lula is no longer in office as president and a shift in government policy in the area of 
South-South cooperation.  However, other participants mainly regard the SSC framework 
as not challenging, at least not for Brazil.  As mentioned previously, the Brazil-Haiti 
framework has not developed independent of external actors.  These external actors 
include the UN-sponsored MINUSTAH (the North) which includes the support of other 
Southern countries who are also affiliated with the United Nations mission such as 
Argentina and Chile.  Thus, Brazil’s presence in Haiti may not be regarded as challenging 
when considering the role and presence of external actors that are from the North or 
whose presence in Haiti is supported by the North.  Additionally, there has been evidence 
that Brazil has shifted away from South-South cooperation that prioritizes Haiti in 
government policy and peacekeeping operations through the UN.  Both countries’ 
challenges around Haiti’s disorganization and their mutual challenges stemming from 
economic and political corruption may eventually question the sustainability of their 
framework.  
The third sub-question was, “How is engaging in the SSC framework strategic for 
both Brazil and Haiti?”  The results of the analysis revealed that there was a perceived 
strategic benefit for both Brazil and Haiti in engaging in a South-South bilateral 
cooperation.  The findings indicated that Brazil and Haiti both have strategic national 
gains in the partnership.  Based on the study findings, part of Brazil’s strategy in 
engaging in South-South cooperation was to enhance its leadership in the Global South, 
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while Haiti aimed to receive assistance for self-sufficiency.  As in the study of Afinotan 
(2014), Southern countries engaged in South-South cooperation due to mutual national 
interests, as did Brazil and Haiti, based on the study findings.352 
The findings of this study revealed that Haiti’s strategic plan in engaging in 
South-South cooperation involved the receipt of financial assistance, as well as technical 
assistance.  Financial assistance helped Haitians sustain the current situation in Haiti, 
while technical assistance allowed Haitians at the local level to be trained for long-term 
benefits and self-sufficiency in the future.  Training involved, but were not limited to, 
health professionals for the well-being of the Haitians, military personnel for security, 
and farmers for the sustainable development of agriculture.  As previously mentioned, 
Brazilian military presence in Haiti through MINUSTAH has not necessarily been 
viewed positively.353  Nevertheless, the strategic plans of Brazil in engaging in South-
South cooperation involved enhancing their leadership role, including the pursuit of 
securing a seat on the UN Security Council.  To date, Brazil has not gained a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council, and according to several of the study’s participants, 
South-South cooperation is no longer a priority for Brazil.   Despite being a middle 
income country, Brazil therefore engaged in South-South cooperation and provided 
assistance for Haiti as an act of pursuing their national interest.  
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The major contribution of the qualitative findings to answering the central 
question is two-fold.  First, the impact of Brazilian assistance to Haiti is highly 
conditioned upon each country’s relationship to the North.  Second, changes in the 
political and economic conditions of Brazil as the development cooperation provider 
affects the SSC framework.   
 
Overall Results of the Study’s Contributions 
The findings of the study conclude that South-South cooperation is an alternative 
to North-South cooperation.   Southern countries believe they are better equipped to help 
other Southern countries because they represent a diversity of perspectives and practices 
that may better assist recipient countries.  Southern countries do not have the same 
restrictions as Northern donors on their development cooperation with other Southern 
countries in terms of OECD-DAC prescriptions and conditionalities.   Southern countries 
see South-South cooperation as an opportunity to pursue their individual national 
interests through the framework of South-South cooperation as an emerging donor.  The 
contributions of the explanatory framework and qualitative research leads to a two-prong 
answer to the central question Why Southern countries engage in South-South 
cooperation?:  (1) a SSC framework between two Southern countries may serve as an 
alternative to North-South cooperation despite remaining highly conditioned by the 
Northern-dominated international system of governance such as the United Nations 
MINUSTAH peacekeeping operation in the case of Brazil and Haiti and (2) the SSC 
framework is primarily driven by emerging donor countries in a MIC-LIC context.  Thus, 
changes in the political and economic conditions of emerging donor countries have great 
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potential for destabilizing the sustainability of SSC frameworks.  With regard to Southern 
development providers, it appears they do not encounter impunity from the international 
system for their role in the lack of sustainability of SSC frameworks, and recipients have 
little recourse.  Figure 8 shows a graphic representation that addresses the central 
question and includes the overall results of the study’s contributions. 
 
Central 
Research 
Question 
 
 
 
Why Southern countries engage in South-South cooperation? 
Study 
Contributions 
Findings of the Explanatory 
Framework 
-literature 
(1)  Southern countries believe they 
are better equipped to help other 
Southern countries because they 
represent a diversity of perspectives 
and practices that may better assist 
recipient countries 
(2)  Southern countries do not have 
the same restrictions as Northern 
donors on their development 
cooperation with other Southern 
countries in terms of OECD-DAC 
prescriptions and conditionalities 
(3)  Southern countries see South-
South cooperation as an 
opportunity to pursue their 
individual national interests through 
the framework of South-South 
cooperation as an emerging donor 
Findings of the 
Qualitative Research 
-in-depth interviews 
-survey questionnaire 
-data sources 
(1)  The impact of 
Brazilian assistance to 
Haiti is highly conditioned 
upon each country’s 
relationship to the North 
(2)  Changes in the 
political and economic 
conditions of Brazil as the 
development cooperation 
provider impacts the SSC 
framework 
Overall Results of the Study’s Contributions 
(1) A SSC framework between two Southern countries may serve as an alternative 
to North-South cooperation however remain highly conditioned by the Northern-
dominated international system of governance such as the United Nations 
MINUSTAH peacekeeping operation in the case of Brazil and Haiti 
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(2) The SSC framework is primarily driven emerging donor countries in a MIC-
LIC context. 
Changes in the political and economic conditions of the emerging donor country 
has great potential for destabilizing the sustainability of the SSC framework 
without much impunity for the Southern development providers by way of the 
international system and little recourse for the recipient country.   
 
Figure 8. Graphic representation addressing the central question. 
 
The chapter opens with the title “A South-South Solution” which suggests that 
South-South cooperation provides a solution for Southern countries, however, one that is 
complex.  In the case of Brazil and Haiti who represent a MIC and LIC, the role of the 
North must be considered.  South-South cooperation at its inception, embraces the 
presence of the North and for emerging donors, the opportunity to extend its influence 
beyond its region and onto an international stage.  The next chapter looks at the study’s 
contributions for rethinking development cooperation and directions for future study. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION  
“Everyone needs a little help on the way to becoming self-reliant.” 
Tupac Amaru Shakur; an American rapper and hip-hop artist, MTV News, 1992354 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Task and Synopsis of the Study 
The overall task of this study was to examine South-South cooperation as an 
alternative development strategy in LAC in the wake of declining aid from the Global 
North to the Global South.  The general problem was that as an economic and political 
framework, South-South cooperation has not produced the empirical support of that of 
the prevailing North-South framework.  The central research question was, “Why 
Southern countries engage in South-South cooperation?”  The question of why is 
important given the history of political and economic crisis in developing countries 
including those that are currently middle income.  Therefore, the purpose of this 
qualitative case study was to examine this problem through the Brazil-Haiti SSC 
framework.  I accomplished this by analyzing the impact through the benefits, challenges 
and strategic rationale of their SSC framework. 
The study was guided by the fundamental idea that national interests drive 
development cooperation between and on behalf of states in the South; thus, states are 
motivated by their national interests when making decisions and creating policies within 
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a SSC framework.  I expected that the self-interests of Southern states would explain the 
existence of South-South cooperation as opposed to strict ideological considerations on 
solidarity or ethical responsibility. 
In order to examine the benefits, challenges and strategic plans for Brazil and 
Haiti’s engagement in development cooperation, three research sub-questions guided the 
dissertation study.  Specifically, the sub-questions sought to determine the nature of the 
Brazil-Haiti framework of cooperation from the perspectives of high-ranking officials 
and subject matter experts on South-South cooperation between Brazil and Haiti.  
Additional data collected included newspapers, government documents, speeches, and 
press releases to further collaborate, support, and contextualize the relationship between 
Brazil and Haiti. 
 Among the study’s participants were high-ranking officials in the governments of 
Brazil and Haiti, including current and former advisors, consultants, political appointees, 
cabinet members, and diplomats, as well as experts affiliated with the World Bank, U.S. 
government officials, and USAID contractors.  They have been involved in commenting 
on, setting the agenda, decision-making, and implementing South-South cooperation in 
general and in Brazil and Haiti.  I chose these elite respondents because they have acted 
on behalf of the state or in the case of academics possess in-depth expert knowledge of 
South-South cooperation in the region.   
Overall, as a subject of study, each case country benefited from their engagement 
in South-South cooperation.  However, the ways in which they each benefited differed 
and the likelihood of subsequent benefit for either country was questionable given present 
and ongoing shifts in presidential policy and party.  The second sub-question focused on 
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examining how challenging the SSC framework is for Brazil and Haiti.  Both countries 
share a similar set of challenges for their engagement in the SSC framework.  Those 
challenges shape the attributes of their partnership and the sustainability of the SSC 
framework.  The third sub-question looked at the strategic reasoning for each country’s 
engagement in South-South cooperation.  According to the qualitative findings, the 
strategy for cultivating a partnership stemmed from Brazil’s need to strengthen its 
position as a leader in the South through technical cooperation and peacekeeping and for 
Haiti to become more self-sufficient in the areas they received technical cooperation and 
peacekeeping from Brazil- namely military and security assistance.   
I understood that countries in the South engage in South-South cooperation, not 
mainly because of a shared mutual national interest by way of the SSC framework, as 
proposed in Chapter 1, or because of a shared mutual benefit, as espoused under the 
principles of South-South cooperation.  Each country’s political landscape vis-à-vis the 
North drives their SSC framework, as evidenced by the number of participants who 
connect the Brazil-Haiti SSC framework to Brazil’s quest for a permanent UN Security 
Council seat; Haiti’s overwhelming need for “military and security” benefits following 
the political crisis surrounding President Aristide; and need for additional assistance from 
the UN supported MINUSTAH led by Brazil following the 2010 earthquake.   
Though I expected that the self-interests of Southern states would explain the 
nature of their development cooperation, each country’s political relationship with the 
North were also an intervening factor in their SSC framework.  An imminent threat to the 
future of the Brazil-Haiti SSC framework points to Brazil’s shifting priorities amid 
political crisis and economic recession and the probable end of MINUSTAH or change in 
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country leadership of the peacekeeping operation in Haiti by April 2017.355  Haiti remains 
a low income, low development country in terms of country risk; however, political and 
economic changes in Brazil present another intervening factor that challenges the Brazil-
Haiti SSC framework.  
I also hypothesized in Chapter 1 that the South-South cooperation framework 
affects development by strengthening development cooperation because the framework 
considers factors outside the scope of domestic conditions.  In the case of Brazil and 
Haiti, the outcome was inconclusive given that the impact of South-South cooperation on 
development between the two countries is not necessarily dependent on the benefits or 
challenges of the SSC framework.  This outcome ties into the findings of the explanatory 
framework in a similarly inconclusive way.  Southern countries believe that as 
development partners, they are better positioned to help other Southern countries with a 
Southern brand of development cooperation.  Yet, these same countries seek their 
individual national interests.  Thus, outcomes of the hypothesis and findings of the 
explanatory framework are both inconclusive and suggest that South-South cooperation 
as a development model is not straight forward. 
Two overarching themes emerged from the contributions of the dissertation study: 
(a) the intervening influence of the Northern-dominated international system of 
governance on the Brazil-Haiti SSC framework and (b) uncertain political and economic 
future of Brazil.  The findings of the study concluded that South-South cooperation is an 
alternative to North-South cooperation, however; the impact of Brazilian assistance to 
                                                           
355 United Nations Security Council (2016).  “Resolution 2313, The Question Concerning Haiti,”  Adopted 
by the Security Council at its 7790th meeting on October 13, 2016.  Accessed December 14, 2016.  
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2313. 
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Haiti is highly conditioned upon each country’s relationship to the North and changes in 
the political and economic conditions of Brazil as the development cooperation provider.   
The goal of this chapter is to offer a political analysis of the impact of Brazil’s 
assistance to Haiti since 2004, as well as a prognosis for the sustainability of the SSC 
framework for LICs in similar development situations to Haiti in need of international 
development cooperation.  I begin by tracing ways to rethink development cooperation in 
Latin America through the Brazil-Haiti case, followed by an evaluation of the potential 
impact of current international developments on the prospects for South-South 
cooperation for countries in the Global South.  The chapter concludes with 
recommendations for further research and conclusion. 
 
RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 
Brazil is a BRIC country that considers itself a global player.356  At the time 
Brazil promulgated its technical cooperation agreement with Haiti and assumed 
leadership of the UN peacekeeping operations in 2004, the country had a strong 
economy, sizable military and a president willing to make Haiti a priority development 
partner above its traditional Latin American and Portuguese-speaking African country 
partners in terms of monetary and human resource investment.  Haiti became a benefactor 
of sustained Brazilian technical cooperation after Brazil assumed leadership of the UN-
sponsored peacekeeping operation MINUSTAH.  Brazil’s motivation for assuming 
leadership of MINUSTAH has been strongly linked to its desire to obtain a permanent 
                                                           
356 Dauvergne and Farias (2012); de Freitas Santos and Cerqueira (2014); Christensen, Steen Fryba (2013).  
“Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities.”  Third World Quarterly, 34(2). 
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seat on the UN Security Council.  Japan is the only country that has served more often 
than Brazil as a non-permanent member of the Security Council.357  
The primary challenge for Haiti is that it only became a benefactor of sustained 
Brazilian technical cooperation after Brazil assumed leadership of the UN-sponsored 
peacekeeping operation MINUSTAH.  This position signals that Haiti’s relationship may 
be highly dependent upon the presence of the Brazilian-led peacekeeping operation 
sponsored the UN (a Northern multilateral institution).  In tangible terms, Haiti has 
offered Brazil a platform to exercise its regional and global leadership aspirations and 
promote its internationalization including Brazilian multinational enterprises.  Haiti 
developed an international development strategy in tandem with the North through the 
establishment of the HRF, of which Brazil is the only other country member from the 
South.  As an international development strategy, Haiti promotes a policy of a friendly 
business climate and openly encourage foreign investments as key to its economic 
recovery.  The findings of this study suggested that Brazil has been less than enthusiastic 
about capitalizing on Haiti’s willingness to engage in significant, sustained investments.  
A study participant suggested that Brazil is not willing to compete with other countries 
with longstanding interests in Haiti such as the United States, the Dominican Republic, 
and France. On the same question, another participant commented on Brazil’s dominance 
in the region, but not specifically in regards to Haiti.  As a result of the Brazil and Haiti’s 
SSC framework, several lessons can inform thinking on South-South cooperation as an 
alternative development strategy for Southern countries. 
                                                           
357 Sotamayor Velazquez, Arturo (2013).  “Democratization and Commitment to Peace:  South America’s 
Motivation to Contribute to Peace Operations” in South America and Peace Operations:  Coming of Age 
edited by Kai Michael Kenkel, London and New York:  Routledge, 45-63. 
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Brazilian Involvement in Haiti 
Brazilian involvement in Haiti has been largely associated with its leadership of 
MINUSTAH and the expansion of South-South cooperation as a matter of foreign policy 
under President Lula and the early years of the President Dilma’s administration.  
Brazilian participation in peace operations in Haiti is decidedly different from that of its 
previous operations that have been labeled “token contributions.”358  Brazilian generals 
have held the role of Force Commander leader for the entire duration of the MINUSTAH 
mission, as well as the largest allotment of troops.  Given the size and scope of Brazilian 
economic and political capabilities relative to other developing country contributions, 
their overall peacekeeping contribution could be considered modest when it is reported 
that Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, and Rwanda are the top five contributors of 
troops and police forces to UN peacekeeping missions.359 
Brazil had minimal technical cooperation with Haiti prior to its leadership of 
MINUSTAH, a multilateral approach to engagement with the country.  Brazil and Haiti 
signed the Basic Agreement on Technical and Scientific Cooperation on October 15, 
1982.  The two countries did not formally begin technical cooperation in earnest until 
November 24, 2004, when the agreement was formally signed into law.  The signing of 
the agreement into law in 2004 represents a 22-year difference between the initial 
agreement and 5 months after Brazil assumed leadership of MINUSTAH.  For the years 
                                                           
358 According to Katharina Coleman, the term “token contributions” signifies small contingencies of 
military observers, staff officers and liaison officer cited by Kenkel (2013), 98. 
 
359 Reuters (September 2015).  “Countries Pledge 40,000 U.N. Peacekeepers at U.N. Summit.”  September 
28, 2015.  Accessed December 27, 2017.  http://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-peacekeepers-
idUSKCN0RS2E420150929. 
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2000-2014, the Ministry of Foreign Relations online database documented 110 South-
South cooperation projects with Haiti; all but four have been marked complete.360  In 
addition, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Division of the Caribbean for 
Itamaraty stated that two bilateral projects have been scheduled for 2016, with only one 
continuing through 2017, as of October 5, 2016.361  Overall, there has been a decline in 
the levels of technical and humanitarian cooperation between Brazil and Haiti following a 
high of 16 projects after the January 2010 earthquake.362 
Brazil had minimal technical cooperation with Haiti prior to 2004, and its 
assistance has steadily declined since 2010.  Whether Haiti will retain its priority status 
with Brazil will be determined once Brazilian-led leadership of MINUSTAH has 
occurred.  Brazil’s bilateral cooperation with Haiti has been strongly linked to its 
multilateral activities with Haiti.  Thus, Brazilian involvement in Haiti is not as robust as 
it has appears given the role and participation of MINUSTAH. 
 
Relying on the UN Sponsored Peacekeeping for Development is Problematic  
The UN Security Council between 2004 and 2016 has adopted 16 resolutions on 
the mandate of MINUSTAH.  For nearly 5 years, the UN Security Council has sought to 
scale back its operations in Haiti.  Resolution 2070 (2012) began the process of drawing 
                                                           
360 Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations; Brazilian Cooperation Agency (2016). 
 
361 Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Division of the Caribbean for Itamaraty, e-mail communication to 
author. 
 
362 Brazilian Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic (2014).  “Brazilian 
Cooperation for International Development 2010.”  Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), 75. 
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down MINUSTAH troops with the withdrawal of infantry and engineering personnel.363  
Three years later, Resolution 2243 (2015) affirmed the “possible” withdrawal of 
MINUSTAH and “transition” to a future United Nations presence in Haiti after October 
15, 2016.364  The UN Security Council reaffirmed the same intent the following year with 
Resolution 2313 (2016).365  The Council moved forward with its intent to draw down 
troops, despite Haiti experiencing significant electoral challenges resulting in delays and 
postponements of the presidential runoffs between December 2015 and October 2016, the 
resignation of the president without a replacement in February 2016, and Category 4  
Hurricane Matthew on October 4, 2016.  Resolution 2313 (2016) extended MINSTAH 
operations through April 15, 2017, pending review of the security and stability context.366  
Thus, intentions for the full withdrawal of MINUSTAH have been underway since 2015; 
this signals that Haiti’s ongoing and long-standing development challenges are not a 
necessary justification for the continued presence of the MINUSTAH mission and 
Brazilian leadership. 
Resolution 2313 (2016), which articulates the most current MINUSATAH 
mandate, affirms the existence of numerous, ongoing development challenges in Haiti.  
The acknowledged challenges include: (a) the Haitian National Police lack of 
                                                           
363 United Nations Security Council (2012).  “Resolution 2070,” Adopted by the Security Council at its 
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independence and need for international support;367 (b) significant humanitarian and state 
capacity challenges, which include drought and food insecurity that impacts 1.5 million 
people; (c) an increase in suspected cases of cholera and cholera-related deaths;368 (d) 
substantial problems with sexual and gender-based violence;369 and (e) failure by the 
Haitian government to assign a ministry to oversee human rights and lack of progress by 
the judicial authorities to investigate and prosecute crimes of serious human rights and 
violations.370  The combination of social inequality, inflation, insufficient investment, 
political uncertainty, and lack of transparent and effective governance systems are 
believed to negatively impact development and the implementation of the Strategic 
Development Plan of Haiti.371 
Noting with concern the slow progress towards consolidating the rule of 
law and calling on the Haitian Government to address the deficiencies in 
the justice and corrections systems, prolonged pretrial detention, prison 
overcrowding, widespread corruption, and denial of human rights 
including fair trial guarantees[.]372 
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Issues around rule of law, justice, corrections systems, and human rights date back to the 
initial resolution establishing MINUSTAH. These have remained priority concerns over 
the course of the UN mission in Haiti. 
 
Contested Domestic Support within Brazil 
Prior to MINUSTAH, the UN authorized five UN missions led by non-Latin 
American or Caribbean countries around stability, security, elections, human rights, and 
one observer group since the early 1990s.  A noted difference is Brazilian leadership and 
troop contribution.373  Since 1947, Brazil has taken part in UN peacekeeping missions 
under Chapter VI peacekeeping provisions, including the Organization of American 
States’ sponsored Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic in 1965.  From 
the start of Brazil’s engagement in Haiti in 2004 through the UN peacekeeping mission, 
however, domestic actors have debated the legitimacy of Brazilian involvement in 
MINUSTAH under Chapter VII.  MINUSTAH’s Chapter VII reference to a peace 
enforcement mandate runs counter to Brazil’s historical principle of non-interventionism 
in the internal affairs of foreign countries.  Brazil has repeatedly sought to withdraw its 
peacekeeping forces from Haiti.  The failure to achieve a permanent seat on the U.S. 
Security Council and long-debated issues of legitimacy within the country concerning 
Brazilian involvement in Haiti contribute to the weakness of the Brazil-Haiti SSC 
framework prior to Brazil’s political and economic crisis, despite benefits each country 
has received.   
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Conclusion:  South-South Cooperation is Dead or Haiti is No Longer a Priority 
If one views Brazil’s South-South cooperation framework similarly to that of its 
economy, one can observe boom and bust cycles.  Specifically, one can recognize a 
relationship with Haiti characterized by ups and downs as reflective of the spending 
cycles before and after natural disasters instead of a balanced occurrence.  Key factors 
include the state of the economy, presidential will, and political crises.  Brazil has 
predicated its foreign policy on development cooperation and success in South-South 
cooperation on a foundation of helping the poor.  Brazil was able to capture domestic 
success around social programs such as Bolsa Familia and experiment with their security 
measures, thus creating a security-development nexus.   
 The findings of the current study contributed to the idea that the decisions of each 
independent state—at least in theory—are governed by motives for their national interest.  
Brazil and Haiti’s engagement in South-South cooperation was believed to be fueled by 
national motives374 as they pursued their political and economic interests.  This study is 
significant in addressing the South-South relationship of Brazil and Haiti.  Findings in 
this study suggested that both Brazil and Haiti both had received benefits from engaging 
in the SSC framework; however, some Haitian leaders, officials, and scholar-practitioners 
perceived that despite Haiti having received assistance through development projects and 
plans from Brazil, Brazil had more to gain politically and economically from the 
partnership with Haiti.  Brazil may no longer seek the same national interests as it did in 
2004.  Brazil may no longer seek the same national interests around pursuing a 
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permanent UN Security Council seat through the Brazil-Haiti SSC framework.  More 
importantly, a political analysis of the findings led me to reconcile this view with the 
summation by two of the study’s respondents:  (a) Haiti is not a priority, and (b) Brazil’s 
South-South cooperation (at least with Haiti) is dead.  Scholars may use these findings to 
enhance future policies and agreements between the two countries and to clarify the 
feasibility of other SSC frameworks and relationships with similar political and economic 
circumstances. 
 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
Without a renewed commitment from Brazil as an emerging donor from the South 
and isolationist thinking prevalent among major powers,375 Haiti and other LICs will 
need to look to the skills gained through the years as recipients with traditional and now 
emerging donors and perhaps pursue other non-traditional providers.376  With this 
understanding, possible directions for future research from the contributions of the study 
can be made.  First, a study exploring the perspectives of Global South leaders and 
officials representing the countries that provided the highest levels of humanitarian 
assistance after the 2010 earthquake may be explored to gain greater insight into the 
limitations that national interests play in contributing to Haiti and other LICs.  Second, 
researchers could consider a comparative study of development cooperation initiatives 
                                                           
375 New York Times (2017).  “Mr. Trump’s Island Mentality.”  Sunday Review.  March 5, 2017, 
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376 The Middle East has a long history of regional development cooperation and contributors to Haitian 
relief following the 2010 earthquake.  See Smith (2011). 
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that have been undertaken in tandem with other stakeholders known as trilateral 
cooperation with a single recipient country.  Third, the methodology employed in this 
study may be replicated in the understanding of the development strategies of other 
Global South countries engaged in South-South cooperation.  Understanding the benefits, 
challenges, and strategies of other Global South countries engaging in the South-South 
cooperation could contribute to a more in-depth understanding of why Southern country 
choose to engage in South-South cooperation. Fourth, further in-depth analysis of the 
strategic plans of Haiti and Brazil in engaging in South-South cooperation may be 
examined once MINUSTAH has withdrawn peacekeeping operations in Haiti.  A central 
question under study could include whether Brazil will return to its pre-2004 levels of 
cooperation (which was minimal), remain the same, or become more robust.  Lastly, a 
study could encompass the perspectives of Haitian humanitarian agencies and non-
government organizations, the police, representatives from the agricultural sector, and the 
infrastructure development sector, as the mentioned stakeholders appear to be directly 
affected by the assistance from Brazil.   
 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, I sought to examine South-South cooperation as an alternative 
development strategy in an era characterized by reductions in aid from the Global North 
to the Global South.  I accomplished this goal by examining the SSC framework between 
Brazil and Haiti with the expectation that their cooperation would be motivated by 
achieving mutual national interest within their development cooperation framework when 
creating policy and entering agreements.  It was expected that Brazil and Haiti’s self-
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interest as Southern states would explain the nature of their development cooperation; 
however, each country’s political relationship with the North were also an intervening 
factor in their SSC framework.  South-South cooperation has been making a 
breakthrough in the development strategies of Southern countries; however, little is 
known from the SSC framework.377  Brazil and Haiti share some similar political history 
and culture, and as a result may fit their countries’ development strategies within the SSC 
framework better than in the North-South relationship.378 
The findings of this study revealed that both Brazil and Haiti benefitted from 
South-South cooperation.  While Haiti generally received assistance, Brazil increased 
political power and the opportunity for new markets in the partnership.  Yet, the study’s 
participants did not find SSC framework particularly impactful on the development of 
Brazil and Haiti with Brazil gaining more their collaboration than Haiti.  The findings 
were inclusive with regard to how challenging the SSC framework is for Brazil and Haiti.  
Half of the study’s participants found the framework “highly challenging” and the other 
half “low or neutral” in terms of a challenge for Brazil and Haiti.  Strategically, Brazil 
and Haiti aim to gain development from engaging in the SSC framework, whereby Brazil 
aims to gain political power in the South, while Haiti aims to achieve sustainable 
development.  The findings were also inconclusive on the strategic nature of the SSC 
framework.  Half of the study’s participant did not hold that engaging in the SSC 
framework as impactful for Brazil and Haiti.  The other half of the participants were 
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divided between finding the SSC framework as highly strategic or not very strategic 
(low).   
Themes emerging from the findings contribute to an understanding of the 
intervening nature of the international system of governance on the SSC framework for 
both Brazil and Haiti, including the quality of their benefits, the nature of their 
challenges, and the strategies they employ in their development cooperation.  More 
pointedly, shifts in the political and economic conditions in emerging donor country 
should be considered a marker that governs the sustainability of the SSC framework 
despite the alternative nature of South-South cooperation.  Presenting a “South-South 
solution” as an alternative to North-South cooperation does not imply immunity from the 
North, markets or other destabilizing influences.  
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APPENDIX I 
Interview Questions 
Benefits: 
1. What are some of the main benefits of South-South cooperation between Brazil 
and Haiti?   
2. What are the political benefits of South-South cooperation between Brazil and 
Haiti?  
3. How is successful development determined within the Haiti-Brazilian cooperation 
framework? 
4. How significant has Brazilian technical cooperation versus other types of 
cooperation ie. financial assistance been for Haiti? 
5. How sustainable are development cooperation activities and projects between 
Brazil and Haiti? 
6. What are the main incentives driving Brazil-Haiti cooperation given ongoing 
efforts to overcome severe development challenges? 
7. Overall, what are the significant strengths of Brazil-Haiti cooperation for 
Haiti/Brazil? 
 
Challenges: 
1. How does the unique history of Haiti contribute to the challenges for continuing a 
Brazil-Haiti framework of South-South cooperation from the perspective of your 
country? 
2. What are some of the main challenges of South-South cooperation between Brazil 
and Haiti?   
3. What are the political, economic, and social barriers in implementing South-South 
cooperation framework for Brazil and Haiti? 
4. What are the cultural barriers that can impede the success of South-South 
cooperation framework for Brazil and Haiti? 
5. What role does Haiti’s relationship with other LAAC countries, Northern states 
and multilateral institutions challenge Brazil-Haiti cooperation? 
6. It is understood that states in the Global South who engage in South-South 
cooperation do not follow traditional reporting and evaluation mechanisms: How 
challenging is this for the Brazil-Haiti framework? 
7. Overall, what are the significant weakness of Brazil-Haiti cooperation for 
Haiti/Brazil? 
 
Strategic: 
1. What’s the strategic reasoning for the application of South-South cooperation to 
Brazil and Haiti? 
2. Which types of development cooperation activities are the most successful?  What 
are the main lessons and drivers of South-South cooperation between Brazil and 
Haiti? 
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3. In your opinion, what makes South-South cooperation an alternative development 
strategy to Northern assistance for countries of the South?  
4. What is the political strategy behind South-South cooperation between Brazil and 
Haiti? 
5. What is the economic strategy behind South-South cooperation between Brazil 
and Haiti? In what ways does the South-South cooperation framework expand 
competition and choice for recipient countries like Haiti? 
6. What is the social strategy behind South-South cooperation between Brazil and 
Haiti? 
7. How is it in Haiti and Brazil’s best interest to engage in South-South cooperation 
framework?  In what ways is it rational and in their national interest? 
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APPENDIX II 
Survey Questionnaire 
QUESTIONS RESPONSE 
What is your opinion on South-South 
cooperation framework? 
 
  
How does Brazil benefit from 
engaging in South-South cooperation 
framework with Haiti? 
 
 
 
 
 
How does Haiti benefit from 
engaging in South-South cooperation 
framework with Brazil? 
 
 
How challenging is South-South 
cooperation framework for Brazil? 
 
 
 
 
 
How challenging is South-South 
cooperation framework for Haiti? 
 
 
 
 
 
How is engaging in South-South 
cooperation framework strategic for 
Brazil? 
 
 
 
 
 
How is engaging in South-South 
cooperation framework strategic for 
Haiti? 
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